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ABSTRACT
What are the necessary components of protracted social conflict (PSC)? The works of Edward
Azar have laid the theoretical foundation of how PSC is approached in modern scholarship by
identifying four necessary components: effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and
social recognition of identity. However, do these components account for all of the descriptive
and sustaining aspects of PSC? How are these components measured? Furthermore, testing and
verification of these theoretically necessary components has been limited. Of specific interest to
this project, then, is how the theory of PSC is organized and what its theoretically necessary
components truly are. This dissertation reconceptualizes and tests the theoretic components of
PSC using a historical-comparative approach with Boolean and confirmatory factor methods of
analysis. A new theoretical framework is applied to the critical cases of the Arab-Israeli and
Northern Ireland conflicts. The purpose of this research project, therefore, is to present, test, and
justify a theoretical reconceptualization of the necessary components of PSC.
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CHAPTER 1
PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT AS A UNIQUE FORM OF VIOLENCE
INTRODUCTION
When contemplating violent conflict across the span of human interaction, there is
an expectation that eventually, these conflicts will end and that “normal”, peaceful (nonviolent) interaction between actors will ensue. There are, however, violent conflicts that
violate the assumed norm that human interaction is predominately peaceful. As such, the
tragedy of protracted social conflicts (PSCs) can be found in their capacity to amass
tremendous loss of life, the destruction of property, hopes, and dreams of the individuals and
societies that are forced to live in their midst. When prolonged violent conflicts occur,
questions naturally arise inquiring as why certain conflicts end within a short or
“reasonable” period of time and why others are prolonged. Questions are also asked as to
what separates these extended conflicts from other forms of violent conflict. It is these
very questions that this dissertation explores.
What is PSC? What are the components that are necessary for PSC to occur?
What separates it from other types of conflict so that it is enduring in nature? Across
scholarly literature, there is divergence in the conceptualization as to what PSC is. There
are differing definitions, parameters, applications, and characteristics among researchers
making a consistent, accurate, and precise conceptualization of what PSC is difficult to
discern. Thus, my dissertation project revisits and elaborates on the “nature” of PSC. In
1

this dissertation, I present a theoretic conceptualization of PSC that has more conceptual
clarity, is more measurable, and offers a more comprehensive and theoretically based
conceptualization of PSC. Furthermore, I test the proposed theoretic structure to
determine what the necessary components of PSC are.
The seminal work of Dr. Edward Azar (1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985,
1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1988, 1990), has provided a theoretical conceptualization and
foundation from which many PSC scholars have built. While other works have added to
the theoretical foundation established by Azar through descriptive analysis, the further
development of the theoretical foundation and conceptualization of PSC beyond his
original work has been limited (Ramsbotham 2005). Much of the analysis of PSC in
existing literature focuses on the attributes and events of PSC. It is my intention,
therefore, to add to the body of scholarly knowledge by building on the work of Azar
(and his colleagues) to present a more measureable and clearly organized theoretical
conceptualization of PSC.
The foundation that Azar’s theoretical work rests on is his conceptualization that
PSC has four necessary components. These are: effective participation, security, selfidentity, and group-identity (Azar, 1985, 29). Yet, does this conceptualization capture the
nature of PSC? Do Azar’s four necessary conditions accurately conceptualize all the
components and conditions that support continued violent social behavior across time in the
most valid manner given its intractable and multi-faceted traits? It is, therefore, the
intention of this dissertation to answer these questions by engaging in the discourse as to
what PSC is and to enquire as to what manner of conceptualization will provide a greater
utility to scholars and practitioners alike.
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In presenting a reconceptualization of the theoretic framework of PSC, I hope to
add to the body of knowledge by presenting and testing a reconceptualization of the
theoretically necessary components and conditions of PSC. In doing so, the utility of my
research can be found in a fuller understanding of what PSC is and what its necessary
components are. This could be of benefit to the further development of scholarship and
to applied intervention in this prolonged form of violent conflict.
In the collective effort between scholars and practitioners to understand, manage,
and eradicate PSC; an accurate conceptualization of what PSC is and what sustains it, is a
tool that could prove to be invaluable. A natural place to begin the discussion of what
PSC is, then, is to identify PSC as a specific and unique form of violent conflict by
clearly elaborating how it differs from other forms of prolonged conflict.
PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT: A DISTINCT FORM OF LONG-TERM
CONFLICT
Conflicts that endure over long periods of time can have tragic outcomes for the
individuals and societies that must live in them. Hence, it is critical that scholars and
practitioners have an accurate conceptualization. That being said, clarifying what protracted
conflicts, enduring rivalries, and protracted social conflicts are, and what their necessary
components are is the logical point of departure for this dissertation. To this end, this section
establishes the term protracted conflict as a broader classification of conflicts that endure
over time and that this broad group of conflicts has two components: enduring rivalries and
PSCs. Furthermore, this section clarifies the separation between PSC from enduring rivalries
and establishes it as a distinct form of long-term conflict. In doing so, the foundation of the
justification and potential utility of this dissertation project is laid.
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Often in protracted conflict literature, conflicts that have the attributes of PSCs have
been called protracted conflicts (Azar 1983,198; Freidman 1999, 2002; Goertz and Diehl
1992; Schrodt 1983). While technically not inaccurate, using the terms protracted conflict
and protracted social conflict interchangeably can result in a lack of conceptual clarity and
can result in conceptual confusion. Enduring conflicts are seen as protracted conflicts
whose conceptualizations can be synthesized through existing definitions as: conflicts
between two nation states with some degree of regularity over extended periods of time in
which the stakes under contention are perceived by both parties are seen to be high and are
inseparably linked to national, societal, and individual needs where the use of warfare, is
used or considered therein (Azar et. Al. 2000, 272; Colaresi and Thompson, 2002, 264,
Diehl, and Goertz, 2001, 4). As a definition of a class of conflicts, this conceptualization of
protracted conflict is problematic. One problem is the assertion that protracted conflicts are
between nation states. As has been stated in PSC literature (and will be tested in this
project), actors that participate in violence can be non-state actors (Azar, 1985, 31; Azar,
1990, 17; Azar et. al., 2000, 272; Boulding, 1989, 5; Coser, 1956, 49). This nation-state
concept is also reinforced in using the term “warfare” in defining statements. The Merriam
Webster dictionary defines “warfare” as, “an activity undertaken by a political unit (such
as a nation) to weaken or destroy another” (Webster 2011). Hence, it is leaving a
conceptual gap, through overgeneralization, when it states that protracted conflicts occur
between state actors. To this end, this project offers a conceptual definition of the group of
conflicts that endure over time- protracted conflict- as: dyadic conflicts between actors with
some degree of regularity over extended periods of time in which the stakes under

4

contention are perceived by all parties to be inseparably linked to national, societal, and
individual needs where the use of violent conflict is used or considered therein.
With a definition of protracted conflict that is more inclusive of the attributes of
both enduring rivalries and PSCs, attention can now turn to how PSCs differ from
enduring rivalries. Throughout the forthcoming section, attributes that are shared and are
divergent between enduring rivalries and PSC are discussed. By clarifying some of the
similarities and differences as members of the same class of conflict, justification for a
clear separation of enduring rivalries and PSCs is realized.
HOW PSCS AND ENDURING RIVALRIES ARE SIMILAR
Enduring rivalries and PSCs do have similarities that make them easy to confuse.
Enduring rivalries and PSCs are not the same type of protracted conflict, however. Each
possesses unique qualities that substantiate the classification of each as a separate and
distinct form of protracted conflict.
As evidenced by their names, the first attribute that is shared is that both forms of
conflict extend over long periods of time (Azar, 1985, 2000; Diehl and Goertz 2002;
Friedman 1999, Marshall 1999, Maoz and More 2002). Temporal considerations are
among the primary characteristics that separate protracted conflicts, enduring rivalries and
PSCs, from other forms of conflict. However, there are different conceptualization between
PSC and enduring rivalries as to how long a conflict must endure to be considered a PSC or
enduring rivalry. The theoretical minimum for a violent conflict to have endured to be
considered a PSC is opaque (and will be addressed in this project), with no clear beginning
or end-points (Marshall, 1999, 36). However, the minimum time requirements for a conflict
to have existed before it is deemed an enduring rivalry can range from at least ten years to
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twenty-five years (Diehl 2005; Wayman, 1996). Even though an exact theoretic criteria is
not provided in PSC literature, a prolonged, conflictual nature is one feature that is shared
between enduring rivalries and PSCs
Another similarity between both types of conflict is that they have repeated periods
of time where tensions are higher than others. Rather than having conflict over time that is
disjointed or unconnected, these “fluctuations in intensity” (Azar, 1985, 36) in PSCs and
enduring rivalries tend to experience tensions over the same issue or groups of issues over
time. While both share this characteristic, PSC conceptualizations are limited in offering a
minimum criteria whereas enduring rivalry scholars offer a range from two to seven events
as a theoretical minimum (Wayman 1982, Gochman and Maoz 1984).
Another key feature that PSC and enduring rivalries share is that they are both based
in conflictual dyadic relationships. The relational aspect of these types of conflict focuses on
the changes in the nature of the relationships between the actors. When conflicts of interest
occur, the issue(s) of contention can change the nature of the relationship and the nature of
the interaction between the two actors. Rivalry relationships are the same pairs of actors that
are “competing with one another and [have] the expectation of a future conflict relationship
with the same specific opponent” (Diehl and Goertz, 2001, 19). This conceptualization of a
conflictual relationship is approximated in PSC literature (Azar, 1983, 90; Boulding, 1989,
5; Rapoport, 1974, 185) as well: “[C]onflict arises from specific demands within the
relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants” (Coser, 1956, 49). In this, it
is the prolonged conflictual relationship that forms the basis for the concept of protracted
conflicts.
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HOW PSCS DIFFER FROM ENDURING RIVALRIES
Though both forms of conflict have similarities that would seem to justify some
conceptual overlap, the differences between them are substantive enough to justify clear
distinction and classification as different forms of conflict within the classification of
protracted conflict. In the forthcoming section, I identify the traits in which enduring
rivalries and PSC diverge. As such, I provide conceptual clarity from which a new
theoretical conceptualization of PSC can be built.
PSC possesses numerous characteristics that separate it substantively as a form of
conflict from enduring rivalries. The first, and most important, distinction is found within
the shared characteristic of an enduring, conflictual dyadic relationship. The initial
distinction between PSCs and enduring rivalries is found in the actors that make up the
conflictual dyad. The level/unit of analysis of these relationships differs greatly and forms
the basis of the separation of these two forms of conflict. In enduring rivalries, the primary
unit of analysis is the state (Diehl 1994; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Wayman, 1982, 1986).
“Rivalries consist of the same pair of states competing with one another. . .” (Diehl &
Goertz, 2001, 19). In PSC, however, the non-state actor is the primary unit of analysis,
where the “identity group” is the most useful unit of analysis (Azar, 1985, 31). By
highlighting the individual and group levels of analysis, the impact that non-state actors, be
they one or many, can have on the continuation of violent conflict can be more fully
recognized and examined. If analysis remains solely at the nation-state level, this important
factor can confound research and diplomatic efforts. The distinction between enduring
rivalries and PSCs in terms of the primary unit of analysis is pivotal to the conceptual
understanding of each form of conflict.
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In functioning within a Westphalian international system, conducting studies that
focus on prolonged conflict based on the state seems a natural course of action. In utilizing
the state-level of analysis, scholars can more easily quantify inter-state militarized disputes
through battle deaths, military expenditures, state-level economic statistics, diplomatic
efforts, and the like (see, for example, the Correlates of War Project). As such, deriving
meaningful information and implications as to the contributors to prolonged conflicts can be
more readily gleaned through a plethora of existing data sets. It is only natural to go for the
low-hanging fruit. However, in limiting the unit of analysis to the state level, (or applying
findings from state-level enduring rivalry analysis to PSC), the many contributions that nonstate actors can make to the enduring nature of PSC can be over looked or erroneously
minimized. In this, the assumption that there is a strong correlation between governmental
policy (agreement in an enduring rivalry) and domestic support for governmental policy
(agreement in PSC) cannot be taken for granted1. When looking at PSC only from the
perspective of the state-level actor (elite), measures that high politics enact through treaties,
accords, and various forms of agreements can be frustrated by the behavior of non-state
actors (masses). By refusing to end violent behavior, non-state actors can undermine the
whole peace process that has been put into place by elite actors. When the role that non-state
actors can play in prolonging a conflict in PSC is not fully realized, addressed, or is
confused (used interchangeably with enduring rivalry), a vital component as to why a PSC is
so enduring in nature could be missed.
Also, enduring rivalries measure casualties only in terms of battle deaths, because it
is conceptualized as state-based. As casualties from violent conflict in PSCs can amass in
11

In this, it is not being said that PSC does not or cannot have state actors. PSCs have had and do have
states as an actor in the conflictual dyad. Rather, the point is that the non-state actor is included in the
conceptualization and analysis.
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fewer numbers, but in greater frequency over time; the actual cost of PSC in terms of human
lives can be overlooked or underestimated. If the deaths from a conflict do not occur in a
specific militarized battle and/or do not total the required casualty threshold, they are often
not considered in databases such as Correlates of War (COW). Individual incidents of
violence in PSCs can result in comparatively fewer deaths and in different locations over the
same issues of contention. When compared to the state-sponsored militarized disputes of an
enduring rivalry, in any one incident it is less likely that the casualties of a single violent
PSC event will reach the required minimum thresholds of many conflict data sets. Hence,
while the cost of PSCs in terms of human lives can equal or surpass that of an enduring
rivalry, it may not be considered because the casualties occurred across time rather than in
one battle or set of battles closely related in time. Similarly, as state-based militarized battles
require greater amounts of organization, funding, and mobilization, battles can occur at a
lower frequency than the violent incidents that occur in PSCs (where individuals can
commit acts of violence with relatively low economic costs at a higher frequency). The
result is that the actual economic and human costs of a PSC can go unrecognized because it
is treated as an enduring rivalry and not as a unique form of violent conflict.
The final distinction between enduring rivalries and PSCs is the necessity of
violence. Enduring rivalries are not necessarily violent and violence does not have to occur
within the dyad. Enduring rivalries can be based in competition and be non-violent (Diehl &
Goertz, 2001, 19, 23). As in the case of the Cold War between Soviet Russia and United
States, there was a long-term, conflictual relationship yet no direct violent conflict erupted
between the primary actors (Diehl and Goertz, 2001,21-23, 32). Conversely, in the thirteen
PSCs identified by Azar (1985), all cases included direct, violent conflict between the
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primary actors. Though violent conflict can, and has, emerged in enduring rivalries, it is not
a necessary component. Herein rests a substantive separation between enduring rivalries and
PSCs.
In highlighting the relational rather than event aspects of enduring rivalries and
PSCs, a clearer understanding of what drives each conflict type across time can be derived.
While both enduring rivalries and PSCs share aspects such as long-term conflictual dyadic
relationships, it is the nuances of this shared relational aspect where useful and discerning
differences can be identified. As enduring rivalries focus on the nation-state as the primary
unit of analysis, a composite definition of enduring rivalries can be: a prolonged conflictual
relationship the same two nation-states over an extended period of time with fluctuations in
regularity and intensity, over the same issue(s) of contention that are perceived by both
nation-states to be inseparably linked to national, needs where the use of warfare, is used or
considered therein (Diehl & Goertz, 2001, 17-48 ; Maoz & Mor, 1996, 157). However,
PSCs have distinguishing aspects and components that justify their classification as a
distinct form of prolonged conflict. PSC can be defined as: a prolonged conflictual
relationship characterized by the intermittent violent interactions between at least one nonstate actor and another entity over an extended period of time sufficient to have become
fully embedded in to the social fabric of the conflict group(s) wherein issues of contention,
that can remain the same or change over time, are perceived by both actors to be
inseparably linked to national, individual, and/or, societal needs, and are considered to be
non-negotiable (Azar et. al. 1985, 1986; Fisher 2001; Friedman 1999; Ramsbotham 2008).
In the endeavor to conceptualize PSC in a manner that is useful, it is critical to
evaluate it as a separate and distinct form of violent conflict. To this end, it is not only
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useful to establish PSCs as a unique subset of protracted conflict, but also to clearly
ascertain the separation between enduring rivalries and PSCs. The following is a pictorial
representation of the class of conflict, protracted conflict and its two components: enduring
rivalry and PSC: (see figure 1.1)

Protracted
Conflict
Enduring
Rivalry

Protracted
Social Conflict

Figure 1.1: Components of Protracted Conflict
THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT
The enduring nature of PSC makes it a frustrating and enigmatic form of conflict to
practitioners and scholars alike. The work of Edward Azar (et. al.) has, to date,
provided the seminal body of literature relative to the theoretical conceptualization of
PSC. However, does Azar’s presentation of the theoretically necessary conditions of
effective participation, security, self-identity, and group-identity (Azar 1985, 29)
sufficiently capture the essence of PSC? In answer to this question, this dissertation
proposes and tests a theoretical reconceptualization of PSC which builds upon the
foundation laid by Azar and his collaborators while providing a clearer, betterdeveloped, and testable conceptualization of PSC. Thus, using Azar’s conditions as a
starting-point, this dissertation justifies a two-tiered approach to the study of PSC.
11

In laying the groundwork for the presentation of a reconceptualization of PSC, my
approach is a departure from most PSC scholarship. Across the literature, PSC is often
framed from the perspective of events resulting in violent conflict. Rather than taking this
view, my conceptualization of PSC is approached from the perspective that it can be an
aspect of conflictual dyadic relationships. By shifting emphasis to the relational aspects
of the actors rather than the evaluation violent disputes, the issues of conflict and/or
contentions, as opposed to the outcomes of repeated violent conflict, can be emphasized.
In utilizing this approach, it is hoped that the whys of the theoretical aspects of
PSC can be better understood. As introduced by Goertz and Diehl (1992), by looking at
PSC as a conflictual dyad, the underlying issues that sustain violent conflict between the
actors can be highlighted. In doing so, understanding of PSC beyond identifying what it
is to grasping how it is sustained over time can be better understood. The relationshipbased approach provides the underpinning for the second contribution that this project
will make to the existing body of scholarly knowledge. When approached from a dyadic
perspective, it is possible to separate out what the descriptive components of PSC are
from the conditions that actually support and sustain PSCs over time. Hence, the first
theoretical tier of PSC addresses the descriptive components and the second tier contains
the components that sustain PSC.
The first “tier” builds upon Azar’s theoretical category of “effective
participation”. It includes four specific explanatory components. In this tier, the
definitional questions of who participates in PSC, when, and how are clearly identified.
Thus, the necessary components for the first (descriptive) tier of necessary conditions for
PSC are: (1) the participation on non-state actors, (2) a minimum of 20 years of violent
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conflict, (3) a minimum of three violence/peace cycles, and (4) 500 or more deaths
(directly related the conflict issues of the PSC). This presentation of four independently
necessary components more fully elucidates Azar’s classification of “effective
participation” and provides clear, concise, and measurable criteria from which an longterm violent conflict can be evaluated to determine whether it is a PSC. While these
components provide a better explanation of what is and is not a PSC from an
observational point of view, they do not explain the mechanisms that lie beneath the
empirical determinants. They fail to explain why PSCs endure over time. To clarify this, a
second, theoretical tier is warranted.
To explain the underlying, supporting mechanisms of PSC, additional,
theoretically necessary components are introduced. It is at this theoretic level that Azar’s
three remaining necessary conditions are utilized. The term “security” in conflict
literature is often used to address the threat to finite resources such as territory, natural
resources, or life (Azar, 1985, 33; Friedman, 1999, 39; Geller, 2000, 413; Pruitt and Kim,
2004, 21; Vasquez, 2000, 373-5). Yet, is the use of “security” alone sufficient to explain
the competition for tangible as well as non-tangible assets in a long-term conflictual
relationship (Diehl & Goertz, 2001, 23)? Tensions over non-tangible assets such as
social, economic and political power, and revenge are seated firmly in the relational
aspects of PSC yet, they are underutilized at the conceptual level. While mentioned in
PSC literature (Azar, 1983, 89; 1985, 28; 1983, 90), when discussed theoretically, the
role of non-tangible asset competition is minimized as emphasis is placed on competition
for tangible assets (Azar, 1985, 60). Hence, the first sustaining theoretical categorically
necessary component includes conflict over tangible as well as non-tangible assets. This
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is the category of Competition-Based Conflict. By being conceptualized in this manner,
conflict that can arise or is sustained from non-tangible assets can also be considered as
to whether it is a sustaining component of PSC.
Similarly, the second necessary categorical component builds upon Azar’s
necessary components of self and group-identity. The category of Psychological
Motivation includes Azar’s identity components as well as the radial categories of
emotion and perception as potentially necessary supporting components of PSC. While
the contributions of these psychological components are given considerable attention in
the literature, their role in the sustainment or continuation of PSC has been minimized
(Azar, 1983, 90; Boulding, 1989, 5; Deutsch, 91; Deutsch & Schichman, 1986, 224, 230).
As such, the introduction of psychological motivations as a categorically necessary
component provides a substantive departure from existing literature on the theoretic
aspects of PSC. By evaluating the concepts of self- and group-identity along with
emotion and perception (as jointly necessary components) in a broader category of
Psychological Motivation, a fuller examination of the role that psychological motivations
play in the enduring nature of PSC can be conducted.
Reconceptualizing, testing, and justifying the theoretically necessary
components of PSC through the lens of a conflictual dyadic relationship provides a
substantive departure from existing scholarly conceptualizations of PSC. When emphasis
is placed on the relationship between the actors rather than the events, the sustaining
components of PSC, which may be more abstract (such as psychological motivations and
competition for social and political power), can be evaluated more fully as to their
contributing and/or supporting roles in the intractability of PSC.
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To summarize, PSC is a unique form of conflict. As such, when considering a
conceptual structure that best reflects the phenomenon, it must include components that
are measurable, that accurately and comprehensively capture what it is, and why it
endures. In presenting my reconceptualization of the theoretical structure of PSC, the
descriptive attributes as well as the sustaining mechanisms are considered. To do
otherwise, an incomplete conceptualization could be offered. This could result in the
frustration of efforts in PSC management and/or hopes of its resolution.
RELEVANCE OF EXPLORING PSC THEORY
When presented as an enduring violent conflict, correctly identifying what it is
and what its supporting aspects are is critical. Failure to do so could result in continued
tragedies for the societies in which PSC occurs as well as touch lives and societies that
are not directly involved in the conflict. Hence, my research is relevant for several
reasons.
One reason why re-evaluating the theoretical components in PSC is of importance
is because of the changing nature of international conflict. Since the end of the Cold War,
the nature of warfare has become increasingly “internalized” and has moved
progressively into areas that are populated by non-combatants or citizens. “Wars are no
longer confined to definitive battlefields, but occur more often in populated areas. . .”
(Bald, 2002, 2). Recent trends in violent conflict indicate that sixty to ninety percent of
the conflict-related casualties are civilian (Bald, 2002, 2, Iqbal, 2006, 631; Ghobarah,
Huth, & Russett, 2003, 199). Similarly, as violence becomes increasingly internalized,
many have become targets because of their ethnic and/or communal identities.
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In his work on children and human rights abuses, Machal found that:
In 1995, 30 major armed conflicts raged in different locations around
the world. All of them took place within states, between factions split
along ethnic, religious or cultural lines (Machal, 2002, 5).
Rather than being accidental casualties of a violent conflict, civilians are increasingly
becoming targets because of their ethnic identities. As such, the recent trends in violent
conflict are of particular importance to understanding the conceptually necessary
components of PSC. Because PSC, by its nature, is violence at the social/local level, if
the current trends in violent conflict continue (that is, being increasingly fought in
populated areas), they run the risks of becoming PSCs. Thus, any hope in preventing
PSCs lies in being able to correctly identify the components that describe and sustain
them and applying appropriate intervention before the conflict sews itself into the social
conscience.
There are other reasons why correctly conceptualizing the theoretical components
of PSC is important, though. As current trends of violent conflict are increasingly along
ethnic lines, long-lived violent conflict that has become part of the social fabric of the
actors can have local, regional, state-level, and international ramifications. Ethnic/social
conflicts are not bound by political borders. A political boundary does not necessarily
equate to the boundary of an ethnic group, especially in today’s increasingly mobile
world. For example, in the Arab/Israeli conflict, murders and assassinations of actors
associated with the conflict have taken place outside of the Palestinian region. On July
21, 1973, Mossad allegedly attempted to assassinate Hassan Salameh, a leader of Black
September in retaliation for the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre (Time 1979).
The assassination attempt was made in Lillehammer, Norway. Similarly, On August 21,
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1983, Mossad shot and killed senior PLO official, Mamoun Meraish as he was riding in
his car in Athens, Greece (Israeli News 2008). Also, even within the United States’
political environment, there are pro-Palestinian and Israeli organizations that lobby
Congress to gain support for their position2. Thus, while violent conflict may be
contained within a specific geographical region at a certain point in time, given the
technological, mobility, and political realities of the current international environment
there is risk of spill-over. Spill-over can threaten the security peoples and nations
through the spread of violence. It can also threaten the stability of political structures and
organizations as well as have a negative impact on human and economic development
through human displacement and/or damage to infrastructure. Any one of these risks can
occur from the local to international level.
Thus, presenting and testing PSC theory so that it more accurately reflects the
actual phenomenon is no mere a trivial academic pursuit. The real-life costs of PSC have
life and death, societal, political, and economic ramifications. Global conditions and our
understanding of violent conflict in the world have changed since Azar’s foundational
works. It is, thus, useful to re-examine our theoretical understanding PSC and to fill any
theoretical gaps that are identified in the currently accepted conceptualizations so that
they reflect global changes, technological, and methodological advances in our scholarly
development. Thus, the utility of this dissertation project can be found in providing a fuller,
clearer, and more testable conceptualization of PSC.

2

As an example, two of such groups are the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the
American Association for Palestinian Equal Rights (AAPER) (Fazekas 2010)
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DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
The goal of this dissertation project is to introduce, test, and ultimately justify the
theoretical reconceptualization of the theory of PSC. To this end, in addition to
identifying the goals of this dissertation, the first chapter clarifies PSC as a sub-category
of the conflict classification of protracted conflict. In doing so, the validity of studying
PSC as a separate and distinct form of protracted conflict is established. Next, the
proposed theory of PSC is introduced. Finally, the utility and scholarly justification for
this project is elaborated.
The second chapter of the dissertation includes the literature review. This chapter
begins with a discussion of the question of rationality in PSC. Based Rapoport’s
conceptualization of conflict as a fight, a game, or a debate, the first part of the chapter
engages the debate as to whether the rational actor model can be automatically assumed
in PSC. The remainder of the second chapter discusses in detail the inclusion of each of
the proposed necessary components. The literature review uses existing PSC,
psychological, and conflict literature. In the existing literature, many of the components
that I propose as necessary components of PSC are discussed at length. However, they
are not discusses as necessary components. Thus, using existing literature, I build a case
that supports their inclusion in PSC theoretical conceptualizations as necessary
components.
The third chapter presents the theoretical framework that my dissertation builds
upon. It is in chapter three that the primary research questions and hypotheses of the
project are presented. Again, this dissertation builds off the work of the late Edward
Azar. While my theoretical proposition puts forth a modification of Azar’s original
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theory, it is my hope that my research endeavors are complimentary to a pioneer whose
work laid the foundation for current PSC scholarship and that my theoretical presentation
is complementary to his original theory. My efforts are not meant to displace or disprove
Azar’s writings. Rather, it is my hope that my findings will add to the excellent
foundation that he laid by presenting a conceptual model of PSC that is solidly founded
in Azar’s theoretical structure, but presented in a more measurable and comprehensive
manner.
Chapter four is the methods chapter where I discuss how I plan to conduct my
research. I discuss the “critical” cases that will be investigated. I also discuss how I plan
to collect data, how the data will be organized, and how it will be analyzed.
Chapters five and six present the two cases studies: Israeli-Palestinian and
Northern Ireland. In these chapters, I discuss the roots and development of each case
from a historical, narrative perspective using the statements of the actors. In using quotes,
it is the actual actors in the conflict that are telling the “story” of their conflict. Finally,
the last section of each chapter I analyze my findings in each case. In this part of each
chapter, I assess what the necessary components of PSC are, according to each case.
Chapter seven is the analysis chapter where I compare the findings of the two
critical PSC cases. I assess each of the proposed components to determine whether or not
they are necessary components of PSC. Finally, determination is made as to whether the
proposed theoretic reconceptualization is supported by the study’s findings.
The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the final findings of this project.
The conclusion reveals whether the theory that is proposed by this project is supported by
the findings.
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The weaknesses and challenges of this project are also addressed. Lastly, the implications
for further study based on this dissertation’s findings are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
When reading existing literature on the subject of PSC, differences in
conceptualizations and nuances of definitions are readily apparent. Scholars often use
general or differing parameters, place different emphases on components, or place
concepts in differing places in theory. This creates a conceptual quagmire as to what PSC
is and what it is not. A more glaring challenge to the establishment of “normalized”
theoretical parameters of PSC, however, is that most PSC literature is descriptive in
nature. The problem of having primarily explanatory components when explaining
violent conflict is also noted by Stephen Brush when he noted that “[m]ost publications
focus on describing a particular event or the experience of a particular country rather than
explaining the phenomena in general terms” (Brush, 1996, 537). The descriptive nature
of PSC scholarship coupled with differences in theoretical applications can result in
ambiguity concerning what PSC is, how it differs from other forms of (prolonged)
conflict, and it can yield findings that lack meaningful utility when applied to real-life
PSCs3. This raises the question, then: can the necessary components of PSC be gleaned
from existing PSC and germane literature so that a robust and parsimonious
conceptualization of PSC can be formulated and tested? To this end, the ensuing

3

In today’s environment, where the benefit of Political Science research is called into question by Congress
, having an accurate conceptualization of PSC so that is it applicable and useful to applied practitioners of
Political Science is of particular merit.
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literature review utilizes existing scholarly knowledge to build a theoretical
reconceptualization that explains the phenomenon of PSC in a more inclusive and
comprehensive manner.
When any discussion relevant to the theoretical approach of PSC is engaged, it is
beneficial to begin with the seminal work of Edward Azar. In 1985, Azar identified four
theoretically necessary components in his conceptualization of PSC. These components
are: effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and social recognition of identity
(Azar, 1985, 29). These components are the foundation from which this literature review
is built. As such, this literature review is presented as an exploration of existing PSC
literature to determine the descriptive aspects of PSC: (1) the actors that participate in
PSC, (2) how the actors participate, (3) time considerations within and across PSCs; and
(4) the sustaining mechanism of PSCs: (4.1) asset competition between the actors, (4.2)
the psychological motivations of the actors. Thus, the presentation of my literature review
in this manner, while still embracing the original intent of Azar (and his collaborators),
lays the foundation for the theoretical model of PSC that I proposes and test in this
dissertation.
Hence, this literature review will be divided into four sections. In the first
section, I discuss the challenges that PSC poses to international relations theories and
provide a theoretical introduction as to why the theoretical approach to PSC needs to be
reexamined, as well as why psychological motivations need to be explored in more depth.
In the second section, titled “Effective Participation”, I discuss: (1) who participates in
PSCs; (2) time considerations- including how long conflicts must endure to be considered
PSCs, how long there must be no violence for it to be considered “ended”; (3) the
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intensity of violence in PSC (how often); and (4) cycles of violence. The third section,
“Security”, discusses asset-based competition as an enduring struggle for control over
tangible and non-tangible assets. The final section, “Psychological Motivation”; which
includes Azar’s self- and group-identity components, discusses the role of cognition in
conflict (in general) as well the sustaining, motivational forces that emotion, perception,
self-identity, and group-identity can be in sustaining PSCs.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THOERY OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT
A hallmark of PSC is that the conflict lingers over a long period of time. This
presents two specific challenges to international relations theorists. The first problem is
that peace is assumed to be the prevailing norm in international relations.
Most international relations theory assumes that the international system
and the nations within it are characterized by peace, with violent conflict
an anomaly. In PSCs, however, conflict becomes the norm, with peace the
exception (Schrodt, 1983, 101).
Because PSCs do not follow the “normal” conceptualization of the nature of
relationships- that being that continual or prolonged violent conflict is the exception
rather than the “rule” in the normal give and take of the relationships between states and
international actors, traditionally useful methods of conflict mediation and resolution are
frustrated as violent conflicts continue to erupt between actors.
The second challenge builds upon the first. This is the failure to resolve the
mechanism that is sustaining the conflict. A measure of conflict is considered to be part
of the “normal” relations between humans (Pruitt & Kim 2004, 9). However, when
conflict occurs between actors, it is also expected that it will be resolved within a
“reasonable” amount of time. PSC violates this norm. In “normal” conflict (if conflict
escalates to the point that political violence occurs), resolution and/or the cessation of
23

violence can occur when there is a clear “winner” and a clear “loser” in the conflict, or
when the cost of continuing the conflict is greater than the cost compromising or
mediation (Pruitt & Kim 2004). When actors lack the capacity to dominate or control the
outcome of the conflict or the cost of compromise is higher to the actors than the cost of
continuing in the conflict (as in cosmic conflicts), however, violence can continue. “The
fact that protracted conflict continues over a long period of time would imply that a
certain mechanism is maintaining it” (Schrodt, 1983, 101). Hence, another aspect of PSC
that is problematic to traditional international relations theories and approaches as it
applies to violent conflict is the failure to resolve the issue(s) driving or sustaining the
conflict. As such, clearly identifying the mechanism or mechanisms that are maintaining
the violent conflict in PSCs- those that are obvious and those that are more opaque and
are more difficult to measure and/or ascertain-- is the foundation in developing an
accurate theoretical conceptualization of PSC.
In attempting to identify the elements that maintain conflict over longer periods of
time, it is useful to identify the conflict type. Kenneth Boulding defines conflict as, “a
situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of the
potential future positions in which each party wishes to occupy” (Boulding, 1962, 5). In
situations of conflict, it is perceived that mutual, conflictual aspirations cannot be
obtained simultaneously. Thus, recognizing the issues of contention between the actors
can be a starting point in identifying the most fundamental ways in which specific types
international conflict can occur.
Yet, in ascertaining what the specific issues of contention between the actors,
what they are competing and conflicting over, there is an assumption that the actors are
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acting in a logical and/or rational manner in their approach to the conflict. This
assumption takes for granted that if the actors are in conflict for the control of a natural
resource or land, that the actors will act in a predictable manner to achieve their goal and
once the contention over the specific source of conflict has been resolved, the conflict
will end. Can conflict, and specifically PSC, however, always be considered a strategic,
value-maximizing endeavor where actors base their behavior on territorial or economic
motives? If this were true, then there would be limited utility in the examination of
psychological factors in the study of PSC. If examples of psychological motivations are
found to be present in PSC, independent of extrinsic stimuli, however, then justification
for studying psychology’s role, from a theoretical stand point, can be supported. In
reference to the role of psychological factors in human decision-making, Marcus cites 44
different studies that support the premise that logic and emotion have an antagonistic
relationship in decision-making (Marcus, 2003, 184-7), which prompts him to state: “We
can discard the normative and empirical combinations that seek to preclude emotion from
the human experience, for humans cannot function without their emotional capacities”
(Marcus, 2003, 187). Thus, when examining how or why humans engage in violent
conflict, the exploration cannot be complete or comprehensive if psychological
motivations are not taken into consideration.
Conflict can be classified in several ways. One way it is classified is
dichotomously, realistic and unrealistic. In realistic conflict, “conflict arises from specific
demands within the relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants” (Coser,
1956, 49). Realistic conflict is characterized by rational, calculated actions that are taken
to achieve specific desired results. Rational theories typically view conflict as a result of
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competition for control of physical assets such as resource competition or territorial
disputes. Realistic conflict theory “assumes that conflict can always be explained by
some tangible (like territory, money, prizes) or intangible (like power, prestige, honor)
resource that is desired by both groups and is in short supply” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 2829). This type of conflict can be likened to Anatol Rapoport’s games and debates where
the focus of the conflict is on the goal of winning the contest through using superior logic
or strategy. “In a game, the potentialities and eventualities of alternative outcomes must
be taken into account”. A game “is idealized as a struggle in which complete “rationality”
of the opponent is assumed” (Rapoport, 1960, 10). In a rational conflict, rational, goaldriven behavior is used where the focus is on achieving a desired goal.
In unrealistic conflict, however, emphasis is placed on the interaction between
opponents rather than the actual issue of the conflict itself. The attention of the actor(s) is
placed upon the need for the release of tension resulting from an issue of contention. In
this case, the focus of anger or tension can displace the original issue of the conflict as a
result of the lack of a suitable resolution. Because the object of frustration is placed on
actors instead of the issue of conflict, functional alternatives replace objective options.
Rapoport’s concept of a fight is useful to illustrate this point.
A fight . . . involves no calculations, [and] no strategic considerations.
Each adversary simply reacts to others and to his own actions. . . Even the
one discernible goal-to harm the opponent- is sometimes absent. Such is
the much-quoted and much misunderstood “struggle for existence” in the
universe of competing species (Rapoport, 1960, 10).
As such, the utility of logic and rationality to predict behavior can be undermined by
human desires and impulses. “Emotion has been conceived as separate from reason and
forceful not only with respect to the misuse of reason but also because it is able to wrest
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control of behavior away from reason” (Marcus, 2003, 184) (italics used for emphasis). 4
The use of rationality- calculation and analysis- to achieve a specific goal by besting or
out-witting an opponent in a realistic conflict, as opposed the desire to harm the opponent
being the goal in unrealistic conflict, are primary differences in conflict and how conflict
can be approached.
Coser’s and Rapoports’ concepts of realistic conflicts being like games and
debates, and unrealistic conflicts being like fights, can be applied to international conflict.
The separation of PSC from “rational” conflicts, such as enduring rivalries, is a
commonly agreed-upon distinguishing feature of PSC by scholars (Freidman, 1999, 4041). This position would seem to be supported by Azar as he identifies the nature of PSC
through the following statements:
Protracted social conflict entails a vicious cycles of fear and hostile
interactions among the communal contestants. With the continued stress of
such conflict, attitudes, cognitive processes and perceptions become set
and ossified. War culture and cynicism dominate. Meaningful
communication between or among conflicting parties dries up, and the
ability to satisfy communal acceptance needs is severely diminished
(Azar, 1990, 17).5
It is not the abstract “issue” that guides the conflicts in their development
but rather the identification of the participants with the contending social
groups. The immediate criterion of identification may be several stages
removed from the original issue (Azar et. al., 1978, 51).
Thus, key to the concept of PSC, and its potentially unrealistic nature, is that over time
the original issues of contention can be lost to the actors as games or debates spiral

4

The inclusion of a non-rational component is not a rejection of the rational-actor model or indicative of
the belief that behavior cannot be strategic in the presence of emotion or other psychological factors. It is
merely the recognition that rationality cannot be automatically assumed in the study of this unique form of
conflict.
5
As with many quotations throughout the literature review; aspects of these quotations can be applied in
several sections. While dissecting the quotations and parsing them out to the “appropriate” section, could
be useful, leaving quotations in the contextual entirety is also useful as it speaks to the complexity of this
exercise of distinguishing the many potential causal components of PSC.
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negatively where actors are no longer satisfied in “winning” with superior logic or
strategy; interest now lies in “hurting” through the fight.
Though controversial and challenging to substantiate, identifying PSC as a
potentially unrealistic conflict could provide some understanding as to why conflicts of
this nature have such enduring qualities- they are not necessarily based on a rational
model of behavior or a rational model of expected utility. Rather, PSCs, regardless of
how they started could be unreasonable conflicts that contain, or have come to contain,
“malicious motivations” (Azar, 1983, 91). If this is so, understanding why PSCs frustrate
“traditional” models of international relations theories and conflict intervention
techniques that concentrate on conflict management and mediation through the sole lens
of the rational actor, is not as difficult to understand- because PSC actors may operate, in
part or entirety, from an unrealistic rather than realistic perspective.
EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION
In conceptualizing PSC as an enduring, negative, dichotomous relationship,
clearly identifying who the actors are and how they interact is critical to building a useful
theoretical framework. Building on Azar’s primary category of “effective participation”
(Azar, 1985, 29) in this section I use existing scholarly literature to identify who the
actors are in PSC, how long a conflict must endure to be considered a PSC, how long
violent conflict must be absent for a PSC to be considered ended, and the nature or cycles
of the violent interaction between the actors. As such, this portion of the literature review
utilizes the existing theoretic frame to lay the foundation for a more comprehensive
examination of exactly what “Effective Participation” means by clarifying who the actors
in PSCs are and how they engage in violent conflict.
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Who Participates
Determining who the participants are in a PSC is critical to the theoretical understanding
and conceptualization of PSC as a unique form of conflict. In fact, identifying the actors
is a defining characteristic that separates PSC from other forms of conflict. Because of
this, Azar considers the actors to be the most useful unit of analysis.
The most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations is
the identity group- racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others. It is more
powerful as a unit of analysis than the nation-state, the reason is that
‘power’ finally rests with the identity group (Azar, 1985, 31).

Foundational to the concept of PSC, then, is that the units of analysis are not necessarily
elite actors who function as emissaries of the state (state or elite actors). Actors in PSCs
include individuals who are non-elite, non-state actors (masses).
. . . the conflicts involve whole societies and acts as agents for defining the
scope of international identity and social solidarity. . . . Hatred is visible . .
. and massacres [are] carried out by the populations themselves (Azar et al,
1978, 50).
This theoretical separation of PSC from other forms of violent conflict by including the
non-state actor does not preclude the state as an actor, however. What the inclusion of
non-state actors does, however, is introduce new levels of analysis that separate the study
of PSC from solely state-based conflict analysis, as in the analysis of enduring rivalries
that only considers the state as an actor. Another level of analysis that is included in the
study of PSC is group membership, where the actors are participating in violence on
behalf of a group that they have an identity, affiliation, or sympathize with.
These conflicts are often protracted in nature; they are perceived by the
antagonists as conflicts about the continued existence of the group, the
nation, or the state; they have been marked, time and again, by violence
against civilians . . . . (Kelman, 2000, 273).

29

Thus, the inclusion of the masses (individuals and groups) with the elite or state entity,
allows the introduction of a key independent component in the attempt to identify why
PSC is so tenacious in nature. This is that the actors in PSC can be inclusive of several
levels of analysis; the individual, the group, and the state.
Considerations of Time
It is explicit in the term “protracted social conflict” that the prolonged nature of a
conflict is a primary attribute. The tendency of scholarly literature when describing PSC
is to describe the conditions that create prolonged conflict rather than identify the length
of time that a conflict must endure before being considered a PSC or establish time
parameters within PSC (Azar, 1985, 28; Friedman, 1999, 52; Kelman, 2000, 273).
Monty Marshall best sums the common consensus among theorists concerning the timeframe of PSC: “These hostile interactions involve sporadic episodes of warfare that have
no clear beginning or end; when they periodically erupt into warfare, it is fought without
rules or standards of conduct” (Marshall, 1999, 36). Therefore, a clear theoretical
parameter of a minimum lapse of time that is required for a conflict to be considered a
PSC is not explicit in current PSC literature. Similarly, because of its unique attributes,
Azar offers the following warning about the attempt to clearly identify time parameters in
PSC:
Because conflicts fluctuate in intensity over time, we tend to make
assertions about starting and end points which may be of limited utility for
an understanding of the inertia embedded in some conflict situations.
(Azar, 1985, 36).
While this warning is merited and there is a danger in using too narrow a scope
concerning time constraints in PSC research, there can be utility in establishing
theoretical time parameters. In identifying enduring rivalries, Diehl and Goertz (2000)
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categorize two stages of conflict “development” before a conflict is categorized as an
enduring rivalry. These are isolated conflicts that have 1-2 disputes (over the same issue)
in less than 10 years, proto-rivalries that have 3-5 disputes in 10-20 years, and when a
conflict has had 6 or more conflicts over the course of 20 years or more, it is considered
an “full” enduring rivalry. Currently, PSC theory has no similar organizational structure.
It is categorized dichotomously. Either a conflict is a PSC or it is not. Utility in using this
sort of pre-PSC stratification can be found in conflict mediation or other types of conflict
intervention. For example, if there is a conflict that has many of the characteristics of a
PSC, but has been only been a “violent conflict” for 10 years, it would not be classified
as a PSC. Using a concrete measure of time to determine that a social conflict has
endured long enough to run the risk of becoming a PSC can spur action that could
prevent the conflict from seeding itself into the social fabric of the actors6 and becoming
a “full” PSC. Thus, deriving more concrete theoretical time parameters could have reallife implications in the evaluation, intervention, mediation, prevention, and/or resolution
of PSCs.
How Long
The sporadic nature of violent conflict in PSC makes clearly delineating time
parameters challenging. However, the question must be asked: How long must a string of
“sporadic episodes” occur between the same actors over the same or similar issues of
contention for it to be considered a PSC? Central to conceptualizing how long a conflict
must endure before it is considered a PSC lies in capturing these “sporadic episodes” as
part of a single, continual conflict (Schrodt, 1983, 103). The tendency for scholars to

6

To be more fully explained later in the identity section.

31

treat conflictual events as discrete episodes, in order to more easily measure and quantify
conflict, can lead researchers to miss larger, more far-reaching trends (and the underlying
sustaining mechanisms) of violent conflict that are (or are leading to) PSC. Lacking
clearly delineated theoretical time minimums in existing PSC literature, it is necessary to
look outside of PSC literature to answer the question of what is a reasonable amount of
time for a series of related violent events to occur to be considered a PSC.
As PSC is conceptualized as an enduring conflicting social relationship, it is
reasonable to reference literature that focuses on the enduring nature of conflict as well as
on its social aspects. The time parameters for enduring rivalries (ER), a form of
prolonged conflict that shares several attributes with PSC, is referenced to ascertain
conflict duration parameters of ERs . Various scholars have used a range of 15 to 25
years as ER theoretical minimums (Diehl & Goertz 2004). Diehl & Goertz have used a
minimum duration for a conflict to endure to be an ER as 20 years (Diehl & Goertz,
2004, 44). Therefore, identifying a range of 15 to 25-years for a conflict to endure to be
considered a PSC could be justified using ER literature and is an adequate point of
departure when ascertaining time parameters for PSCs.
The second aspect of considering the potential minimum time duration for a
conflict to be considered a PSC is the social component of PSC. As non-state actors are a
hallmark of PSC, the question of how long a conflict needs to continue before it seeds
itself into the fabric of society is useful to consider. Prolonged exposure to violence can
impact a society through emotional health, identity, and generational chosen trauma7
(Aronson 1999, Gass & Seiter 2003, Pruitt & Kim 2004). “Chosen traumas can keep

7

“Chosen trauma” is the shared, intergenerational mental representation of an event that becomes an
identity marker for a large group (Volkan 2004)
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hostility alive across many generations to come” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 13). Similarly, in
Toynbee’s War Weariness theory, wars occur in 100-year cycles, wherein people who
have fought in wars are hesitant to submit their children to the same horrors that they
have experienced. As subsequent generations mature, the children of the generation that
engaged in violent conflict have children that have never experienced war. Hence, “they
are much more inclined than their elders to test the waters of combat” (Cashman, 2000,
152) because they lack the personal experience and knowledge of how terrible violent
conflict can be. A key difference, however, is that wars are not always fought in PSCs
and violent conflict is often expressed through sporadic, cyclical episodes of violence.
Thus, the same level of intensity of conflict that is experienced in war may not be
experienced by an elder generation. This difference could be a mitigating factor, reducing
the aversion to violent conflict in the elder generation that Tonybee’s theory suggests. As
a result, aversion to violent conflict may not vary as greatly across generations in PSC,
making it more socially acceptable to continue the lower-intensity violence of previous
generations.
. . . given that the protracted conflict is central for significant others, later
generations of individuals will be socialized by significant others for
whom the external conflict is highly salient (Friedman, 1999, 52).
In these examples, the concept of the generation is used by scholars to measure societal
forces across time as it is related to violent conflict. Thus, when considering a theoretical
minimum duration of time for PSC, it is reasonable to consider two measure of time: (1)
the actual time that a violent conflict has endured; (2) the time that it takes for a conflict
to seed itself into a society by using the concept of generation (Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003,
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711). In doing so, the participation of the non-state actor- the social aspect, is included in
the time consideration of protracted social conflict.
Another time consideration of how long PSCs endure is the question of
determining when a PSC has ended. As with the problem of when a violent conflict is
considered to be a PSC, the literature is also limited as to when a PSC can be considered
ended. In combination, the sporadic and enduring nature of PSCs coupled with the
common lack of overt military mobilization and formal treaties, plus the participation of
the masses, can indeed make the determination of when a PSC has ended opaque. Given
the lapse of time between the violent spikes of conflict, what is a reasonable amount of
time to have passed for it to not be considered a “normal” lapse in the cyclical nature of
PSCs but an actual end or resolution of the conflict itself?
While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a
cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no
distinguishable point of termination (Schrodt, 1983, 101).
These conflicts are not terminated by explicit decisions, although cessation
of overt violence may defuse tensions somewhat. They tend to linger on in
time and gradually cool down, become transformed, or wither away (Azar,
1983, 89).
With the understandable hesitance and ambiguity in existing literature as to clear,
testable termination parameters, what, then, is a reasonable length of time for no
violent conflict have to occurred for a PSC to be considered terminated? Again, it is
useful to reference literature on of enduring rivalries. Wayman, Diehl, and Jones each
determine that ten years without a “dispute over [the] same unresolved issue” is a
sufficient lapse of time for an enduring rivalry to be considered concluded (Goertz
and Diehl, 1993, 162). However, given the presence of non-state actors and how PSC
can seed itself into the identification of the actors, how long does it take for the
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actors, themselves, to lose or shed the conflict identity8 and embrace in non-violent
behavior? As mentioned above, the concept of a generation has been used by scholars
to measure societal forces in conflict over time (Cashman, 2000, 152). If it is
reasonable to ascertain that a protracted conflict has threaded itself into the fabric of a
society after a generation of violence through “chosen traumas” over the same
conflict, then is it not also reasonable to determine that a PSC has terminated if a
generation has passed with no cycles of violence?
Though not explicit in the literature on PSC, the concept of the generation has been
utilized by scholars to measure changes in societies. Thus, it is reasonable to measure
the beginning and ending of protracted conflict not only by using time parameters, but
also through the concept of the generation.
How Often
As noted in the above section, another attribute of PSC is that it is not fought like a
war in that violence does not occur within a single window of time9. Rather, the
literature points to periods of non-violence and outbreaks of violence, or, cycles of
violence.
Protracted social conflict entails a vicious cycle of fear and hostile
interactions among the communal contestants (Azar, 1990, 17).
[Protracted conflicts are] hostile interactions which extend over long
periods of time. . .[T]hey linger on in time. . .[and] are not specific events
or even clusters of events at a point in time; they are processes (Azar et.
al., 2000, 272).

As in the previous quotations, when the cyclical nature of violence is discussed,
description rather than clear and measurable parameters are given (Azar et al, 1978.
8
9

Conflict identity will be developed further in the identity section.
Although, as in the Palestinian/Israeli PSC, “official” wars have been fought.
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50; Azar, 1983, 89; Azar, 1985, 29). Hence, for a conflict levels to meet the minimum
theoretical criteria of PSC, how many cycles of violence and peace are necessary and
what is the necessary minimum time lag between violence spikes? As the literature
describes these cycles, but does not specify the number of violence/peace cycles and
frequencies that are necessary, what is a minimum standard from which a theoretical
framework can be built and justified? The Nedler-Mead mathematical model for
minimums suggests that at least three points are necessary to begin to identify a
pattern. In this, at least three points are needed to “find the minimum of a function of
n variables” (Matthews and Fink, 2003). Thus, to establish a theoretical minimum for
a pattern of violence/peace cycles in protracted conflict, three complete cycles are a
reasonable minimum. To establish a more robust theoretical minimum, however, the
Cox and Steward (T60) sine test for trend model states that six data points are
necessary to establish a trend (Randall, 1998, 71 & 146). Thus, to establish a lower
theoretical threshold, a minimum of three cycles of violence can be supported using
scholarship outside of PSC scholarship, but using a minimum of six cycles is a
stronger criteria as it establishes a trend rather than a pattern.
Another consideration of the cycles of violence is the time that separates one violent
cycle from another. In considering the necessary amount of time between violent spikes,
PSC literature is more descriptive in nature and does not clearly delineate minimum
criterion for lapses in violence to be considered separate cycles. Thus, what is a
reasonable minimum amount of time that must elapse between violent spikes so that they
are not considered as the same violence episode? The mathematical models of the
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Nedler-Mead minimum for a pattern or the Cox and Steward minimum for a trend can
serve as threshold guides.
Summary of Effective Participation
Azar’s category of PSC of effective participation includes four separate
aspects of PSC: who participates in PSC, how they participate, how long violent conflict
must endure to be considered a PSC, and cycles of violence. When exploring who that
actors in PSC are, literature reveals that the participation of non-state actors (individuals
and groups), while not precluding the state actor, are a fundamental attribute of PSC.
Similarly, when considering how long a violent conflict must endure to be considered a
PSC, PSC scholarship notes that PSCs endure over long periods of time; but is hesitant to
deliver measurable criteria to use to determine what conflicts have endured long enough
to be considered PSCs and when violence has been absent long enough for the PSC to be
considered ended. What PSC literature does communicate in terms of the enduring nature
of PSC, however, is that violent behavior can be passed on from one generation to
another which addresses the social component of PSC. Also, when seeking a minimum
duration of time that a violent conflict can exist to be considered a PSC, literature on
enduring rivalries, a similar form of prolonged conflict, is consulted. Using enduring
rivalry scholarship, the use of a minimum duration spanning from 15 to 25 years can be
supported. When addressing how violent acts are committed in PSC, the literature
reveals that the actors of PSC engage in peace/violence cycles with lapses of time
between each cycle. PSC scholarship is limited on a criterion that clearly delineates how
many peace/violence cycles or how long the lapses between the cycles are necessary to
meet a theoretically minimum threshold, however. When literature outside of PSC is
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consulted, support can be found for using three and/or six data points to establish
theoretical minimums using mathematical theories.
SECURITY/ COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT
In identifying the necessary components of PSC, Azar identified the need for
security as one of the four components that must be present for a long-term conflict to be
classified as a PSC (Azar, 1985, 29). While territorial issues are an oft-mentioned aspect
of the security issues that arise in PSC (Azar 1985; Friedman 1999), existing literature
also references other aspects of security that actors can be in conflict over. As such,
actors compete with each other to gain control over limited resources or assets (tangible
and intangible) so that they can gain or preserve security. With the achievement or
preservation of security as the end goal, what, then, does existing literature reveal that the
actors in PSCs enter into violent conflict over? In answer to this question, the following
section examines the actors’ need for security through competition for finite resources
that can be tangible or intangible in nature.
Competition for control or power over limited resources can take many forms in
contributing to PSC. It is often the point of conflict in which reasonable conflicts begin and
can be the first phase in the development of a PSC10. Conflict often arises as a result of
competition over basic “[h]uman needs and long-standing cultural values . . . [that] will not
be traded, exchanged, or bargained over. They are not subject to negotiation” (Azar, 1985,
61). These basic needs can include, but are not limited to food, shelter, physical safety and
well-being, access/control over resources, territory, identity, autonomy, self-esteem, and a

10

It is important to note, however, that while there may be an overlap of psychological elements in
competition-based conflict, it is the conflict over control of an asset and not the legitimacy of the actors
themselves that is the unit of analysis in this section.
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sense of justice, (Kelman & Fisher, 2003, 316; Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 15). Thus,
competition for basic needs can be expressed in two categories that are consistent with
scholarly work - competition for control of tangible assets, such as territory, economic
resources, and natural resources; and competition for control of non-tangible assets such as
societal, cultural, and political power (Keohane & Nye, 2001, 273; Diehl & Goertz, 2001,
23).
When framing competition for scarce tangible and/or non-tangible assets in a
conflictual dyadic relationship, it is useful to consider the role spatial proximity of the
actors to the probability of violent conflict. Starr (2005) found that the probability for
violent conflict increases proportionally to the spatial proximity of the actors. The role
geographic attributes, resources, territorial lines, and spatial contiguity have been found
to be positively related to the willingness of actors to engage in violent conflict (Hagan
1994, Hensel 2000, Huth 2000, Starr 1994). As actors compete for the same finite
resources and/or assets while living in close proximity, or are spatially intermingled; the
probability for conflict increases. When actors find themselves in a relationship where
highly-valued resources are or become limited, a rivalry for these resources can occur
when the actors begin to compete for control of the assets.
Competition over a scarce item also makes it seem even more valuable,
increasing the likelihood of conflict (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 21, 26).
The source of protracted conflict is the denial of those elements required
in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a
compelling need (Azar, 1985, 60).
In a finite system, the proximity of the actors exacerbates the scarcity of a resource or
asset can create a threat to security or survival which can be a precursor of conflict. Thus,
competition for a finite resource by actors living together or within the same geographic
region can be a source of violent conflict.
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How can conflict over a limited resource become a PSC, though? A possible
sustaining mechanism of PSC relative to asset competition is changing issues of
contention. When this occurs, a conflict that started over one issue, may or may not be
the central issue of contention as time continues and subsequent generations become
actors. As time passes and the original contention that began the conflict remains
unresolved, the conflict can become a process where the originating issue(s) central to the
conflict can change to take on additional components or nuances of contention (Azar et.
al., 2000, 272).
It is not the abstract “issue” that guides the conflicts in their development .
. . The immediate criterion of identification may be several stages
removed from the original issue (Azar et. al., 1978, 51).
As one subject of dispute replaces another or neither actor is able to definitively beat the
other forcing a final outcome (as discussed previously), “inertia” can set in (Azar, 1985,
36). With conflict between the actors continuing over time, the conflict can become
seeded into the society and become a PSC. Hence, PSCs can take on complex, multifaceted characteristics, from the issues of contention and actors, making causal
components difficult to identify and resolve.
Tangible Assets
Conflict as a result of competition for control of physical assets or resources is wellestablished in PSC literature (Azar, 1985, 33; Friedman, 1999, 39; Geller, 2000, 413; Pruitt
and Kim, 2004, 21; Vasquez, 2000, 373-5). These include competition for physical
security, resources, and territory In a finite system, many quarrels over tangible assets are
zero-sum conflicts where the loss of a resource can mean literal life and death for the actors
placing them in a position where they have nothing to lose by engaging in violence to
40

retain or gain control the asset (Pruitt & Kim 2004). For example, the loss or gain of land
has ramifications across all levels of government and society. Control of a fixed and secure
geographic region gives governments and people the opportunity to extract resources, build
economies, and achieve personal, societal, and governmental security. Hence, the impact of
conflicts over borders, geographical formations, or other natural resources can have an
impact economic, demographic, and spatial security issues (Starr, 2005, 288-9; Wilkenfeld
& Brecher, 2000, 286-7). Violence can occur as the competition unfolds and actors
become ensnared by conflict spirals as they defend or attempt to gain control of scarce
resources to ensure survival. The result of this type of competition is a security dilemma
wherein actors fear each other’s willingness to use force to secure “needed” tangible assets.
As each party attempts to resolve their security dilemma by being “more prepared” to
defend their “right” to control the resource (Cashman 2000; Pruitt & Kim 2004; Russett &
O’Neal 2001; Wilenfeld & Brecher 1998), a negative conflict spiral can ensue (Cashman,
1993, 280; Vasquez, 2000, 376-7). A threat to security and/or survival through limited
physical resources can compel actors to act by engaging in violent conflict to overcome the
threat or scarcity of a tangible asset.
Non-Tangible Assets
While conflict over tangible assets is well-supported in conflict and PSC literature,
competition for control over limited non-tangible assets is supported as well. Control of
power is another source of competition-based conflict. Conflicts over control for power can
include the struggle for economic, ideological, political, and social power. Azar defines
these concepts as basic social needs in the following manner:
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The economic structure of a society is determined by the state of development of
its productive forces and its position within the international division of labor. Political
structure is built on the relative access to power of contending social forces. Ideology is
the conduit through which economic and political interactions shape images and
perceptions of social forces; ideology organizes society in the economic and political
arenas (Azar, 1983, 89).
Conflict in these areas can be manifested as an attempt to change the balance of
power or address the unequal distribution of power (Azar, 1985, 28; 1983, 90). When
societal competition fails to rectify inequalities over time, what begins as a “reasonable”
conflict to address perceived social injustice (Gurr 1970) can lead to a shift in the direction
of frustration resulting in violent conflict.
Because aspects of power, such as social power, economic opportunity, political
legitimacy, or ideological legitimacy are non-tangible, their measurement can be relative.
Hence, the determination of whether actors have sufficient power is more susceptible to
measurements based on perceptions of the actors11. When an attempt to address social
injustice is not fruitful, violence can be justified as a means of forcing the desired change
to occur (Gurr 1970, Nacos 2011).
Inequality in the social structure is largely responsible for overt hostile
behavior, especially in protracted social conflicts. It is the product of political and
economic inequality and ideological domination of one social group over another
(Azar, 1983, 90).

11

Though the concepts of perception and (relative) deprivation are germane to competition for non-tangible
assets, they will be developed more fully in the Psychological Motivation section of the literature review.
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Collective violence varies directly with inequality. . .Inequality, moreover,
is the major social characteristic that differentiates conflict structures
associated with unilateral collective violence from those associated with
bilateral (or reciprocal) forms such as feuding and warfare. . . [B]ut
unilateral violence is not likely to arise where the parties are equal in size
and resources. As the vertical distance between antagonists increases,
unilateral collective violence becomes more likely (Senechal de la Roche,
1996, 113).
The attempt to change the status quo on the part of one actor, or group of actors, often
elicits a response from those who benefit from maintaining the disputed
structures/practices the way they are (McPhail 1994). This response can be violent or can
lead to violence as actors demand and do not realize change or conciliation. “The
escalating reciprocal spiral of disturbance and resistance yields a struggle . . . that results
in violent injury or death” (McPhail, 1994, 22-23).
As escalating cycles of resistance and/or tit-for-tat violence ensues, it is
reasonable to understand how the “self-perpetuating process” (Azar et al., 1978, 50;
Marshall, 1999, 36) or the protracted nature of PSC can occur.
Summary
Fundamentally, every actor’s primary concern lies in survival and securitywhether an individual, a group, or a governmental entity. Yet, it is not security in and of
itself that drives PSCs. Rather, it is the prolonged failure to gain or ensure security and
survival because of competition that drives it. Hence, competition-based conflict is a
more useful theoretical categorization as it better captures the fact that the actors are
competing for security as well as survival. Whether the competition is over tangible or
non-tangible assets; violent conflict can occur as actors struggle gain or retain control of a
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resource that they feel they cannot survive without. Failure on the part of the actors to
resolve this competition can lead to PSC.
PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION
Psychological motivations are one of the key factors that separate PSC from other
forms of conflict. While many forms of conflict remain “realistic conflicts,” it is the
development of emotions over time toward the conflict and the actors involved in the
conflict that could begin the downward spiral where a realistic conflict becomes an
unrealistic conflict or an emotion-based fight. As such, are the two identity componentsself and identity- as delineated by Azar, sufficient to explain the entire spectrum of the
potential psychological motivations that can make up PSC? In answer to this question,
the following section uses established PSC, conflict, and psychology literature to build
the argument that, while important, identity issues are a subset of a part of a larger group
of psychological motivations that are present in PSC.
While there is extensive discussion as to the various contributions of
psychological motivations of PSC, beyond identity-based motivations, other aspects are
not listed as necessary components to the theory of PSC. However, the argument for the
addition of psychological motivations to a broader theoretical frame is supported.
We are brash enough to advance the view that the social psychological
perspective provides a useful framework for considering the processes
involved in conflict, whether the conflict is interpersonal, intergroup, or
international” (Deutsch and Shichman, 1986, 219).
Human needs are often articulated and fulfilled through important
collectivities such as the ethnic group the national group, and the state.
Conflict arises when a group is faced with nonfulfillment or threat to the
fulfillment of basic needs: not only such obvious material needs as food,
shelter, physical safety, and physical well-being but also, and very centrally
such psychological needs as identity, security, recognition, autonomy, selfesteem, and a sense of justice (Kelman & Fisher, 2003, 316).
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Thus, the following section examines emotion and perception in addition to self-identity
and group-identity as literary justification for exploring and expanding the role of
psychological factors of PSC.
Laying a Foundation - Cognition
Can psychological factors play a role in PSC? Scholars who subscribe to the
rational-actor model of conflict minimize the role that psycho-social factors can play in
violent conflict. Political psychologists and those who embrace a cultural model of
political science disagree, however.
I think it is astounding that most of the political science literature seems to
put aside the notion that at least some wars are fueled by passions and that
one reason they are so hard to conclude is that people have come to hate
each other and to find the notion of compromise repulsive (Jervis, 1989,
488).
How people make decisions and behave are functions of their cognitive processes. These
cognitive processes, both “logical” and “emotional,” organize the world in which we live
and places stimuli into a more understandable context from which to operate. However,
an “ideal” rational model requires that three conditions hold: (1) the thinker has access to
complete, accurate, and useful information; (2) the thinker has unlimited resources with
which to process data; and (3) the thinker has unlimited time in which to assess the
information (Aronson, 1999, 119).
Earlier studies of decision-making retained the presumption as it was
applied to rationality, that is, efficient and prudent linkage of means to
ends (Janis, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977). But problems began to arise. The
influential work of Daniel Kahneman, Richard Nisbett, and so many
others, which demonstrated how substantially humans depart from the
rational decision-making judgments, has serious and far-reaching
consequences, inasmuch as it confirmed these ancient presumptions about
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the limitations of human nature. . . Humans do not normally weigh the
evidence fairly and accurately, consider all points of view, or accurately
evaluate the outcomes under consideration” (Marcus, 2003, 185).
In the absence of ideal conditions people increasingly rely on cognitive sources (existing
schemas and cognitive short-cuts) to help them make decisions (Aronson, 1999, 156-7).
These include (but are not limited to) values, beliefs,12, personality, cognitive complexity,
the need for cognitive consistency, group think (peer pressure), images or symbols, and
leadership style (Burleson & Caplan, 1998, 233; Byran, 2002, 3-4; Conover & Feldman,
2004, 206; Feldman, 2003, 480; Levi, 125-32; Rosati & Scott, 2006, 292-5 ; Viotti &
Kaupi, 1998, 207-8; Winter, 2003, 124). People can make. . .
. . . generalizations about how decision-makers perceive others’ behavior
and form judgments about their intentions. These patterns are explained by
the general ways in which people draw inferences from ambiguous
evidence and in turn, help explain seemingly incomprehensible policies.
They show how, why, and when highly intelligent and conscientious
statesmen misperceive their environments in specified ways and reach
inappropriate decisions” (Jervis in Viotti & Kauppi, 1998, 207).
In the light of this, Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality can help explain how
thought processes can be “rational” despite the absence of ideal circumstances. Because
actors can lack the ability and/or resources to achieve preferred solutions, they can apply
“rational thought” only after having greatly simplified the choices available. Thus, the
decision-maker becomes a “satisficer” in that they seek a satisfactory solution rather than
the optimal one (Simon 1991). In evaluating the role of psychological motivation in PSC,

12

Values and beliefs are non-transient in nature and are viewed as the “underpinnings of attitudes” (Bem
1970 ) “Value” is defined as an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of

existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or endstate existence” ( Feldman, 2003, 480). Similarly, “belief” is defined as “a configuration of ideas
and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional
interdependence” (Converse, 2004, 181).
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while a rational actor cannot be automatically assumed, it is equally “irrational” to
summarily dismiss (bounded) rationality. In other words, when seeking to ascertain a
comprehensive conceptualization of the necessary components of PSC, potential,
previously unexamined motivations cannot be automatically dismissed. Exploring the
possibility of additional sustaining psychological motivations of PSC could prove to have
utility in understanding what is supporting or maintaining the intracted nature of this
form of violent conflict.
Emotion
Emotions can be defined as “short-lived, biologically-based reactions to stimuli
that reflect appraisals of ongoing events. They can manifest themselves in subjective
experience, expressive behavior, or through physiological responses (Richards, 2002,
309). Theory suggests that emotion occurs at the conjuncture of two cognitive processesassociative and declarative memory. As a stimulus is processed through the cognitive
filter, the facts of the stimulus (declarative memory) are compared to existing schemata,
preferences, and prior behaviors to similar or the same stimuli (associative memory)
(Marcus, 2003, 197). Yet, it is not the stimulus itself that causes emotion. “[I]t is the
interpretation of events rather than the events per se that determine which emotion will be
felt” (Roseman, 1984, 14). The formation of each basic emotion (such as surprise, fear,
anger, anxiety, sadness, hatred, and the like (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 101)), then, is the result
of the reaction that the individual has of the stimulus.
Negative emotions can contribute to violent conflict. Though often transient in
nature, “emotions can lay the foundation for passions that are not transient, are deeply
buried, and unless set aside by heroic action, have enduring effects throughout the life of
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a person” (Marcus, 2003, 189). It is these deep-seeded emotions that can form attitudes
that may lead to violent conflict.
[Attitudes] tend to generate, reinforce, or intensify mutual images of
deception. They tend too, to increase the likelihood of confusion in the
direct and indirect communications between the parties. . . (Azar et, al,
1978, 51).
“Hatred often plays a far more significant role in the case of endogenous
conflicts . . .Such hatred is engendered by an internalization of the
distinction between “us” and “them” (Rapoport, 1974, 185).
Negative emotions can encourage the desire to hurt, to take revenge, to punish in the
hope of teaching “other” a lesson, and reduce the legitimacy of the opposing party (Pruitt
& Kim, 2004, 103). They can turn a game or debate into a fight (Rapoport 1960). Thus,
negative, emotion-driven behavior, can start a negative spiral of violent conflict that can
lead to PSC.
Because of the role that emotion can have on behavioral choice, the uncertainty
(Cioffi-Revilla & Starr, 1995, 449) that the human actor can bring to PSC through
cognitive processes cannot be fully captured with the existing theoretic frame. Thus, it is
expedient that the conceptualization of PSC be modified to include a more inclusive
concept of the role of psychological motivation beyond identity alone to include the
psychological motivation of emotion.
Perception
Attitudes and perceptions, whether factually accurate or not, are notoriously longlived. The perception of wrong-doing can produce emotions that motivate violent
behavior. Hence, perceptual issues have the potential to be major contributors to the
psychological motivations of PSC.
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One manner in which the concept of perception can contribute to PSC is from
prolonged feelings of relative deprivation13. Deprivation can be decrimental when the
ability to achieve declines but expectation remains high, aspirational when expectations
rise but the ability to achieve remains static, or progressive when the ability to achieve
indeed increases but at a slower rate than expectation (Gurr, 1970).
The basic frustration–aggression proposition is that the greater the
frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of
frustration. . . The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the
development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent,
and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and
actors (Gurr, 1970, 9).
Feelings of deprivation (real or imagined) can arise from historical context, emotions,
attitudes, social issues, civil rights issues, level of knowledge of an issue through
selective information processing, an incorrect interpretation of attitudes and events,
developmental inequality, political inequality, resource competition, reconstructive
memory, illusory correlation, self-fulfilling prophecy, rationalization, or attribution
distortion (Aronson, 1999, 143, 146,159; Boulding, 1989, 5; Deutsch & Shichman, 1986,
221, 224, 230; Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 12, 103,104). The exacerbation or enduring presence
of any one or more of these perceptual components can lead to violent conflict as actors
feel they are denied the opportunity to achieve, at the expense of another party, that they
feel they have a right/are entitled to.
Structural victimization is perceived to affect some groups
disproportionately or to benefit other groups. It is at this juncture of
actual physical and psychological deprivation that structural

13

Relative deprivation is defined as, “a perceived discrepancy between men’s values expectations and their
value capabilities” and has three distinct patterns: decremental, aspirational, and progressive deprivation
(Gurr, 1970, 13, 56).

49

victimization bursts into hostile and violent actions and interactions
(Azar, 1983, 90).
The perception of wrong-doing or victimization -whether through immediate, structural
means (as in the perceptions of the Palestinians and Israelis over who is entitled to
Palestine/Israel); or through a process that leads to the loss of legitimacy14 can be an
impetus for violence. When a divergence or incompatibility of interest between actors
results in one group failing to achieve what it considers to be a reasonable or deserved
goal, the losing group can feel that they have been deprived of a reasonable goal in
comparison to the winning group. As such, the ensuing disillusionment can lead to
violence. “Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic,
instigating condition for participants in collective violence” (Gurr, 1970, 9). The feeling
of wrongful deprivation, if left unresolved, can be a motivation for violence through the
“psychology of the slippery slope”; where failed attempts to rectify perceived injustices
are used to justify subsequent intensification of behavior leading to violence (McCauley,
2004, 47-48). “There is nothing quite as motivating as feeling that one has been deprived
relative to a legitimate standard” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 20). When extended over time, as
in the nature of PSC, perceptions can become internalized, leading to a psychological
structural change within a society; where perceptions leading to anger, fear, and blame
can be used to justify conflict escalation (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 102-104). Once
perceptions are internalized into the fabric of society; frustration, and ultimately violence,
they can be difficult to exterminate.

14

Legitimacy is defined as “the implication of the existence of right,. . . based on such criteria as its popular
acceptance, the legal or constitutional processes that brought it to, or maintains it in a position of authority.
. . (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, 484) or a particular rule or norm that enjoys the support from a relevant set of
actors (Gelpi, 2003, 14).The process of loss of legitimacy (Gass & Seiter 2003) is explained more fully in
the identity section of this literature review.
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Misperception is another aspect of perception that can lead to violent conflict. An
incorrect interpretation of events, motives, or behaviors can occur for many reasons. The
first aspect of misperception is the incorrect evaluation of events, self, and/or others.
Over or under estimating the abilities and importance of the actors, affinity or aversion to
risk, attributional distortion15, categorization, stereotyping, established operational codes,
failure in informational tools, mirror image assumption16, over simplification of causal
inferences, stress and time constraints, a tendency to overindulge in pessimistic and/or
wishful thinking, or using historical analogies are some of the ways in which the
misperception of reality can occur (Jervis, 1976, 319-357; Levy, 2003, 257-270 Pruitt &
Kim, 2004, 159; Rosati, 2006, 293-5). When misperception occurs, actors can justify
violence based on an erroneous assessment or assumption. “When both parties to a
conflict attribute malevolent motivations to each other, it breeds a vicious circle of selffulfilling prophecies” (Azar, 1983, 91). As such, an “incorrect definition of the situation”
(Levy, 2003, 258) can elicit the perception of threat from actors from the out-group
(explained and developed more fully in the next section) and thereby increasing the
likelihood of violent conflict. Because of this, misperception can be a sustaining
component of PSC.
As perception, misperception, and emotion are reinforced by the actions and
reactions of both parties, sentiments are justified. Whether the (mis)perception began as
factually accurate or not has minimal importance. (Mis)perception becomes reality to the
actors and to them, it is fact/truth. Over time (mis)perceptions can be generalized into

15

Attributional distortion occurs when one draws causal inferences about why other people behave as they
do.
16
Mirror image occurs when actors hold diametrically opposed views of each other. If “self” is positive and
good, then “other” must be evil and malevolent.
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unrelated areas, creating a “complicated causal network that makes these conflicts
difficult to solve” (Azar, 1983, 85). Because of this, misperception can play a role in the
intracted nature of PSC.
Identity
Identity is the way that we, as humans, define ourselves and others. Whether
individually or collectively, the sum of our attributes, experiences, influences, beliefs,
and values inform us about who we are (Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 234). When
conceptualizing what identity is, Erikson identified four critical aspects: (1) a sense of
uniqueness, (2) a sense of inner sameness and continuity with what one has been in the
past and what one anticipates being in the future, (3) a sense of inner harmony and
wholeness, and (4) a sense of inner solidarity with the ideals and values of one’s social
context (Erikson, 1980, 109; Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 223).
Identity issues unarguably make a large contribution to the psychological
motivations of PSC. As humans, “we define ourselves according to what we are and are
not” to form our concepts of identity and self (Brinkerhoff, 2008, 73). The concept of
identity includes individual and group identities; which are inclusive of the social and
individual perceptions of self. When any of the components of the concept of identity are
challenged or threatened, the threat to the self or social image, ensuing anger or
bitterness, and/or fear can be an impetus to conflict. As such, violence can have utility as
a function of identity, in two ways: offensively- in retaliation or to take an asset away
from another actor, or defensively- to preserve or prevent the loss of an asset or value. If
unresolved, the relationship between identity and conflict (as conflict can be used to
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restore or secure identity) can endure across generations, perpetuating itself through self
and group image.
The conflict itself can become embedded in the social fabric of the actors, one
person at a time as actors begin to identify themselves through the conflict. Violence can
be used as a defensive measure to protect or restore a positive image of self or the group
that one identifies with. Challenges to identity can arise from many sources including
immigration, emigration, changing civil society, and interpersonal or inter-group conflict
(Brinkerhoff 2008) where a person can be directly confronted with the weaknesses that
their concept of identity holds. Whether the result of a sudden event or the result of
societal evolution; “threat[s] to identity are likely to enhance solidarity and [the] potential
for mobilization (Esman 1986). This reasoning has been used to explain Fundamentalist
Islamic Terrorism in the Middle East (Beaudoin 2006). As people who have built their
self-image from time-honored and established traditional Muslim practices see an influx
of modernization and westernization into their homeland, an identity crisis has ensued.
Seeing the norms and morés that they define themselves with disappear, replaced, or
marginalized, Muslims are motivated to take action to restore the “world” they know and
define themselves by (Stout 2004, McCauley 2004,Viviano 2003). It is this motivation to
defend and restore the positive self (or group) image that can be an impetus for violence
(Aronson, 1999, 234-5). As such, the violence that is used to restore, protect, or maintain
a positive image (of self or the group), if not accomplished in a “short” period of time,
could be a sustaining mechanism of PSC.
Another example of how violence can be a defensive instrument to protect
identity is through attempts to keep the violent conflict going when it is believed that the
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conflict may be ending. In long-lasting violent conflicts such as PSC, the conflict can
become part of individual and group identity. Growing up in a violent environment,
children’s identity formation can be influenced by the prospect of continual violence;
actual violent events, social influence from the reaction to violent events, and their own
ultimate participation in violence. Because of the constant bombardment of violence, the
conflict can become part of individual and group identity. When it appears, then, that the
violent conflict may end, actors that have incorporated the conflict into their identity face
the potential loss of how they define their being. The prospect of peace undermines
Erikson’s third and fourth aspects of identity (Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 222-223). The
actors’ identities are no longer secure and an identity crisis may ensue17- If the conflict is
gone, who will we (I) be? How will we define ourselves? How will we be unique or our
existence have meaning? Thus, to preserve the established identity that is supported by
the continuation of violence, actors may be compelled to act to ensure the continuation of
the conflict.

Identity crisis and confusion (Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 234) can be an

instrument of defensive violence where the actors attempt to ensure the continuation of
violent conflict.
Self-Identity
Self-identity issues, as contributors to the psychological motivations sustaining
PSC, are well-supported in PSC literature. The concept of self-identity includes the
concept of individual religious, ideological, cultural, ethnic, tribal, linguistic, economic,
and/or regional perception/definition of self (Lijphart, 1977, 3-4, 14, 142). When any of
the components of the concept of personal identity are challenged or threatened, the
17

An identity crisis occurs when the continuity or the continuation of the sameness of one’s believed
personal or social role is called into question, threatened, diminished, or disappears (Fadiman & Frager,
2002, 234).
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threat to (positive) self-image can occur. Theorists posit biological, psychodynamic,
cognitive, and social factors (Osborne & Frost 2004) as potential motivations for violent
behavior in individuals based on self-identity.
When searching for potential psychological motives for violent behavior in
individuals, theorists postulate that violent behavior can be based upon instinctual,
biological drives. In their article, “The Anatomy of Hatred”, Osborne and Frost (2004)
explain that when survival is threatened, the biological impulse to “fight or flight” will
engage instinctively. As such, Osborne and Frost attribute the American reaction to the
September 2001 terrorist attacks, engaging in “unwarranted military action” against
actors not related to the terror incident, as an application of biological psychology’s
theory explaining how violent behavior in humans can be explained as a reaction to the
(perceived) threat to survival:
Although anger, sadness, and other emotions certainly enter into the 9/11
experience, it is our contention that the most primal emotion involved in
that episode is fear. . . Essentially, we may say that the brain is more
vigilant in its scanning for triggers associated with fear. As citizens of the
United states now double-take a man of Middle Eastern descent who
boards an airplane, because of 9/11, we have now come to identify people
from this region as a possible threat to survival. This elicits a fear response
that could be acted upon from an instinctual need for survival (Osborne &
Frost, 9, 2004).
When an individual perceives that their physical well-being or survival is threatened,
according to the biological theory of psychological motivation, the individual may
engage in violent behavior that is motivationally founded in self-preservation rather than
malice. This theory is supported by the work of Stephen Barber concerning youth who
lived through the Intifada. In his study, Barber found that Palestinian youth who
personally experienced or witnessed violence against Palestinians at the hands of Israelis
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experienced greater occurrences depression and antisocial behavior. Also, they were
more likely to become actively religiously and to become active in the Intifada
themselves (Barber 2001). Thus, those who personally experienced an assault or
witnessed one being afflicted on someone that they personally identified with, were more
apt to engage in behaviors that increased the ability to defend them physically as well as
defend their sense of individual identity.
Psychodynamic theory is another potential explanatory theory for violent
behavior in individuals. This theory explaining violence maintains that the internal
human need to express disturbing thoughts is tempered by societal morés and normseven the fear of death. Aspects that can influence individuals to engage in acts of
violence, from this psychological perspective, include: (1) a sense of rootlessness or lack
of connection with others within the community or society (this is especially salient
among migrant populations [Brinkerhoff 2008]); (2) rapidly changing value structures
within one’s social/societal structure; (3) rapid changes that creates an increased sense of
uncertainty about the future; (4) an economic or political system that makes it “difficult
for young people to assume a responsible role in society”; (5) an increased awareness of
oppression, perceived hypocrisies, injustice and/or structural violence; and (6) an easy
access to munitions and other forms of contraband (Halleck, 1978, 328-329). When an
“injustice” has occurred, the ensuing inner turmoil (surprise, dread, guilt, embarrassment,
anger, etc) can spur violence (Spencer & Myer 2006). In an unjust or threatening
environment, individuals can act independently or communally to create or preserve an
internally acceptable reality to alleviate the threat to self-identity.

56

Cognitive theories of individual violence have a divergent perspective, however.
Cognition-based explanations of violence rest in empirical and perceptual cognitive
filters. As the human mind develops- from the earliest sensorimotor state to the final
formal operational state, learning and behavior is built progressively. As such, the more
reinforced a perception or behavior is through the various stages of development, the
more difficult it is to eradicate and the more apt an individual is to act to defend their
learned self-concept. In the process of forming a sense of self-identity, the people and
events that surround us have an impact on the development of norms and values.
Children learn patterns of hatred very early in life, by as young as 4 or 5
according to some researchers- while still thinking pre-operationally.
Where patterns of hatred are formed early in childhood, and are registered
neurologically during a period of brain development that is highly plastic,
then the likelihood of altering these early categories of hate later in life is a
daunting one (Osborne & Frost, 2004, 12).
As we grow, experiential and perceptual learning molds our cognitive process. When a
person identifies a stimulus, especially one that it contrary to established cognitive
patterns, it is easier to rely on established schemata and to generalize engaging cognitive
filters as a short cut (cognitive rigidity) than to engage in cognitive dissonance by reevaluating opinions, values, and beliefs. Thus, a challenge to the image that one
identifies with is more easily outright rejected (cognitive rigidity & shortcuts) or taken as
a threat than re-evaluating established schemata and risking negative consequences to the
self-image (Azar, 1983, 90; 1985, 29; Hermann, 2003, 294). As such, it is particularly
salient PSC.
Social factors and roles can also contribute to an individual’s willingness to
engage in violent behavior. As people are exposed to conflict, especially from childhood,
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deprivation or bias against one’s member-group can have a profoundly negative impact
on the image of self.
We may thus postulate a positive relationship between conflict duration
and the proportion of the population influenced by the conflict in their
formative years. . . given that the protracted conflict is central for
significant others, later generations of individuals will be socialized by
significant others for whom the external conflict is highly salient. This
dynamic can be viewed as a function of the protracted property of the
conflict (Friedman, 1999, 52).
As children grow, the opinions and values of the people who raise them are ingrained
through observation, conversation, and socialization. Thus, as the individual is raised
amidst chronic conflict, the conflict becomes part of self-identity- as it did in the prior
generation.
Repression and deprivation have a negative identity impact on individuals as
well. The need to obtain or retain a positive image and identity is common to all people
and groups. Deprivation or bias against one’s member group can also have a profoundly
negative impact on the image of self with the ensuing effort to restore a positive selfimage leading to violence. As the negative image conflicts with the positive self-image,
motivation to restore the positive self-image (ego defense) and alleviate cognitive
dissonance will emerge (Aronson, 1999, 234-5; Feldman, 2003, 490).
Our self-conceptions are our most valuable possessions and we ordinarily
make every effort to present our self-identities in a favorable manner and
to defend those identities against attack. . . . .When one individual is
insulted by another the former seeks verification and then, to save face,
requests cessation or an apology from the latter. The latter often refuses
because to do so would be to lose face him or herself. That refusal
increases the disturbance to the former who then increases or varies his
action to eliminate or oppose that disturbance. The escalating reciprocal
spiral of disturbance and resistance yields a struggle between the two
individuals that results in violent injury or death (McPhail, 1994, 22-23)
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As such, the need to resolve this cognitive dissonance and restore a positive self-image
can be a driving force behind PSC (Gass & Seiter, 2003, 64-8; Jervis, 1976, 396-399,
404). Because no other identity of self, other than that of the negative image generated
from social or deprivational forces is known, the need to generate a positive self-image is
frustrated over time. Thus, the effort to build a positive self-image also takes on enduring
qualities. Hence, violent conflict can become embedded, one individual at a time, into the
collective social fabric of the actors as each individual attempts to justify their own
positive self-image. Over time, as actors strive and fail to achieve a positive self-image
by justifying their “rightness” in the conflict, the quest to prove or defend a positive selfimage can become a sustaining aspect of violent conflict.
Group-Identity
Groups often form as a result of common material interest, status, congenial, or
symbolic interests (Stout, 2004, 61; Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003, 9). Just as in selfidentity; group identification can be based on religious, ideological, cultural, ethnic,
tribal, linguistic, economic, and/or regional factors. Membership in such cooperative
organizations can provide individual, group, and societal legitimacy as actors identify
themselves as members of a group that they share goals, values, or characteristics with.
As such, groups can have considerable influence on the values and beliefs of the actors
within the groups. This is because humans have a powerful psychological need to belong
(Huddy, 2003, 514; Maslow, 1943, 380; Snyder, 1996, 247). The more a person
identifies with and internalizes a group’s values18 (as opposed to merely complying to

18

The process of value integration includes three steps. The first step is compliance, when a person goes
along (conforms) to another’s wishes motivated by external reinforcement (carrots & sticks). The second
step is identification, where one sees the wisdom/value of desired action/position. Last, is internalization
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them), the more likely they are to integrate the group’s identity as part of their own
(Aronson, 1999, 33-6). It is from this need to belong, to create an in-group19, that group
identity has several potential ways that it can contribute to PSC.
Inter-Group Dynamics
The first way that group-identity can play a role in PSC is in how the group
identifies itself, internally. In plural or heterogeneous societies, where people from
different social or ethnic backgrounds live side-by-side, differences between identity
groups can become a rallying point for violent conflict (Lijphart 1977). Because certain
social, ethnic, language, and religious characteristics are deeply-seeded in many societies
and are reticent to change, violent conflicts based on divergent group identities and
interests can occur.
“Group identity formation and protracted social conflicts are inextricably
linked. Ethnicity is an acute awareness that there is a bond between people
of similar culture, language, religion, beliefs, customs, habits, and –most
importantly—life perspectives. The shared perceptions encompass all of
life’s core values and issues” (Azar, 1983, 21).
If a group’s identity is organized according to deeply- seeded societal cleavages, where
compromise is looked upon as immoral or unfavorable; the conditions for protracted
violent conflict can be present.
. . .the crucial characteristic of human feuds is that they are culturally
transmitted, so that the distinguishing characteristics of the enemy may be
anything: family membership, social class, nationality, religion, or
ideology. The conflict is a self-perpetuating process. . . [wherein] positive
feedback predominates (Azar et al, 1978, 51).
when a person takes the desired action/value as their own and motivation rests in internal, self-generated
impulses (Aronson 1999).
19
In-group: “a group with which one feels a sense of solidarity or community of interests”. Out-group: a
group that is distinct from one's own and so usually an object of hostility or dislike (http://www.merriamwebster.com (6/12/12)).
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Because of the importance of group identity in these societies, violent conflict can occur
based on the implications of the social/ethnic differences (cleavages) (Lijphart 1977).
This can occur as the homogeneity effect20 causes members of one group to generalize
the same (negative) characteristics about the members of another (identity) group. When
violent conflict is perpetuated and in turn positively reinforced by the in-group, cleavagebased conflict can be a sustaining component of PSC.
An extension of how groups identify themselves internally is the role of how
identity issues impacts relationships between groups. This social categorization can be
conceptualized as in-group/out-group thought, where perceptions and relationships are
based on group membership and identity rather than on an individual or an individualmerit basis. “It is only when others are not seen as individuals but are categorized as
members of social groups or categories that negative intergroup attitudes can be activated
toward them” (Duckitt, 2003, 559). Identification based on group identity can increase
the likelihood of violent conflict though: (1) over emphasizing the positive (benevolent
and moral) traits of the in-group, (2) minimizing or justification of the negative or
“challenging” attributes (and actions) of the in-group, (3) blaming the out-group for
negative events (scapegoating), (4) decreasing the incidence of positive and meaningful
dialog between groups, (5) increasing zero-sum thinking, (6) negative stereotypes of the
out-group, (7) suspicion of (hostile) intent of out-group, (8) lower tolerance of the
differences of the out-group in comparison to the in-group, (9) de-individuation and dehumanization of out-group by seeing the out-group as “deficient in moral virtue”, and

20

Homogeneity effect.- “The tendency to perceive members of an out-group as “all alike” or more similar
to each other than members of the ingroup” (Baron, Byrne, Branscombe, 2006, 11 th edition).
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(10) de-legitimization of the out-group by suggesting that the out-group violates basic
human norms, (12) denial of the humanity of the out-group (Huddy, 2003, 525-6;
Lijphart, 1977, 27; Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 60, 106-112; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003, 720-1). As
such, group identity can provide the perception of a moral justification to positions,
which can be used to justify violence against the out-group (Horowitz, 2000, 201-2, 204,
215, 226-7). Thus, the out-group can come to be seen as the “mortal enemy” of the ingroup and “the identity of one’s own group as partly defined by its enmity to the other”
(Staub, 2003, 721). “When both parties to a conflict attribute malevolent motivations to
each other, it breeds a vicious circle of self-fulfilling prophecies” (Azar, 1983, 91). It is
this sort of in-group/out-group antagonism, group-based conflict, that is associated with
group identity that can give violent conflict an intractable nature.
Intra-Group Dynamics
The dynamics within groups can also have an impact on the likelihood of violent
conflict. One feature of a group that can contribute to violent conflict is the level of the
group’s homogeneity. A group that is more heterogeneous is more likely to hold
moderate, accommodating positions that encourage the peaceful participation of actors
(Lijphart, 1977, 100-104). Though a benefit of group solidarity (homogeneity) is that
there is a lower probability of within-group dissent or conflict, a higher degree of
cohesion within a group can create an environment that is hostile to dissenting opinions
increasing the likelihood of group-imposed conformity through groupthink21 or the
embracing of extreme positions and/or policies.

21

Groupthink- “the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence seeking becomes so
dominant in a cohesive in-group that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action
(Aronson, 1999, 18)
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. . . a group that, from its inception, is conceived as a struggle group is
especially prone to engage in violent heresy-hunting; and its members are
obliged to participate continuously in the selection and reselection of those
who are “worthy,” that is, those who do not question or dissent, precisely
because its very existence is based on the “purity” of its membership.
Such groups must continuously engage in self-purification drives, and so
they must constantly breed heresy and schisms. . .Their social cohesion
depends upon total sharing of all aspects of group life and is reinforced by
the assertion of group unity against the dissenter. The only way they can
solve the problem of dissent is through the dissenter’s voluntary or forced
withdrawal (Coser, 1956, 100-101, 103).
Thus, higher percentage of group homogeneity increases the probability of the occurrence
of risky or extreme behavior through the overestimation of the competency and/or
morality of the group (Aronson, 1999, 18-9; Gass & Seiter, 2003, 146-7). Similarly, the
more alike groups are in their values or beliefs, the more opportunity there is for smaller
differences to be disproportionately emphasized- which can contribute to intolerance and
violent conflict (McCauley, 2004, 48). The degree to which a group is hetero- or
homogenous can have an effect on how averse or prone the group is to engaging in
violent behavior.
Summary
The literature on the role of psychology in violent conflict and PSC is large.
Through a review of the existing literature, it is clear that there is theoretical support for
the proposition that there are more psychological motivations present in PSC than just
identity components. Clearly, the justification for including the testing of emotion,
perception, self-identity, and group-identity as jointly necessary components of PSC is
well supported in existing literature. Thus, my proposition that there are psychological
motivations underlying, sustaining mechanisms of PSC can be supported, from a
theoretical/literary perspective.
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CONCLUSION
During the course of the literature review, I have prepared a foundation from
which I will present my theoretic conceptualization of PSC from in the next section.
While Azar’s theory still provides utility in understanding what PSC descriptively,
measurable criteria are limited and categories need to be narrowed and broadened to
better capture what PSC is and what its necessary components are. As such, the category
of Effective Participation, as conceptualized as the inclusion non-state actors, time
considerations, and cycles of violence can be supported using PSC, conflict, and other
germane scholarly works. Similarly, Azar’s category of Security, as conceptualized as
asset-based competition for tangible and non-tangible assets can be supported in the
literature as well. The categories of Social Recognition of Identity and Distinct Identity,
as presented in the broader category of Psychological Motivations, present my greatest
departure from Azar’s established theory, but are well-supported in existing literature.
The theoretical implications of psychological motivations, as identified by
emotion, perception, self-identity, and group-identity, though all are not currently listed
as necessary components, can all be strongly supported in existing scholarly literature.
The theoretical benefits of expanding “identity” issues to include emotion and perceptual
considerations introduce potentially broader and further reaching components that could
result in a better understanding of the sustaining components of PSC. If supported by my
findings, a new theoretic framework could have utility in the academic and applied
realms of international relations and conflict resolution.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PSC
INTRODUCTION
When encountering a puzzle, researchers attempt to discover what, how, and why
an event has occurred. In taking what is known or observed, theoretical explanations can
be built in an attempt to explain what is not known, through analysis of what is (Bernard,
2002, 61-2; Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009, 23; KKV 1994). Theories, then, are “good
ideas about how things work” (Bernard, 2002, 60-61) that attempt to explain the
association between the known and the unknown. This chapter approaches the existence
of PSC as a theoretical puzzle. By using what is known and observed about PSCs, I lay
out a theoretical explanation of what PSC is, how it occurs, and why it is such an
intractable form of violent conflict.
To explain why PSC occurs in addition to what it is, theory is needed. Grounded
theories, then, are attempts to develop theories from an analysis of the patterns, themes,
and common categories discovered in observational data” (Babbie, 2006, 296).
To transform specific explanations into general theoretical terms, the
researcher’s theoretical framework must be broad enough to capture the
major elements of the historical context. That is, the set of independent
and intervening variables must be adequate to capture and record the
essentials of a causal account of the outcome in the case (Bennett and
George, 2005, 92-93).
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Theory attempts to capture the essential components of a phenomenon in the most
comprehensive and parsimonious manner that retains measurability. As I demonstrate in
this chapter, I assert that the existing theoretical conceptualizations of PSC are too broad
in some areas and too narrow in others to comprehensively capture the theoretical nature
of PSC.
Building these fundamental aspects of theory, Most and Starr (1989, 71) note
that, “theories are important for understanding and explaining why wars occur, and a
critical component of those theories is specification of the logical connectiveness”.
What is the “logical connectiveness” in PSC that makes it endure? What is different
about PSCs that makes them defy conventional wisdom in international relations theory
and literature concerning violent conflict and war (as was presented in the literature
review)? In response to these questions, to find the “connectiveness” in the theoretical
aspects of PSC, my dissertation strives to answer two fundamental questions about the
nature of PSC. The first question is: “What are the patterns, themes, and categories that
are necessary for PSC to occur?” This first question addresses the “what” and “how”
aspects of explaining PSC. The second question attempts to answer why PSC occurs:
“What are the sustaining mechanisms of PSC?”
In asking these two research questions, I am inquiring as to the fundamental
theoretical aspects of PSC. I propose a two-tiered framework that is inclusive of the
components that can quantify the descriptive components of PSCs as well as propose
what could be the underlying, supporting apparatuses that can make them so enduring in
nature. The ensuing theory and conceptualization is designed to complement the existing
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theoretical frame while providing clarity, measurable parameters, and fill-in
theoretical gaps as to the necessary and sustaining components of PSC.
THEORY
Protracted social conflict can be defined as a conflictual dyadic relationship
characterized by intermittent violent interactions between non-state actors and another
entity for a sufficient length of time to have become fully embedded in the social fabric of
the conflict groups wherein issues of contention, while they can change over time, remain
of such importance to the actors that they are considered non-negotiable. Though a
definition of a PSC is useful to differentiate it from other forms of conflict, what it does
not answer is why PSC occurs in the first place. To answer why PSC occurs, a theoretic
frame must be built.
As identified in the literature review, the work of Dr. Edward Azar has been the
foundation of recent PSC research. It is the theoretical frame that appears to be used most
often by PSC scholars. According to Azar, the four necessary components that explain
the occurrence and protracted nature of PSC are effective participation, security,
distinctive identity, and social recognition of identity (see Figure 1). However, are each
of these necessary conditions sufficiently (categorically) global in nature to conjointly
capture the phenomenon of PSC in a parsimonious manner? Is there another way that the
theoretic framework can be organized so as to more clearly conceptualize PSC and make
it more comprehensive and testable?
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Figure 3.1: Azar's Conceptualization of PSC
It is the purpose of my dissertation to introduce a complementary framework to the
theory of PSC that embodies the spirit of the existing frame while filling in theoretical
gaps, provide clarity to concepts, place components at a more useful level of analysis,
and provide clear and measurable parameters to derive a more robust theoretical frame
from which knowledge and understanding can be discovered. In this dissertation project,
I propose that PSC has six jointly necessary components. The first four components- the
participation of non-state actors, a minimum of 20 years of violent conflict, a minimum
of three violence-peace cycles, a minimum of 500 directly relatable deaths entail the
descriptive elements of PSC. These four components are a development of Azar’s
component of Effective Participation and explain some of the descriptive aspects of PSCwho participates and how. The last two categorical components of my theory,
Completion-Based Conflict, and Psychological Motivation address the sustaining
mechanism(s) that causes violent conflict to endure over time. As will be discussed in the
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next section, Competition-Based Conflict is conceptualized as competition for tangible
and/or non-tangible assets and Psychological motivation is conceptualized as violence
motivated by emotion, perception, self-image, and/or group image. It is upon these
theoretical propositions that the theoretical framework is built.
The theoretic framework that my dissertation presents addresses the descriptive
aspects of PSC as well as the sustaining mechanisms. In proposing that the categories of
Non-state Actors, ≥ 20 years of violent conflict, ≥ three violence-peace cycles, ≥500
directly relatable deaths, Competition-Based Conflict, and Psychological Motivations as
jointly necessary components of PSC, a more comprehensive theoretic frame of the
necessary components is presented.
CONCEPTUALIZATOIN
By using the building-block strategy to address identified gaps in the currently
accepted theoretic construct, a more comprehensive conceptualization for the theoretic
framework of PSC is presented. “This approach to theory development is a ‘building
block’ approach. Each block, a study of each subtype, fills a ’space’ in the overall theory
or in a typological theory” (George & Bennett, 2005, 78). While adapting existing
theoretical constructs to new concepts, careful diligence must be exercised so as to avoid
“conceptual traveling” or distortion from the original theoretical concept. Thus, a
classical approach to concepts is employed through the use of the “ladder of generality”
(Collier & Mahon, 1993, 845-7; Goertz, 2005, 55-57). As such, the primary categorical
designations remain true to Azar’s original theory. The ensuing theoretical framework is
built upon the concepts established by Azar. What the theoretic frame also includes,
however, are other components that are mentioned in Azar’s and others’ works that are
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deemed important or fundamental to the conceptualization of PSC but are not included as
necessary components. This is done through reorganizing and increasing the intension or
extension of the categories so that the theoretical conceptualization of PSC is more
inclusive and/or measurable.
By moving up and down the ladder of generality towards a more general or
narrow conceptualization, the original defining categories are preserved within new
theoretical ones. For example, Azar’s category of “Effective Participation” is too broad to
capture in a measurable way who participates and how. Therefore, this category is
divided into four separate categories that are more discretely measurable but conceptually
consistent with Azar’s original concept of determining who participates and how through
the category of “Effective Participation”. Likewise, “distinctive identity, and “social
recognition of identity” are addressed in the broader, more inclusive, category of
“Psychological Motivations” (Goertz, 2005, 63). Similarly, the category of “Security”
will be included in the broader category of “Asset-based Competition”. When
conceptualized in this manner, each “new” category is now more measurable.
Components can be measured and tested to justify their inclusion as necessary aspects of
PSC. “The possibility of encompassing more cases through the elaboration of secondary
categories can allow for considerable flexibility regarding the meaning and application of
the category” (Collier & Mahon, 1993, 850). With this “flexibility” to explore “family
resemblances”, components within each categorical family can be tested to determine
necessity within the theoretic frame of PSC.
What is of importance to this endeavor is establishing the theoretic existence (and
possible necessity) of the components of PSC. To achieve this goal, intension, extension,
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secondary, and radial categorization are all utilized in the forthcoming conceptual
structure as components are organized into discrete categories. In this, the general
concepts and necessary components that pertain to PSC in existing literature will be
theoretically preserved while being updated, clarified, and tested.
EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION
What is “effective participation” and how is it measured? As an independent
category, “Effective Participation” is too broad to capture or measure who participates in
PSC and how. As conceptual reorganization moves down the latter of generality toward
a more specific conceptualization, Azar’s category of “Effective Participation” is
separated into four independently necessary categories. These categories more clearly
identify who participates (effectively) and how. These categories are: Non-State Actors,
≥ 20 years of violent conflict, ≥ three violence-peace cycles, and ≥ 500 directly relatable
deaths (See figure 2).
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Boolean “and”

≥20 Years
Violent Conflict
(X2)

Effective
Participation

≥3
Violence/Peace
Cycles (X3)
≥ 500 Deaths
(X4)

Figure 3.2: Expansion of Azar’s Category of Effective Participation
Component X1, “Non-State Actors” defines who the specific actors are in PSC.
This secondary category of effective participation is in conceptual compliance with Azar
and other scholars’ literature on protracted conflict. Often in violent conflict, and
particularly in enduring rivalries, the state is the primary unit of analysis. This is not the
assumption in PSC, however. The participants of the conflict, the conflict group, are the
primary unit of analysis (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 114). As stated in the literature review, a
defining characteristic of PSC is that it is not limited to dyadic, state-level, elite versus
elite conflict. Rather, in PSC, non-state actors (masses) are the primary unit of analysis.
Non-state actors include individuals and conflict/identity groups such as ethnic, religious,
and/or linguistic groups that exist as actors in violent conflict, separate from any state
affiliation. This does not preclude the inclusion of the state as an actor in PSC, however.
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The theoretic mandate is that, there must be a non-state actor present in a violent conflict
for it to be considered a PSC. Thus, conceptual extension of Azar’s conceptualization of
a category of Effective Participation, the first necessary component of PSC, must be that
the conflict includes non-state actors.
Components X2 and X 3 identify the necessary time parameters of PSC. These
concepts are also an extension of Azar’s original category of Effective Participation and
include a minimal time for the entire conflict to have existed, a minimum number of
violence/peace cycles in the conflict, and minimum time duration of peace between
violent spikes. Though existing literature acknowledges the “protracted nature” and
generational qualities of protracted conflict, clarification of the concept of this secondary
category must be narrowed to become measurable. Thus, movement down the ladder of
generality to provides a narrower, more precise conceptualization.
Component X2 defines the minimum time that a violent conflict must exist to be
considered a PSC. The existing literature is not explicit as to any criteria of time in which
a conflict must endure before being considered a protracted conflict. Thus, a radial
categorical concept must be included to address minimum time criteria. Before a society
can enter into a “war culture” mentality (Azar 1990, 17), a sufficient amount of time must
elapse for the conflict to become part of the fabric of the societies that the violent conflict
has occurred in. The literature supports the concept of one generation as a useful measure
of time in which the actors can internalize (socialization) a culture of violence into their
self and cultural identity. In this application, though, there are both familial and cultural
definitions of a generation. The familial definition commonly utilizes birth cycles, such
as the average time elapsed between the birth a mother’s first offspring and the birth her
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daughter’s first offspring (Bennett, 1960, 11). However, as noted by Strauss and Howe
across time there is no “one universal lifecycle”. Thus, using biological parameters, the
teen years into the thirties, according to stages of civilizational and technological
development, cultural factors, the availability of health care, and mortality rates, could be
applicable. In short, in today’s world, a biological generation can be as little as ten to
thirteen years or as many as thirty or more.
Another way to conceptualize a generation is through the social cohort. A cultural
generation is defined as a cohort of individuals whose development has been impacted or
shaped by particular events or trends (Berger, 1960, 10) or as a “special cohort-group
whose length approximately matches that of a basic phase of life, or about twenty-two
years over the last three centuries” (Strauss & Howe, 1991, 34). This concept of a
generation is more germane to the theoretical goals of this dissertation and it offers a
more precise number of years in which a generation can be measured. Therefore, the
concept of a generation will be defined as a period of twenty years. This duration of time
approximates the cultural generation definition used by Strauss and Howe while still
falling within the parameters of a familial generation offered by Bennett. Furthermore, it
remains true to the premises in existing literature that PSC is enduring in nature and has
generational qualities.
Having established one generation of twenty years as a theoretical minimum
duration for the establishing of a violent conflict as a PSC, what, then, is a reasonable
period of time without violence to consider a PSC to have ended? As indicated in the
literature review, there is no distinguishable “point of termination” (Schrodt, 1983, 101)
in PSCs. As in establishing time parameters for the classification of a PSC being the
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length of time necessary for a violent conflict to become part of a cultural consciousness,
it would stand to reason that the standard of time, a generation of twenty years, would
also be a useful measure to determine whether the PSC has absented itself from the social
fabric of the actors as well. Therefore, a lapse in violence between the actors equal to or
greater than twenty years is sufficient to determine that a PSC has ended.
In PSC, there can be durations of time where there is no violence between actors
only to have violent conflict erupt again at a later time over the same issue or stimulus.
Component X3 addresses the minimum number of violence/peace cycles theoretically
required for a conflict to be considered a PSC. Because the minimum patterns of
violence are not identified in existing PSC theory, it is necessary to add to this secondary
category by adding a radial sub-category (Collier & Mahon, 1993, 848; Goertz, 2005,
58). Thus, a violence/peace cycle can be defined as a rise in tension among actors to the
level wherein the actors of one group commit an act of violence and it is reciprocated in
kind, or it is increased in intensity by the opposing group, or it is committed by both
groups simultaneously resulting in at least on directly-relatable death. The Nedler-Mead
model indicates that a minimum of three data points is necessary to begin to form a
pattern. Therefore, a minimum of three violence/peace cycles is used to set a minimum
parameter.
Finally, scholarly literature is also not clear as to minimum time duration between
violent spikes. As indicated in the literature review, time measured in years as used in
enduring rivalries, is insufficient to account for the unique attributes and participants in
PSC. Because non-state actors do not necessarily need time to finance, arm, train, and
mobilize armies or have similar structural restraints, it is conceivable that they can act
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more quickly than states in engaging in violent behavior. What, then, is a reasonable
lapse of time between violence spikes to establish a theoretical minimum that can account
for the participation of non-state actors? With limited PSC and conflict literature to use as
a resource, the Nedler-Mead minimum of three data points seems reasonable to apply as
criteria for a lapse of time between violence spikes. If three months pass after the
completion of a violence spike without another violent incident, then a non-violent trend
may be emerging. Thus, a minimum of three months of time seems to be a reasonable
duration of time between episodes of violence is useful measure.
Component X4 refers to the number of casualties as a result of PSC. Given the
ambiguity concerning intensity criteria in existing PSC literature I have refined the
concept by referring to related scholarship on violent conflict. By doing so, the proposed
conceptualization retains the spirit (family resemblance) of existing theory while
introducing measurable parameters (Collier & Mahon, 1993, 847).
Using battle deaths is a common standard of measure for inter-state violent
conflict. However, given the sporadic and individual nature of PSC, using the standards
for formalized military action is challenging. “Use of armed force” refers to “the use of
arms by parties in order to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict, resulting
in at least 25 deaths in a year” (Wallersteen, 2006, 4-5). Because periods of violence and
non-violence are a hallmark of PSC, requiring 25 deaths to per year may be too stringent
for a theoretical requirement for a type of conflict that is known to have periods of nonviolence. However, over the twenty-year span presented as a minimum time frame, the
same rate of 25 deaths per year totals 500 deaths. If a total of 500 deaths within each 20year window is used as a conceptual minimum, it is inclusive of the 25 deaths per year
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rate, but allows for the periods of non-violence that is common in PSC. Thus, a total of
500 deaths over a consecutive 20-year window of time is used as a reasonable number to
set as a minimum threshold for deaths in PSC.
COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT
Azar’s theory of PSC includes a category called, “Security”. I am inclusive of
Azar’s secondary category of security when I conceptualize my secondary category as
“Competition-Based Conflict” (X5) and add two secondary radial categories,
“Competition for Tangible Assets” (X5a) and “Competition for Non-Tangible Assets”
(X5b) (See figure 3). Conflicts over tangible assets are conceptualized by discovering
whether a conflict is over issues concerning physical security, resources, or territory.
This includes when actors are concerned with physical harm or death, the denial of
natural or man-made resources, the denial of property, or a threat to sovereign territory.
Similarly, conflict over non-tangible assets includes conflict over power. Power- based
conflict is conceptualized by identifying whether a conflict is regarding a struggle for
economic, social, or political power. This includes influence from material wealth, that is
ethnicity-based, or power achieved through achieving social or political position. Violent
conflict as a result of continual competition for an asset can become a sustaining
mechanism over time, turning a conflict into a PSC. As such, continual, unresolved
competition-based conflict could explain why PSC endure.
As noted in the literature review, violent conflict often begins as a conflict over
tangible and/or over non-tangible assets. However, my conceptualization of CompetitionBased Conflict does not mandate that both must be present for PSC to occur. Therefore,
my revision treats the presence of competition as a necessary component, but one that can
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fulfilled in either of two substitutable ways: over tangible asset and/or non-tangible
assets. Hence, the presence of only one of the components is needed to satisfy the
theoretical requirements of my theoretic frame (as in Figure 3).

Physical
Security
Competiiton for
Tangible Assets
(X5a)

Resources

CompetitionBased Conflict
(X5)
Key:
Boolean “or”:

Borders

Economic
Power
Competition for
Non-Tangible
Assets (X5b)

Social
Power
Political
Power

Sustaining Component:

Figure 3.3: Conceptualization of Competition-Based Conflict
PSYCHOLGOICAL MOTIVATION
The final theoretical component is “Psychological Motivation” (X6). Existing
theory includes the components of distinctive identity and social recognition of identity
as the necessary components of PSC that explain any psychological motivation. When
the components are conceptualized as distinctive identity and social recognition of
identity, it is not clear what aspects(s) of identity an actor, actors, or group of actors are
seeking from identity distinction. In fact, these conceptualizations can apply to both the
individual and the group. Furthermore, because the theoretic frame under examination is
relative to social or inter-communal violence, both distinctive identity and social
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recognition identity are directed toward wanting acceptance from the external world
(sociological) not the internal (psychological). As such, both components are very
similar- actors want others to recognize and accept who they are and what makes them
different. As conceptualized, these two components do not capture the different
psychological and sociological factors that could be sustaining PSC.
The final component of my theoretic conceptualization of PSC is the secondary
category of “Psychological Motivation. This category is divided into four radial
categories: emotion (X6a), perception (X6b), self-identity (X6c), and group-identity (X6d).
Emotion is conceptualized as behavior that is motivated by love, hate, anger, fear,
happiness, sadness, and the like. Similarly, perception is conceptualized as actions that
arise from feelings of deprivation, historical context, social issues and context,
misperception, attribution distortion, and rationalization. Self and group-identity are both
conceptualized as behaviors that are founded in ethnicity, culture, religion, and language.
Action based on self-identity is motivated from how an actor defines/sees him/herself,
individually whereas behavior based in group-identity is based on how an actor defines
themselves relative to any group affiliation or membership.
As with Competition-Based Conflict, the individual components within the radial
category of Psychological Motivations are considered to be jointly sufficient to capture
the role of psychological motivation in PSC (see Figure 4). At least one, but not
necessarily all, of the psychological components must be present to satisfy the categorical
theoretical minimum. Finally, the category of Psychological Motivation, like
Competition-Based Conflict, is conceptualized as a sustaining category. Rather than
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explaining who participates in PSC and how, it can explain why actors engage in violence
and why PSC is enduring in nature.

Emotion (X6a)

Perception (X6b)
Psychologoical
Motivation (X6)

Self-Identity
(X6c)
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Group-Identity
(X6d)

Sustaining Component:

Figure 3.4: Conceptualization of Psychological Motivation
CONCLUSION
My proposed theoretical framework presents six independently necessary
components of PSC as seen in Figure 5: ≥ 20 years violent conflict, the participation of
non-state actors, ≥ 3 violence/peace cycles, ≥ 500 deaths, competition-based conflict, and
psychological motivation. These components are reinforced by other necessary and
sufficient radial components that provide a clear and measurable theoretical

80

conceptualization of PSC. The following is a pictorial representation of the proposed
conceptualization:
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Figure 3.5: Proposed Conceptualization of PSC
The proposed conceptualization of the-theoretic framework of PSC retains the
essence of the characteristics identified in the existing literature. The creation of radial
categories to complement existing concepts retains family resemblances to Azar’s

81

original conceptualization while providing a clearer model on which to test and study the
phenomenon of PSC. This two-tiered approach not only presents a more comprehensive
and measurable conceptualization of PSC, it also provides descriptive and sustaining
components. As such, I directly engage in the discussion as to why PSC endures across
time on a theoretic level.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGIES
INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of my dissertation is to present a modified and testable
theoretic conceptualization of the theory of PSC. To accomplish this, specific cases
relevant to PSC are selected and analyzed. A set of systematic empirical methodologies
are utilized. While this is a multi-method research project, because of the overall research
design, the principal methodology of my dissertation is comparative case study. Thus,
my dissertation is qualitative in nature and Charles Ragin’s Boolean truth table is the
primary tool of analysis.
The comparative historical approach, through the use of case studies (George &
Bennett, 2005, 93), is the approach of qualitative discovery that will be employed.
Qualitative methods can be useful when the unit of analysis is categorical rather than
numerical, the research agenda contains historical components, research puzzles are
philosophical rather than empirical, samples are insufficient for a large-N study, or when
the goal of inquiry is in understanding the larger implications rather than gaining insight
in one aspect of a phenomenon (Agresti and Finlay, 2009, 12; King, Keohane, and Verba
(KKV), 1994, 5). “[T]he best way to understand a particular event may be by using the
methods of scientific inference also to study systematic patterns in similar parallel
events” (descriptive inference) (KKV, 1994, 34). “Interpretivists seek to explain the
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reasons for intentional action in relations to the whole set of concepts and
practices in which it is embedded” (KKV, 1994, 37). Qualitative approaches can build,
reject, modify, clarify, or fill gaps or omissions in theory (Babbie, 2006, 298; KKV,
1994, 99-109). As such, the qualitative, an historical case study approach can provide
significant utility to the research goals of my dissertation.
Historical analysis can be used to gather information to test theories across and
within historical cases. The “historical macro-analysis” method seeks to comprehend and
explain the causal mechanisms of political phenomena (Büthe, 2002, 481). This approach
provides valuable contextual and inferential insight as to the causal and sustaining
mechanisms of a phenomenon. Historical analysis can be used (1) in parallel
demonstration of theory- where multiple historical cases are examined to determine
whether a theory “repeatedly demonstrate[s] its fruitfulness-its ability convincingly to
order the evidence- when applied to a series of relevant historical trajectories”; (2) with
contrast of contexts- to test if a theory holds from case to case; or (3) by controlling
comparisons through determination of whether key variables change before or after an
event (G&B, 2005, 81; Skocpol and Somers, 1980, 175-8). Because of this, an historical
approach combined with comparative case analysis is useful in investigating the theoretic
aspects of PSC.
Because PSCs are long-lived conflicts, using a historical research design is an
optimal methodology for discovering the necessary and sufficient components of PSC.
As I am seeking to identify causal inference, Skocpol and Somers’ (1980) inductive,
macro-causal approach provides utility. Histories of PSCs can be assessed for their
similarities and difference (Mills [1888] 1970, Büthe 2002), across and within cases, and
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to identify necessary components. Because of this, the extended case method is used to
test the theoretic components of PSC. The extended case method is where “case study
observations are used to discover flaws in and to improve existing social theories”
(Babbie, 2006, 298; Buraway, 1998, 9).
In clearly identifying what a researcher expects to find before discovery, Buraway
conceptualizes the utility of extended case methods in not discarding theory, but in
rebuilding or improving on existing theory by filling “theoretical gaps and silences”
(Buraway, 1998, 10). Buraway’s statement perfectly captures the goal of my dissertation
and the reasons why I am using case-based methodologies.
CASE SELECTION
In determining which histories are to be analyzed, purposeful selection of cases
must occur. George and Bennett define cases as “instance[s] of a class of events” such as
revolutions, regimes, or economic systems (2005, 17). Cases can be identified by
selecting all the cases that contain the variable (component) of interest, selecting samples
from the population of cases, or by using specific criteria to purposively select cases
(Singer, 1977, 9-10). Using specific criteria, such as key components, is an example of
purposeful selection. Cases can also be selected because they are critical examples in the
puzzle under study (G & B, 2005, 80; Gerring, 2007, 233-238). Additionally, researches
can choose cases that are most similar (method of agreement); most different (method of
difference), or because they are negative cases where the components are present but the
outcome is different (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004; Mill, [1888], 1970, 206; Singer, 1977,
9-10; Skocpol and Somers, 1980, 183). By using purposeful selection, researchers can
identify previously unknown components that are relevant, determine which components
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are necessary- “a condition that must be present for the effect to follow”, which
component(s) is (are) sufficient- “a condition that if present, guarantees the effect in
question” (Babbie, 2006, 93) to explain the phenomenon, and/or identify causal
mechanisms (Brady and Collier, 2004, 23-24; Skocpol and Somers, 1980, 183). From
this, researchers are able to generalize observed commonalities and test the theories of the
puzzles they are attempting to solve.
Because my goal is to test and modify theory, how I go about the purposeful
selection of cases is critical to success. To build his theory, Azar selected PSC 13 cases,
(Azar, 1983, 87). While it is my hope to eventually include all of Azar’s cases and add
others that may be PSCs, the time-consumptive research method of content/discourse
analysis makes an extensive list of cases prohibitive at this time. Thus, in my case
selection, controlled comparison is utilized where specific selection criteria are used to
avoid selection bias and provide the most useful critical cases to initially test my
theoretical conceptualization. Hence, four cases are selected.
The first two cases that are selected are the Arab/Israeli conflict and the Northern
Ireland PSCs22. These two cases currently represent the more “troublesome” and
“hopeful” PCS cases. Presently, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most intractable and least
likely PSC to reach any sort of resolution in the near future. Conversely, the Northern
Ireland case appears to be in the process of resolving its enduring conflict. Thus, of the
currently identified PSCs, it appears to be the most “promising” case of ending their PSC.

22

While at prima-facie it may appear that using these two “hallmark” cases introduces selection bias,
however, it is the theoretic structure that is being tested and not the cases themselves. Thus, selecting
critical PSC cases offers the greatest utility in theoretic evaluation. If the propositions of my dissertation do
not stand up to the empirical evidence presented by two well-established PSCs, then the premise of the
project is flawed. These cases are selected because the focus of inquiry is on the theory presented, not the
testing of the cases themselves.
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Hence, both the Arab-Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs are selected through the use of
critical case criteria.
The third case is selected because it has “most similar” attributes which are its
conflict patterns and the prolonged length of the conflict. This is the Kashmir conflict.
Control of the region of Kashmir (an area abutting the states of India, Pakistan, and
China) has been under dispute since the end of British rule in South Asia in 1947 (Husain
2009). This case is salient to this study because it has several similar attributes to the
Arab-Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs such as being enduring in nature, the
participation of non-state actors, and violence/peace cycles. Thus, it is selected as a “most
similar” case.
Finally, a negative case is selected because it has many of the same components
as recognized PSCs, yet no violent conflict has emerged to the point where any scholar or
entity has classified it as a PSC. Thus, this case will be used to test for the theoretical
sufficiency and necessity of specific components in my theoretic frame. The negative
case will be Post World War II Belgium. After World War II, Belgium experienced deep
cultural discord between its predominantly Walloon (French speaking) and Flemish
(Dutch speaking) citizens. Yet, no violent conflict emerged. Thus, the case of post-World
War II Belgium is selected because it has many similarities to other PSCs without the
presence of violent conflict.
The use of case studies is useful for providing an understanding of how variables
act and interact with each other (Gurr, 1970, 20). By selecting four cases; two critical
cases, one most similar case, and a negative case, I strive to determine what components
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are truly necessary (and sufficient) to explain PSC. If successful, a better understanding
of what the necessary components of PSC will be discovered.
METHODOLOGY: DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION APPROACH
Data collection techniques in this dissertation are designed for the purpose of
conducting content and discourse analysis to determine the necessary components of
PSC. By analyzing the content and quotes within newsprint, it is hoped that the
descriptive and supporting aspects of PSC are identified. To this end, the following
section reveals the how the data collection methods are approached and what sources are
used to collect the data for this project.
Identifying the parameters of how data will be collected is the first step in
planning data collection. In PSC, this begins with the clear identification of the dates,
actors and the originating issue(s) of contention. As the nature of PSC can change and
spill-over to include other actors and issues through time, identifying and using the
original actors keeps the research and measurement attuned and maintains a measure in
internal validity. While historical antecedents are critical to understanding conflict, the
enduring nature PSC can introduce ambiguity through time as actors and issues of
contention change. For example, because of the historical context of the Jewish people,
the Crusades, the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the colonial relationship
between Great Britain with both the Arab and Israeli people, issues and events can spillover to include other actors and new topics of contention. To avoid the challenges that
this can present to the data collection process and the validity to the project as a whole,
data collection for the Arab-Israeli case will begin with the establishment of Israel as a
state on May 14, 1948; data collection on the Northern Ireland protracted conflict will
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begin with the establishment of Ireland as an independent state from Great Britain on
December 2, 1922; data collection in the Kashmir conflict will begin starting with the end
of British colonial occupation of the region in 1947; and the October 20, 1945 vote
rejecting Belgian re-unification with France in favor or autonomy will be the beginning
data of data collection for the Belgian case. Only events occurring in the actual conflict
territories will be considered.
It is not the intention to dismiss or diminish the importance of historical context
from this study, however. Indeed, historical narrative is included in this project to provide
the much-needed context that surrounds these conflicts. Historical narrative, therefore,
will be the first part of the discussion of each case. Each cases’ historical narrative
contains the contextual background as well as events during the times where violent
conflict did or should have occur(ed).
To examine the presence of PSC over time, data is collected in each case in fiveyear intervals for a period of 12 months at the beginning of each five-year period. For
example, as Israel became a sovereign state in 1948, data is collected for the months in
1948 that it was a sovereign state and then in 1953. Data is collected from January 1
through December 31 during 1953. The next interval where data is collected in the
Israeli/Arab case is 1958, where data is also collected for that calendar year as well. Thus,
the years in which information is sought in the Arab-Israeli conflict are: 1948, 1953,
1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. The same timeinterval procedure is used for all the cases.
At each twenty-year bench mark, each individual case is assessed. Independent
components within each case are evaluated to determine its presence or non-presence
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using the theoretical minimums identified within this dissertation. If all of the six
proposed necessary components are present, then that conflict will be coded as being a
PSC for that 20-year window. For example, the Palestinian/Israeli case will be evaluated
to determine if it is a PSC in 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008.
In measuring for the presence of individual components, various sources of information
are utilized. To identify who the actors in PSC are (masses or elite), the deaths as a result
of PSC, the conflict-issue, and determine the psychological motivation of actors, direct
quotes and information is gathered from newsprint. Databases with newspaper archives,
such as ProQuest and Lexus Nexus, are the primarily sources of newspaper reports
concerning the cases under investigation. The New York Times is the primary/preferred
news outlet that information is gathered from. This is because the New York Times is the
paper of record for the United States. When the Times has insufficient data (articles) on a
case, the Times of London is utilized next.
DATA COLLECTION
Because content and discourse analysis methods are being utilized, measures are
taken to ensure the reliability of the data that is collected. This is accomplished by: (1)
creating a set of codes prior to beginning data collection23, (2) applying these codes
systematically to the data collected, (3) testing the reliability of the codes and coding
methods by re-examining the coding used , and (4) analyzing the data systematically
(Bernard, 2002, 476).

23

Please find established coding parameters in the Appendix, table 1. Additionally, a dictionary of
psychological motivation has also been built throughout this dissertation’s process. It is organized into four
sections: emotion, perception, self-, and group-identity. Prior to beginning data collection, the dictionary
was “filled” with words that communicate psychological motivation in each category. Words added to the
dictionary during the data collection process include citations for justification and collaborative purposes.
Please refer to Appendix, table 2 for a sample of the dictionary
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Each article reported from each case is analyzed to determine whether there was
an act of violence that occurred, when it occurred, who perpetrated the act, who the
victim(s) were, if there were injuries in the violence, if there were deaths in the violence,
and which actors died in the violence. Other information collected includes whether there
were direct quotations in the report and their sources, which group of actors made the
statement, and whether it was a member of the masses or a member of the state
government elite24. Direct quotes from the actors are analyzed to ascertain the source of
the violent conflict (over tangible or non-tangible assets) as well as any psychological
components that may be present (emotions, identity, and perceptions) as it pertains to the
violent conflict. Key words and phrases are identified and coded that communicate the
presence of the identified components. Verbs, adjectives, and context within quotes are
analyzed to determine whether they communicate psychological attributes. A statement
such as, “Israeli fighter jets released bombs on civilian populations in the Golan Heights”
would be coded as no psychological motivation or conflict source content identified as
this is a statement of fact. However, consider the following quotes:
Waad Hussein Massaad, a pretty 12-year-old, vowed to blow herself up in
an attack against Jews as rage over Israeli actions swept through the Arab
world yesterday. "I have nothing to fight with but my flesh. . . I want to
die with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. I hate the Jews; I want to kill
them," she said. . . (Washington Times 2002).
They want to hunt us (New York Times 1973).

24

An elite, in this project, is conceptualized as an actor who acts as an official representative, spokesman,
or leader of a governmental body. For example, an Israeli officer speaking in uniform, in an official
capacity, is coded as “elite”, where leaders of non-state organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah were
coded as “masses”.

91

The content of communication will be analyzed for indications of motivations25 for
violent conflict on the part of the actors. As in the examples above, the quote from Waad
Hussein Massaad, if used, would be coded as being a quote from a Palestinian, a member
of the “masses”, and has having the psychological motives of emotion (“hate”) and selfidentity (“I”) present. Similarly, the second quote is from another Palestinian youth.
Thus, this quote would be coded as being from a Palestinian, from the masses, and as
having the psychological motivations of perception (“want”) and group-identification
(“They”, “us”). Words that contain psychological motivation identified from a
dictionary of terms that communicate psychological motivation.26 This dictionary
contains the definition of the word and what psychological motivation it communicates.
MEASUREMENT: THE BOOLEAN METHOD
In measuring the components of PSCs, a building-block approach is used as each
identified conceptual sub-type of PSC is applied to fill in the existing theoretical gaps
(George & Bennett, 2005, 79). This begins by measuring identified components using
pre-determined coding. As concepts are being measured only for their presence, they are
coded using a dichotomous nominal scale: 1= phenomenon is present, 0 = phenomenon is
not present. Each of the identified components is designated as either present or not
present as determined by their presence in each news report. Because I am building an
original dataset, to ensure the internal reliability of my data collection, I employ the
following techniques: (1) When data collection on each case is completed, I wait for a
25

Statements that contain too few words to definitively determine meaning or are ambiguous, though are
coded for a quote being present in the report, are not coded as containing competition-based or
psychological motives. Meaning or motive inferred or directly stated from the author of the article are also
excluded. For a full set of exclusions, please refer to the appendix.
26
Because no pre-existing dictionary or collection of adjectives or verbs that communicate motivation has
been located, I am building this dictionary myself. Though every effort is being made to maintain reliability
and objectivity, not having an independent and external resource is a weakness of my project.
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minimum of one month and return to the data to double-check the coding. (2) For each
case, every tenth article entry in my dataset is selected for review, (3) I return to the
original article, re-read it, and re-code the article. (4) I compare the original coding to the
second coding to ensure that coding has been consistent over time. (5) The articles that
are re-checked are marked indicating that they were used to check coding reliability.
Once data collection and coding is completed, the deductive approach to theory
testing is applied through the use of a Boolean truth table. The individual components
being measured are classified as independent components with the dependent variable
being the binary determination of the presence of PSC (Ragin, 1987, 85-88). Utilizing a
binary truth table enables the independent components to be sorted in “logical
combinations of values” (Ragin, 1985, 87).
Truth tables provide all the possible combinations of independent variables to
indicate whether a phenomenon is present by having as many rows as there are
combinations of variables. As there are six different components being tested there will
be 256 possible combinations. The following truth table, based on the model by Ragin,
demonstrates the format and coding that will be used in evaluating the proposed theory of
protracted conflict:
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Table 4.1: Sample of Boolean Truth Table
Condition
X1
a/0
A/1

X2
B/1
B/1

X3
C/1
C/1

X4
D/1
D/1

X5
E/1
E/1

X6
F/1
F/1

PSC
Outcome
Y
0
1

Key: 1= Phenomenon is present
0= Phenomenon is not Present
A= (any capital letter) Phenomenon is present27
a= (any small-case letter) Phenomenon is not present
X1 = Existence of non-state actors in violent conflict
X2 = 20 years or more duration of violent conflict
X3 = Minimum of three violence/peace cycles
X4 = 500 or more deaths directly related to same violent conflict
X5 = Competition-based Conflict
X6 = Psychological Motivation
Thus, when radial categories are collapsed so that only the secondary categories are
measured, there is only one possible combination of components to fulfill the necessary
conditions for PSC to be present, when all of the components are present. This is
represented by the Boolean combination A+B+C+D+E+F= PSC(1). When all of the
radial categories are expanded and included, however, as there are thirteen components
there are over five thousand positive PSC combinations (13!-6!=7!). Boolean
designations for the components tested are: A= Non-state actors, B= 20 Years, C= 3
Violence/Peace Cycles, D= 500 deaths, E= Territory, F= Resources, G= Physical
Security, H= Political Power, I= Social Power, J= emotion, K= Perception, L= Selfidentity, M= Group-identity. Positive Boolean combinations for PSC must comply with
the following structure: A+B+C+D+ (E or F or G or H or I) + (J or K or L or M) = PSC

27

Alphabetical representation of concepts are used only for demonstration of Boolean Algebraic
combinations.
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(1)28. Hence, when all the radial categories are included as Boolean positive outcomes,
some of the positive outcomes could be represented by: ABCDeFGHIJKlM,
ABCDEfGHiJKLm, ABCDeFgHIJklm, ABCDeFGhiJKlM, or ABCDEfGHIJkLM. When
compared against this Boolean structure, the criteria for what cases are and what cases
are not PSCs becomes clear. As additional cases are applied to the proposed theoretical
frame, they will be compared to the Boolean matrix to determine if the cases correspond
to any one of the Boolean combinations that equate to a positive condition for the
presence of PSC.
Using this formatting, cases will be examined for the presence of each of the
thirteen components by applying them to a Boolean truth table. For example, while
examining the information for the Arab-Israeli Conflict, if it is found that there were 500
or more deaths during the 20-year window of 1968-1988, then component X2 will be
coded as “1” meaning that the existence of that variable was present during that particular
span of time. If, however, the actual deaths were found to be lower than 500 between
1968 and 1988, the variable X2 would be coded as “0”. This would indicate that the
variable was not found to be present.
Because the Arab-Israeli, Northern Ireland, and Kashmir conflicts are all
established PSCs, each conflict must have conflict patterns that match one of positive
Boolean combinations to support my theoretic frame. If any of these cases are found to
have conflict patterns other than the combinations of components that positively identify
violent conflicts as PSCs, then my proposals cannot be supported.

28

Note that component s A, B, C, and D (the four descriptive components of Azar’s effective participation)
are present all the time.
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APPLYING BOOLEAN ALGEBRA
At this point in the project, for Boolean Analysis to be used to establish
theoretical minimums, it is necessary to record only the presence or lack of presence of
each component. Hence, when an instance of competition-based conflict over physical
security is noted in a direct quote, the existence of that particular component will be
coded as a “1”. At the end of each calendar month, the following components are tallied
to determine if they meet the Nedler-Mead model’s minimum of three data points to
begin to form a pattern: violent incidents; presence of non-state actors; conflict over
tangible assets of territory, resources, and security; conflict over non-tangible assets such
as political power, and social power; and psychological motivations of emotion,
perception, self-identity, and group-identity. If there are less than three events in each of
these components within a one-month period, the category is coded as “not present” (0)
for that month on a Boolean Truth table.
At the end of each calendar year, the monthly sums of each component are
calculated. Components that are present for at least three of the twelve months (25%) are
coded as present in a Boolean Truth table for that year. Next, to determine if each
component is present consistently over time, annual totals are assessed over a twentyyear window (the [proposed] minimum time that violent conflict must be present for a
violent conflict to be considered a PSC). At the end of each twenty-year cycle, each
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component is evaluated for its presence in that particular cycle. If the component is
present in at least three of the one-year increments (75%), then a pattern is emerging and
it is coded as present. Then, each of the six proposed necessary components of PSC are
assessed for their presence within each 20-year cycle. If all of the components are
present, then that twenty-year cycle is coded as present for PSC.
All of the components are now assessed to determine necessity and sufficiency.
“A cause is defined as necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to occur”
(Ragin, 1987, 99). If each component is found to be present in each of the three positive
PSC cases, then it is determined that, that component is a necessary component of PSC
(Ragin, 1987, 100). Finally, the components of the negative (Belgian) case are analyzed
to determine whether any components are sufficient to “cause” a PSC. Sufficiency is
assessed by determining which component are and are not present in the negative case as
opposed to the positive cases (Ragin, 1987, 99). If one or more components are found to
be absent in the negative case but are present in the three positive cases, then a strong
argument can be made that these components are a sufficient component of PSC.
The exceptions in using the Nedler-Mead model as minimum criterion are with
the components that measure minimum time duration and directly relatable deaths.
Because using a 20-year minimum for a violent conflict is supported in enduring rivalry
and generational literature (the social component of PSC), any violent conflict that has
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lasted less than 20 years is automatically coded as “not present” (0). Similarly, any
violent conflict that has endured more than 20 years over the same issue or set of issues,
and the other “necessary” components are coded present, it will coded as “present” unless
there has been a continuous break in hostilities (over the same issue[s]) that totals 20
years or more. In this case, the “clock” will start over again, and the violent conflict will
be coded as “not present” (0) until it once again reaches the 20-year mark of violent
conflict. The other exception to using the Nedler-Mead model of minimums is with 500
or more directly attributable deaths over each 20-year cycle. I using this criteria, there
must be at least two deaths per month for a month to be coded as “present” for deaths and
25 deaths per year for the year to be coded as present (1).
THE CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD
Utilizing Boolean approaches to analyzing categorical data is particularly useful
in honing combinations of components to clarify theoretical matrices. In studies such as
mine, it is particularly useful in identifying which components should be eliminated or
added in the consideration of the theoretically necessary components of PSC. Limits to
using Boolean methodologies, however, can be found in discovering the underlying
patterns in the data that could help to explain the “relatedness” of observed data
(Tchernova, 2006, 4). As I propose that there are sustaining categorical components
(Competition-Based Conflict and Psychological Motivation) within PSC (and that there
are individual components within each category that are jointly necessary components of
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PSC), analyzing how components vary and cluster can add further clarity as to which
components contribute to PSC. Thus, factor analysis is employed.
Factor analysis is a statistical method that reduces observed, correlational data to
determine the relatedness of the data. It assesses whether variations in the data are a
reflection of other latent variables that are not readily (or have not been) observed. This
is done by reducing the variables used in the study into a smaller number of derived
variables (factors). Factor analysis uses existing, observed data and compresses the data
into a single variable called a factor or a single typology (Ragin, 1987, 149-50; TorresReyna 2012). This creates indices that contain variables that measure “similar things”
conceptually to explore the structure of a set of variables or to confirm a specific set of
hypotheses (Torres-Reyes 2012). Using no outcome variable, factors show how variables
are correlated or interrelated through their variation patterns (clustering) (Ragin, 1987,
149-50).
Using confirmatory factor analysis, I assess whether PSC has a single common
factor for all of the components being measured or if it has more than one factor. In
essence, I confirm whether the data fits/supports my proposed conceptual model. By
analyzing factor scores, valuable theoretical insight can be gained by showing how
components should be categorized.
CONCLUSION
For the analysis of my theory, I choose four different cases. Each case represents
a different aspect of PSC. The Palestinian case is a critical case because it is currently
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deemed the most “unsovable” PSC case. Similarly, the Northern Ireland case is a critical
case because it is currently “working” towards resolution and towards no longer being
classified as a PSC. The Kashmir case is utilized because it has “most similar” attributes
to the critical cases. Lastly, the Belgian case is selected as a negative case. This is
because, like the Kashmir case, it has many similar components to the critical cases, yet,
no violent conflict has occurred. In selecting these four cases, a cross-section of PSCs is
identified and is tested determine what the necessary (and hopefully sufficient)
components of PSC are.
To gather the data to test my theory, I utilize content analysis of newsprint reports
as my primary source of information. This is done to be able to capture the continual
episodic violence that can fail to meet the minimum criteria for selection in more formal,
large scale conflict data sets. More importantly, though, it allows me to capture and
analyze the statements of the actual actors involved in each violent conflict as the events
actually occur. In doing so, I hope to glean a more accurate portrayal of the motivational
factors compelling the actors to violence.
Lastly, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods to interpret the data that I
collect. Boolean analysis is used to determine the necessary and sufficient components of
PSC. Though limited, through the use of a logit regression, I can determine if there is a
statistically significant relationship between the proposed necessary components and PSC
100

and glimpses of the strength of their relationships can be seen as well. By using a mix of
qualitative and quantitative methodologies in my dissertation, I drive at not only what are
the descriptive components of PSC, but what are the necessary, sustaining components as
well.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ARAB/ISRAELI CASE
“If love of your land is a crime, all of history is criminal” – inscription found on a wall in
Joya, Lebanon.i
INTRODUCTION
To determine the necessary components of PSC, I begin by identifying the
components of the Arab/Israeli PSC by tracing the historical development of the Israeli
state qualitatively. I establish who the critical actors are in the dyad and how the conflict
had developed over time. Focus is placed on components that can clarify the descriptive
aspects of PSC and on identifying supporting components that could play a role in the
enduring nature of PSC. This is accomplished by examining the major conflicts/wars that
have occurred in the dyad and by examining the statements of the actors that are involved
in the conflict to assess glean explicit and implicit motives for the continuation of violent
behavior29 .
The cornerstone of contention in the modern Arab/Israeli PSC is the territory that
the Israeli government and people now claim as their sovereign territory30. “The core of
29

Search criteria for the Arab/Israeli cases includes: Israel, or Israeli, and Palestinian, or Arab, and dead, or
killed, (and) or casualties. For other coding rules, examples of coding, and a sample of how the data set is
organized, please refer to Appendix 1 at the end of the dissertation.
30
The question over which group has the greater/more compelling territorial claim in this case is an issue of
great importance and contention to more people than just the actors directly involved in this PSC. Because
of this realization, it is my hope that if there are statements and information in this dissertation that are
found to be distasteful to readers that favor one side over the other, that they are mitigated/balanced by
other statements and information. Every effort is made to be as neutral and intellectually honest as possible.
The goal of this dissertation, and in every case analyzed herein, is not to place an evaluative judgment on
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any set of actors as to their “rightness” or” wrongness”, but to determine as accurately and as
comprehensively as possible necessary components of PSC.
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the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the claim of two peoples to the same piece of land”
(Dowty, 2008, 4). This conflict, however, did not start with the establishment of the state
of Israel. Whether the state of Israel should exist and be a home for the Jewish people has
been a source conflict between the Arab and Jewish people for more than a century.
Because of this, a historical analysis of the how the Arab/Israeli PSC began could provide
context and qualitative support to efforts to understanding the necessary components of
PSC. Though a compelling argument can be made that the roots of this conflict spans
centuries of contention and conflict over the same territory, because of space limitations,
only the conditions that played a role in the establishment of the state of Israel, a
cornerstone contention in this PSC, are developed. Thus, the development of this case
begins with the events that played a role in the development of the Arab/Israeli PSC and
the establishment of the Israeli state.
Beginning with the events and actors surrounding with the origins with the of the
Zioinst movement, I trace the events that led up to the establishment of the Israeli state in
1948. Then, from 1948 through 2012, I used data collected from 13 evenly-spaced, oneyear time windows and the major wars fought between the dyad to trace the conflict
through the eyes of the actors. This provides snapshots of the actors’ actions, statements,
and motivations across the development of the conflict. Finally, in the analysis section, I
assess the components measured across the span of the conflict to determine which (if
any) of the components that were measured are significant to this critical PSC case.
NO PLACE TO CALL HOME – THE RISE OF ZIONISM
During the second half of the 19th century, Jewish sentiment for establishing a
home state began to coalesce across Europe. This was for two reasons. Because Judaism
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is a non-proselytizing religion, many Jews feared that the liberal policies of Western
Europe would lead to assimilation, threatening the very existence of the Jewish faith.
Also, Jewish sentiment for a homeland grew due to increasing persecution at the hands
Tsarist Russia and in Eastern Europe.
Though persecution of the Jewish people is documented throughout time, in
Western Europe in particular, this particular historical period saw large-scale massacres
(pogroms) of the Jewish people in Poland and other Tsarist regions- an area that
reportedly held over 50% of the European Jewish population (Dowty, 2008, 2-3, 9, 27;
Garner, 1994, 12). To flee persecution and preserve their faith, the Jewish people began
to immigrate to their ancestral homeland of Palestine (Filastin), an area which was
located completely within the Turkish Ottoman Empire.
The pogroms began with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in March of 1881.
Upon Tsar Alexander’s death, reforms that had benefited the Jewish people in Tsarist
Russia were immediately reversed. By the end of the year, approximately 250 pogroms
had been carried out and over the next four decades, an estimated 4 million Jews fled
Russia (Aronson, 1980, 28; Ettinger, 1976, 881-888). At that particular time, only 2% of
Jewish refugees fled to the “Holy Land”. Overwhelming majorities fled into Western
Europe. Once in Europe, however, Jewish immigrants faced similar anti-Semitic
sentiments that they endured under the new regime. Jewish migrants hoped to assimilate
into a new home and a new country in Western Europe. The predominantly young and
well-educated (because of Tsar Alexander II’s reforms) Jewish migrants faced rising
exclusivist nationalist sentiment across Europe, however (Öke 1982). They were not
wanted where they came from and they were not wanted where they were going to. It is
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in this environment that the prospect of immigration into Palestine began appeal to the
Jewish people. The Zionist movement began to grow as Jewish immigration into
Palestine increased and the idea of a Jewish home state began to take root.
Initial attempts by Zionists to bring the Jewish plight to the attention of
international actors failed, however. It was not until Austrian journalist and philosopher,
Theodor Herzel, published, The Jew’s State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution to the
Issue of the Jews in 1896 and Der Judenstaar in 1897, and the First Zionist Congress in
1897 that Zionism31 began to grow (Dowty, 2008, 36). Herzl asserted that Jews should
be “granted sovereignty over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful
requirements of a nation” (Öke, 1982, 329). When Herzl tried to establish a Jewish
colony within the Ottoman Empire, though, Jewish liaison, Philip de Newlinski was told
by the Ottoman grand Vizier, Halil Rifat Pasa, to relay the following message:
If Mr. Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to
take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does
not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by
fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood. We
will again cover it with our blood before we allow it to be wrested away
from us (Öke, 1982, 330).
Initial Zionists efforts to establish a homeland were not fixated on Palestine, however.
Attempts to establish settlements in British Uganda, Cypress, South Africa, and the US,
were also made (Kornberg, 1980, 242). Though the thought of a homeland was wellreceived by Jews in principle, it was not until a fresh wave of persecution upon the
Jewish people that occurred in Russia and Poland (1904-13) that the Jewish people began
to take an active interest in a Jewish home state in Palestine (Gerner, 1994, 16).

31

Though there are many different tenets in Zionism, it can be generically conceptualized as the
claim/belief that the goal of reestablishing the historic homeland of the Jews, Eretz Israel, is a legitimate
goal of the Jewish people.
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The second wave of Jewish immigration (aliyot) eventually formed the backbone
of the drive to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. They did not want to live as a
minority, being assimilated into Arab communities. Many of Israel’s emergent political
leaders, such as David Ben-Gurion came from this wave of immigrants into Israel
(Gerner 1994)32.
During this period, the beginning of the twentieth century prior to World War I, as
persecution increased, Jews began to lobby the international community to gain support
the establishment of a Jewish home state (Lalmbroza 1987). Additionally, groups were
founded to assist Jews wanting to immigrate and to aid new settlers already in Palestine.
These organizations included the Jewish National Fund which purchased land in
Palestine in the name of the Jewish people, the Keren Hayesod which helped to finance
agricultural and settlement efforts in Palestine, the Jewish Agency which aided
immigration and settlement establishment, and Hadassah which funded medical
institutions in Palestine (Gerner, 1994, 17).
To understand a measure of why the Arab community had such a strong reaction
to the prospect of a Jewish state, perspective is needed. In its hey-day, in the 17th century,
the Ottoman Empire spanned across all of Northern Africa, including the Arabian
Peninsula, and reached up into Eastern Europe through the Caspian and Black Seas
(Dowty, 2008, 15; Lewis, 1980, 29). In a less than a century (1830-1911), however, the
Ottoman Empire lost half of the territory that it had possessed at its height to European,
32

In the interest of intellectual honesty, it is only fair to point out that there were divisions in the Zionist
movement regarding the establishment of a Jewish home state. Early immigrants of the first aliyot, like
Agudat Yisrael, did not favor establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Revisionist Zionists envisioned a
homogenous Jewish state restored to its furthest historic boundaries. Labor Zionists felt that a Jewish home
state should be built organically, from the ground up. Finally, Brith Shalom (political Zionism) believed
that Palestine was a land of two people and that both peoples should work together to establish one state for
all (Gerner, 1994, 19-21).
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colonial powers (Dowty, 2008, 15-16; Lewis, 2002, 68). Additionally, due to their defeat
in the Crimean War, the Ottoman government was forced to make religious concessions
granting equal and non-discriminatory status to non-Muslims throughout the remaining
Ottoman Empire. This was done to suit the interests of colonial powers (Dowty, 2008,
17). Thus, by the time that Jewish immigration began to increase at the end of the
nineteenth century and the Zionist movement emerged upon the international
consciousness, the Ottoman Empire was already reeling from the embarrassing loss of
half of their land and forced religious-based concessions.
When Jewish immigration into the Holy Land began, because of the Islamic
tradition of accepting D’immi33 (Y’eor 1985), Jews were accepted and accommodated in
Muslim society. The expectation was that immigrants would be assimilated into the host
culture. However, as levels Jewish immigration increased, Ottoman leaders understood
the potential implications of mass-Jewish immigration and instituted conditions on
immigration policies to stem the rising tide of Jewish immigrants. This included that Jews
could immigrate into any area of the Ottoman Empire except the Palestinian region; Jews
could immigrate only as individuals, not as part of an organized political entity; and that
once in the Ottoman Empire, Jews could not purchase land (Dowty, 2008, 42-44).
However, the lack of ability to enforce these policy changes and attempts at
modernization led to unwanted and unforeseen consequences.
The Land Law reform of 1858 was part of the Tanzimat-- an attempt made by the
Ottoman Empire to modernize and reform Palestine and other parts of the Empire by
“regularizing” land ownership through a series of reforms that included registration of

33

D’immi/Dhimmi- non-Muslim, but faith-based individuals and groups, living within Muslim-dominated
territories.
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land ownership and taxation (Abu-Manneh, 1990, 261-262; Thompson, 1993, 471-472).
These reforms, however, had unforeseen and dire consequences on the peasant farmers
who had lived on and farmed these lands for generations. With no prior legal claim to the
land they occupied, many tenant farmers and their families had no way to pay for new
registration fees and taxes. What was intended to protect the Palestinian people’s
property and interests actually ended up causing them to lose the lands that they had held
for generations. When their properties were sold to often-absent (and Jewish) parties,
they were displaced and homeless when the new owners came to claim “their” new land
(Thompson, 1993, 461). Resentment against Jewish immigrants at the local level began
to increase.
Initial migration into Palestine met with minimal resistance at the “national” level,
however. At first, Ottoman leaders saw the cultural and economic influence/interference
of colonial powers as a much larger threat than a few Jewish migrants. Thus, when
Jewish immigration began, it received only minimal resistance. This initial “acceptance”
of Jewish immigrants lead) to the assertion that;
[i]f Jews fleeing the pogroms (racial massacres) of late nineteenth-century
Tsarist Russia had entered the Ottoman Empire seeking no more than the
right to live as a minority practicing its own religion, there would have
been no Arab-Israeli conflict (Dowty, 2008, 3).
As immigration increased and more Palestinian land was purchased by Jewish settlers,
however, violent conflict between Jewish settlers and Palestinians began.
As immigration continued to increase, and Herzl’s repeated requests (and
subsequent denials) for the establishment of a Jewish settlement within the Empire came
before the Vizier, the Ottomans began to take more aggressive action to stem the flow of
Jewish immigration. They tried (and failed) to persuade European powers to limit Jewish
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emigration, imposed severe entry restrictions on Jewish immigrants. Jews that were
allowed to enter the Ottoman Empire were issued visitor permits (Red Tickets) that
required that they leave after three months, and they tried to stop the legal purchase of
land by foreigners that the 1858 reforms had allowed (Öke, 1982, 334-336). By 1908,
however, the Jewish population in Palestine had tripled from its 1882 levels, and Jews
had purchased 156 square miles of land, establishing 26 colonies (Öke, 1982, 336).
The beginning of the twentieth century, prior to World War I, marked a time
where both Jewish and Arab nationalist sentiment began to grow. It was a time when
Zionists began aggressively working towards establishing a “permanent” home in
Palestine and Palestinians began to aggressively work to keep the Zionist threat to their
homeland at bay (Dowty, 2008, 66-67)34. In the following statements by local Arab
leaders just prior to 1900, it is clear that the Arab community realized even at this early
stage that a conflict over territory was forming.
But to establish Jewish colonies is another question. The Jews have the
financial capacity. They will be able to buy many tracts of land, and
displace the Arab farmers from their land and their fathers’ heritage.
However, we did not conquer this land from you. We conquered it from
the Byzantines who ruled it then. We do not owe anything to the Jews.
The Jews were not here when we conquered the country (Ruhi al-Khalidi
in Mandel, 1976, 66).
. . .Good Lord, the world is vast enough, there are still uninhabited
countries where one could settle millions of poor Jews who may perhaps
become happy there and one day constitute a nation. That would perhaps
be the best, the most rational solution to the Jewish question. But in the

34

Also in the interest of intellectual honesty, it must be stated that because Jewish immigrants came
predominantly from Western states, they travelled to Palestine with the concept of territorially-based
nationalism and statehood already in their consciousness. At this time, the concept of territorially-based
allegiance was not present in the Palestinian collective. Arab nationalism was expressed as a desire to
remove Ottoman rule rather than by territorial loyalty (Gerner, 1994, 21; Oren, 2003, 3-4). “The distinction
of Palestinians from the main Arab population emerged as a reaction to the conflict with Jewish settlers. It
did not exist before the Zionist movement, it was one of the results of it” (Dowty, 2008, 2).
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name of God, let Palestine be left in peace (Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi in
Mandel, 1976, 47-48).
As Arab nationalism grew from the Zionist threat, in-group/out-group sentiment grew as
well. In a poem published in filastin in 1913, it is clear that group bias was developing
over the land of Palestine.
Jews, sons of clinking gold, stop your deceit;
We shall not be cheated into bartering away our country!
Shall we hand it over, meekly,
While we still have some spirit left?
Shall we cripple ourselves?
The Jews, the weakest of all people and the least of them,
Are haggling with us for our land;
How can we slumber on?
We know what they want- and they have the money, all of it. . . .
And you, O Caliph, guardian of the faithful,
Have mercy on us, your shield. . .
Bearer of the Crown, does it please you
That we should witness our country
Being bought from us, wrenched from us (Mandel, 1976, 175-176)?
Written within this poem are not only statements about the growing threat of the land of
Palestine being taken from the Arabs, language also communicates an “us versus them”
mentality as well: “We shall not be cheated. . . haggling with us for our land. . .”
Perceptual statements are also present. The writer of this poem, Sheikh Sulayman al-Taji,
communicates that he believes that Jews are rich, deceptive, cheaters, weak, and lacking
the respect of others. He also indicates that he believes that the Arab people are
demoralized, have broken spirits, have a sense of learned helplessness, and need the help
of a higher power to preserve their land. Other statements by Palestinians during the
period prior to World War I share the same sentiments. Over 600 articles were written
voicing development of a negative sense of we/they thought; a growing frustration with
the actions of Jewish settlers; and negative perceptions of Jewish intentions, legitimacy,
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and character (Khalid, 1997, 122-124). Thus, at the onset of World War I, the foundation
for a PSC over the Palestinian territory (competition-based conflict), including with the
participation of state and non-state actors, episodes of violence with directly relatable
deaths, and the presence of psychological motivations were already being established.
WORLD WARS I AND II – AND ANOTHER WAR IN THE MAKING
Throughout World War I, Zionist efforts continued. Zionist lobbyists, David BenGurion and Yitzak Ben-Zvi travelled to Istanbul to seek an increase in immigration into
Palestine. Facing internal pressure and placing the war as a higher priority than Jewish
immigration, the Ottoman Empire was hostile to the prospect of increased Jewish
immigration and deported many “existing” Jewish immigrants (Dowty, 2008, 70).
The end of World War I brought the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman
Empire was divided amongst Western European allies with Transjordan (today’s states of
Israel and Jordan) being under British control. On November 2, 1917, the Balfour
Declaration was issued.
His Majesty’s government views with favor the establishment in Palestine
of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and politics
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country (Balfour 1917).
Similarly, on July 22, 1922, the League of Nations entrusted Great Britain with the
Mandate of Palestineii- a plan to establish a homeland for the Jewish people in
Palestine35. The purpose of the Mandate was to allow Britain a period of approximately
35

A dual referencing system is used for the remainder of the chapter. Though a-typical, my citation style
remains in compliance with APSA citation guidelines and serves a unique purpose (in keeping sources
clearly identified and differentiated) that complements my research goals. In-text citation indicates
information retrieved from “traditional” scholarly sources (APSA, 2006, 18-24). Because newspaper
articles are to be referenced in a notes section rather as “traditional” references, (“Information on citations
of newspaper articles, interviews, and personal communications should be included in the notes, not the
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twenty years in which to establish functional, autonomous Israeli and Palestinian states
while recognizing “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine”.
However, Arabs who been promised independence and self-determination by the British
once free of the “Turkish yolk” found themselves facing the prospect of betrayal by
colonial powers. Their land had been “mandated” away from them and they were defined
as “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world” and would be subjected to “tutelage. . .until such time as they are able to
stand alone” in Article 22 of the League of Nations’ Mandate of Palestine (League of
Nations 1924). In September of 1922, the League of Nations and Great Britain declared
that the Jewish national home would not extend to the area east of the Jordan River. The
territory east of the Jordan River (approximately 77% of the British-controlled territory),
Transjordan was given to Abdullah ibn Husayn36 to rule and the remaining 23% of the
territory was to be divided between the “indigenous” Arab Palestinians and the Jewish
people (Dowty, 2008, 72).
Palestinian resistance to the prospect of a Jewish homeland was immediate.
During this time of transition, conflicts between Arabs and Jews were numerous as
Palestinians fought to retain their homelands and Jews fought to establish a home state.
Jewish foreign ministers were assassinated, Arabs held riots and demonstrations,
synagogues were burned, and Jewish and Palestinian civilians were murdered in
numerous terrorist incidents (Dowty 2008). Similarly, economic conflict occurred as
references” (APSA, 2006, 24)), the citation for each quote referenced from newsprint is included at the end
of the chapter. Actor quotes are a foundation of my data-collection technique and each chapter can contain
well over 100 references to newspaper articles. Therefore, a dual referencing system is utilized to
distinguish news print information from other sources. This method of citation also aids in the ease of data
verification because articles that are cited in each case are referenced at the end of each chapter rather than
in one large section for all the newsprint quotes in the appendix.
36
The spelling of the King of Jordan’s name varies. For the sake of consistency, the spelling that is used in
the first reference cited is used.
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well. Products were boycotted by both sides. Palestinians were denied jobs in Jewishdominated areas (and vice versa). Additionally, as immigration continued to increase as a
result of increased persecution between World War I and World War II37, violence
between the actors increased as well (Samuel 1920). Arab diplomatic pressure caused
Britain to try to limit the number of immigrants and land purchases through the Passfield
White Papers of 1930 and the British White Papers of 1939. Despite this, the percentage
of the Jewish population in Palestine grew, from eleven percent in 1922 to thirty-three
percent in 1947 (608,000) (Bard 2004).
The increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine between World Wars I and II
stemmed from two primary causes. The first reason was that Zionism presented the first
real promise of a home state for the Jewish people in almost two millennia. The second
reason for increased Jewish immigration into Palestine was that persecution of European
Jews (in Germany and Poland in particular) was increasing during the 1920s through the
early 1940s and “traditional” havens that were previously open to Jewish immigrants had
closed their gates (Dowty, 2008, 73-4; Stone, 1997, 177). Consequently, Palestine
offered the only hope of refuge and a home for displaced European Jews.
As the Jewish population increased in Palestine through each aliya , violent
conflicts increased throughout the 1920s as Palestinians fought against further Jewish
immigration into their homeland (Gerner, 1994, 25; Oren, 2003, 3; Yiftachel,
2006,122)iii,iv, v. Among the most infamous violent events between Jews and Palestinians
that occurred during this time period is the Hebron Massacre. In 1929, after a series of
mutually inflammatory incidentsvi,vii, Palestinian-led riots broke out in Jaffa and
37

One aliya was from 1920-1923 as Jews fled Russia. Another was during the mid-1920s when Jews fled
Poland. The last aliya was during the mid to late 1930s when Nazism compelled German and Austrian Jews
to flee their homes (Dowty, 2008, 74).

114

Jerusalem on August 23viii. The next day, 96 Jewish students were murdered by
Palestinian peasants in Hebronix, x. The subsequent riots, clashes, and terrorist attacks
between Arab peasants, armed Bedouin groups, and Jewish settlers left an additional 196
dead by the end of Augustxi, xii. One Jewish woman who witnessed the Hebron Massacre,
made the following statement:
How shall I describe the sight of those awful corpses? Who could believe
such barbarous acts could be committed in the twentieth century? There
was not one body that had been struck with only one blow. Each victim
had been tortured to the limit. It was deliberately planned beforehand. The
best proof of this is that the form of death was fitted to the profession of
the victim. For instance, a baker’s head was tied to a lighted stove and
literally baked. . .xiii.
This woman’s statement communicates her emotional and perceptual reaction to the
massacre. This woman’s dismay of having witnessed Palestinian aggression is evident by
her reference to the dead as “awful bodies” and called the Palestinians’ behaviors
“barbarous acts”. Also, note that this woman had the perception that the deaths and
method of death of specific Jewish settlers had been pre-planned and that she had the
perception that twentieth-century human development has progressed beyond the
behaviors that she witnessed. To the Palestinians, however, the Jewish immigrants were
exclusivist, arrogant, too Western, too modern, too aggressive, practiced economic
discrimination, saw the Jews as taking advantage of their economic troubles by
purchasing land that they (the Palestinians) were forced to sell, and (most importantly)
the Palestinians were offended by the Jewish settlers’ attitudes that they (the Jews) had a
“right” to establish a Jewish state in Palestine (Dowty 2008; Gerner 1994).
By the mid 1930’s both the Jews and Palestinians realized the gravity of the
conflict that they were in. Both groups within the dyad were playing a zero-sum game
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over the Palestinian territory as we/they mentalities solidified: “We and they want the
same thing. We both want Palestine” (Ben-Guiron 1936). In this conflictual
environment, Palestinian organizations such as the Black Hand, the Arab Higher
Committee, and Jewish organizations such as Lehi (the Stern Gang), Irgun, and Haganah
were established (Gerner, 1994, 20; Oren, 2003, 3). In November 1935, the Arab Higher
Committee issued to their colonial “overseer”, Great Britain, demands to counter the
increasing Jewish presence in Palestine. These were: (1) that a popularly elected
Palestinian governmental council be established, (2) that Jewish immigration be
completely halted, (3) and that the purchase of Palestinian land by Jews be prohibited
(Haim, 1978, 211). Though the British agreed to the demands in principle, the structure
of the council and the conditions and controls that the British government dictated
prompted both the Zionists and Palestinians to reject the plan (Haim 1978). Subsequent
plans and negotiation attempts also failed. These failures to bring compromise and
consensus, and ever-increasing Jewish immigration, set the stage for the 1936-39 Arab
Revolt.
In April of 1936, the Palestinians launched a country wide revolt against the
Mandate regarding the Jews and against British rule over Palestine. The revolt had two
phases. The first phase lasted a little less than a year and was a well-organized, regional
effort by Arab leaders to rid Palestine of both the British and the Jews (Gershoni, 1987,
368-370; Oren, 2003, 3). Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
supported the Arab Revolt and he praised the efforts of Palestinians as a “heroic struggle”
where the Palestinians were “our brave Palestinian brothers who with a single heart are
defending the holy places of Islam [against] the Jewish injustice (Gershoni, 1986, 371).
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The first wave of the Arab revolt was defeated within a year by British colonial forces
and many of the political leaders who led the revolt were exiled (Sufian, 2008, 38; Oren,
2003, 3). The first wave of the Arab revolt shows a coordinated effort by Arab elite and
non-elite (non-state) leaders to counter the growing Jewish presence and influence in
Palestine.
The second wave of the Arab revolt lasted from 1937 through 1939. This portion
of the rebellion was led and carried out by the Arab peasantry (non-elite). When the first
phase of the revolt was defeated, Britain sent the Peel Commission to Palestine to find
out what led to the revolt. The Commission found that “[t]he underlying causes of the
disturbances of 1936 were: (1) The desire of the Arabs for national independence; (2)
their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home” (Peel et. al.
1937). They also found that the conflict was driven by two rival groups, the Arab Higher
Committee and the Jewish Agency. In their report, the Commission concluded that,
[t]he evidence submitted by the Arab and Jewish leaders respectively was
directly conflicting and gave no hope of compromise. . .The grievances
and claims of the Arabs and Jews as regards the Courts cannot be
reconciled and reflect the racial antagonism pervading the whole
Administration. . . As regards Jewish suspicions as to the conduct of
criminal prosecutions, the Commission points to the difficulties of the
Legal Department in a land where perjury is common and evidence in
many cases, particularly in times of crisis, [is] unobtainable, and [we]
conclude that the animosity between the two races, particularly in times of
crisis, has shown its influence to the detriment of the work of a British
Senior Government Department (Peel et. al. 1937).
Recognizing the irreconcilable interests (territory) and growing animosities (emotion)
between the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, the Commission recommended a partition
plan that would grant the Jews a home land, but retain the vast majority of the territory
for the purpose of establishing a Palestinian home state as well (see map 5.1).
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Map 5.1: Map of Palestinian Partition Plan as Presented by the Peel Commission in July,
1937xiv
The Palestinians summarily rejected the granting of any territory for the establishment of
a Jewish home state. The Jews, unwilling to give up any part of the land of Palestine also
rejected the recommendation (Smith, 2010, 138). In a personal letter, David Ben-Gurion
wrote regarding the Peel Commission’s proposal: “No Zionist can forgo the smallest
portion of the Land of Israel. . .” (Ben-Gurion 1937). As fighting increased between the
Jews and Palestinians, the Peel Commission’s partition proposal was rejected as being
“impracticable” (Woodhead 1938)xv.
The second phase of the revolt was marked by increased violence and terrorist
attacks between Jews and Palestinian Arabs (Norris, 2008, 25). During this time, violent
acts such as sniping, arson, sabotage, and kidnapping were reported as “routine
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incidents”xvi.

Furthermore, when studying local depictions of the 1936-39 revolt, Sandy

Sufian found that newsprint representations of actors showed negative body distortions
(inferring corruption, malice, and dishonesty), the dehumanization of the “enemy”, and
the portrayal of enemies in animal form. Similarly, self-depictions confirmed moral and
political superiority. Sufian (2008) also found that in- and out-group stereotypes
intensified as the revolt developed over time. When the revolt finally ended in 1939,
approximately 5000 Arabs and 300 Jews had been killed (Hughes, 2009, 348-49;
Levenberg, 1993, 74).
The Arab Revolt brought about changes in both the Jewish and Palestinian
communities. The Yishuv (Jewish residents in Palestine) had grown stronger in numbers
and determination, Palestinian leadership was now lacking due to banishment, and the
revolt had a negative impact on the Palestinian economy (which was fragile even before
the Revolt began) (Oren, 2004, 3). However, the overall outcome of the Arab Revolt
cannot be categorically called a “victory” for the Jewish settlers. Though the British
military was able to subdue both waves of the Arab rebellion, with the prospect of a
second pan-European war looming before them, the British government was motivated
to placate the Arab community. Colonial Britain attempted to address Palestinian
demands by effectively nullifying the Balfour Declaration and by issuing the White
Paper of 1939. The White Paper called for an independent Palestinian state, the
restriction or Jewish immigration, and the protection of Palestinian land rights (Sufian,
2008, 38). Britain also assisted in the formation of the Arab League during World War II
(Oren 2004).
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Just prior to the end of World War II, the Arab League formed as a pact between
Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq to “promote Arab security and interests”
(Arab League 1944; Arab League 1945). In the charter, the Alexandria Protocol, the
League clearly stated that though it denounced the “treatment of Jews by dictatorial
European states,” it firmly supported the Palestinian Arabs’ right to preserve their
homeland, achieve independence, and called for the cessation of Jewish immigration.
They also asserted that:
The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the
woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European
dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused
with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than
solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by
inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and
denominations” (Arab League, 1947, 5.A).
Affirming their collective opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, the Arab
League also clearly stated that if a Jewish state were to be instituted, it would be
considered an injustice towards Palestinian Arabs. Furthermore, in a supplementary
document, the Pact of the League of Arab States, issued on March 22, 1945, the Arab
League stopped just short of declaring Palestine a sovereign Arab state.
At the end of the last Great War, Palestine, together with the other Arab
States, was separated from the Ottoman Empire. She became independent,
not belonging to any other State.
The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her fate should be decided by the
parties concerned in Palestine.
Even though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on
the basis of the recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the
League of Nations determined a system of government for her.
Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no
more be questioned de jure than the independence of any other Arab
States.
Even though the outward signs of this independence have remained veiled
as a result of force majeure, it is not fitting that this should be an obstacle
to the participation of Palestine in the work of the League.
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Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider
that in view of Palestine’s special circumstances, the Council of the
League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in
its work until this country enjoys actual independence (Arab League
1945).
In this statement, the Arab desire for Palestine to have political and territorial sovereignty
is evident. As the Arab League grants Palestine a delegate to their organization, they
attempt to give Palestine the same rights and privileges in the organization as other Arab
states. In doing so, they directly assert that the land of Palestine should be regarded as an
independent and sovereign Arab/Palestinian state.
Thus, it is evident that even prior to World War II, elements of PSC began to
emerge. From the beginning of the twentieth century elite and non-elite Arab actors took
part in organizing and carrying out measures to prevent further Jewish influx into “their
land”. Also present by the end of World War II was evidence of territorial-based conflict
and the emergence of emotional motivations, perceptual attributions, and group bias.
POST WORLD WAR II – WHO GETS WHAT, WHERE, WHEN AND HOW
In light of the horrors of the Holocaust, the idea of granting the Jews a home state
became more appealing to Western powers after World War II. “As the dimensions of the
horror became known, shock and guilt shaped attitudes toward ‘the Palestine issue’”
(Dowty, 2008, 82). Post war economic and political realities, however, played a large
role in the development of the establishment of the Israeli state, and subsequently the
Palestinian/Israeli PSC. Britain was decimated economically by World War II. Because
of this, it no longer possessed the capacity or will to exert colonial control over Palestine
and India. (Dowty, 2008, 82-83). Furthermore, when initial efforts to resolve the
Palestinian “problem” after World War II failed, Britain’s willingness to handle the issue
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unilaterally waned as well. Arabs refused to acknowledge a Jewish state that had any
jurisdiction over Arabs, Jews were pushing even more aggressively for a home state in
Palestine in light of the Holocaust, and American President, Harry Turman, “hounded”
them to side with the Zionists (Oren, 3002, 4-5). Thus, in line with withdrawing from its
leadership role in the international community, Britain passed the responsibility for the
“Palestinian issue” to the United Nations (UN) in early 1947.
When Britain handed control of the Palestinian “problem” over to the UN, A
committee of eleven nations was tasked to study the conflict and suggest a solution. The
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), considered three options: (1)
a one-state plan where Jews and Palestinians would share the state and governance, (2) a
two-state plan where the land of Palestine would be divided between the Jewish and
Palestinian people, and (3) a one-state plan with consociational provisions granting Jews
limited, local self-governance (Dowty, 2008, 83). Amidst dissent, the UNSCOP
committee presented the two-state Partition Plan to the General Assembly.
Before the decisive UN vote, Jewish Agency representatives, David Horowitz and
Abba Eban, attempted to negotiate with the Arab League’s Secretary, Azzam Pasha,
independently to reach a mutual solution on September 16, 1947. Pasha’s response was:
The Arab world is not in a compromising mood. It’s likely, Mr. Horowitz,
that your plan is rational and logical, but the fate of nations is not decided
by rational logic. Nations never concede; they fight. You won’t get
anything by peaceful means or compromise. You can, perhaps, get
something, but only by the force of your arms. We shall try to defeat you.
I am not sure we’ll succeed, but we’ll try. We were able to drive out the
Crusaders, but on the other hand we lost Spain and Persia. It may be that
we shall lose Palestine. But it’s too late to talk of peaceful solutions (Bard,
3, 2004).
Similarly, Jamal Husseini, spokesman for the Arab Higher Committee, to the UN
said that if the UN passed the Partition vote that the Palestinians would “drench the soil
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of our beloved country with the last drop of our blood” (Hurewitz, 1976, 308). Arab
leaders insisted upon a single, unitary Arab state from the UN. The Partition Plan divided
Palestine West of the Jordan into Arab and Jewish territories (see Map 5.2).

Map 5.2: United Nations’ Partition Plan for Palestine in 1947xvii
The Partition Plan (GA Resolution 181) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on
November 27, 1947 by a vote of 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions (including Britain) (United
Nations 1947).
Upon hearing that the Partition Plan had passed, the Jewish people immediately
reasserted their right to statehood.
Our right to independence has now been confirmed in principle, [it] must
be translated into fact by the building of a progressive state whose high
standard of democracy and culture will compensate for the smallness of its
size and for the complicating conditions besetting its inception -Leumi,
Vaadxviii.
As wide-spread celebration by Jews began, the reaction by Arab leadership was also
immediate. The Arab League issued the following statement:
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. . .The Arab delegations to the United Nations solemnly state their
conviction that the vote in regard to the partition of Palestine has been
given under great pressure and duress, and that this makes it double
invalid. Such a vote does not and could not give real expression either to
the sincere views of the delegations or to world opinion at large.
We sincerely believe that the hearts of the world are with us, we
believe as firmly that the conscience of the world will not tolerate the dire
consequences which will inevitably follow if nothing is done to remedy
the unequal injustice that has been meted to the Arabs.
It is worthy of attention that those who did not support this
fantastic resolution include all the nations of the East who are directly
concerned in this matter and whose number amount to over one thousand
million people.
We trust that through the steadfastness of our people and through
our belief in God and the justice of our cause our right will prevailxix.
The reaction to the passage of the Partition plan amongst the Palestinian masses was also
immediate and violent. Riots and strikes against Jewsxx, xxi, resulted in numerous Jewish
deaths across Palestine from terrorist attacksxxii which occurred within hours of the plan’s
passage. Demonstrators in Iraq called for a “Jihad for Palestine” as Emir Abdul Ilah
addressed a throng of demonstrators saying, “I will lead volunteers and fight with my
blood in Palestine”xxiii.
This level of tension and violence remained elevated for the remainder of 1947.
From the date of the partition vote in the UN until February 1, 1948, there were 2,748
Jewish and Palestinian deaths and injuries (Bard 2004). On December 31, 1947, Emile
Ghory, a member of the Arab Higher Committee, stated that “[o]nly a change in policy
can stop” the violence between the Jews and Palestiniansxxiv. The same article reported 43
Jewish deaths within a 24-hour period. Also, when asked about the robberies of several
Jewish supply trains, Ghory replied, “We do not consider them robberies. They are
stopping supplies from reaching the enemy, just as the Allies kept them from the
Germans during the war.” In this statement, Ghory legitimizes the actions of the in-group
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to the international community by equating the robberies to “virtuous” actions taken by
the Allies in World War II.
While it would be convenient to lay the entire responsibility for the bloodshed at
the feet of Arab Palestinians, it would be disingenuous to ignore Jewish-led violence. On
January 2, 1948, the New York Times, reported that Jewish organizations, such as
Haganah, had carried out attacks leading to the death of four Palestiniansxxv. Similarly, on
April 9, 1948, the Dier Yassin massacre was orchestrated and led by the Jewish
“paramilitary” organizations Irgun and Lehi. They were responsible for the deaths of over
one hundred villagers- including women and children (Oren, 2003, 4; Gebler, 2006, 311).
Though acts of barbarism can legitimately be brought against the Jews and Arabs
alike, the Arabs willingly accepted responsibility for the violence that occurred in the
season immediately preceding the establishment of the Israeli state. On April 16, 1948,
Jam Husseini, spokesman for the Arab Higher Committee, told the UN Security Council
that,
[t]he representative for the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were
not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny
this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight (Bard 2004).
Even prior to the establishment of a state for the Jewish people, elements of a PSC were
present. Violent conflict between the actors had been present for more than 20 years,
there were cycles of heightened tension and violence, there were far more than the
proposed theoretical minimum deaths across the first half of the twentieth century,
statements containing territorial motivation for conflict were present, and statements
indicating the presence of psychological motivation were present as well. Because of the
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presence of these elements, it is not a stretch to question whether a PSC existed even
before the state of Israel received international recognition.
1948: THE STATE OF ISRAEL/OCCUPIED PALESTINE
When Jewish leaders declared Israel a sovereign, independent state on May 14,
1948, the conflict took on a new component, state-based militarized conflict.
Immediately after declaring its independence; Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq
invaded Israel (Rowley and Taylor, 2006, 79). The Israeli War of Independence/The
Catastrophe claimed approximately 8000 military casualties (Singer 1972, Eckhardt
1987). Violence occurred between non-state actors after the official end of the 1948 war,
however. After the official end of the 1948 war, there were over 100 violent incidents
that resulted in approximately 1450 deaths. Non-state organizations were referenced 22
times as having participated in violence or as being associated with violence or the PSC.
Overall, there were 61quotes identified from the 1948 articles. These groups include: the
Stern Group and Irgun Zvai Leumi (prior to their incorporation into the Israel
Army/disbandment)xxvi, Fighters for the Freedom of Israelxxvii, the Arab Legionxxviii,
Fawzi el Kawukjixxix, and individual immigrantsxxx. Individual immigrants were labeled
as a hostile group by Arab leaders.
There were twenty-seven quotes that clearly stated why violent acts were being
committed in 1948. Territorially-based conflict statements were referenced 19 times and
was cited more than the other motives combined38. Security motivated-statements had
seven references and resource-based quotes had six.

38

The number of quotes from each year and the actual components measured from the quotes may not be
equal. This is because numerous articles utilized more than quote from more than one actors. Also, quotes
can have more than one components present at the same time.
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As soon as we rid ourselves of the enemy in our midst, we shall work for
the liberation of Palestine and hand it back to its inhabitants –General
Naguibxxxi.
The truce has not come into effect today in Palestine. This day, as far as
operations were concerned, was just the same as yesterday. And let me say
this, that no Jewish force broke the truce- Alexis Ladas, Haganah
Chiefxxxii.
Nevertheless we reserve the right to defend ourselves, and if attacked shall
reply. We demand that the Arabs withdraw from positions they occupied
in No Man's Land during the cease-fire period –Dov Joseph, Israeli
military Governorxxxiii.
These quotes by Arab and Israeli actors reflect territorial and security motivations of the
actors. General Naguib refers to liberating Palestine while Dov Joseph demands that the
Arabs withdraw from land that they occupy. Alexis Ladas makes a reference to securitymotivated violence when he states that if the Arabs violate the truce, the Israelis will
respond. Similarly, Dov Joseph asserts the Israeli right to self-defense (physical security)
if provoked by the Arabs.
There were 49 statements that contained psychological motivation in the
Israeli/Arab PSC. There is a virtual three-way tie between statements that reveal emotion,
perception and group-identification, with 25-27 statements in each radial category. Selfidentification statements were made only three times.
. . . although they come to Palestine as immigrants, are in reality nothing
but trained fighters –Arab civilianxxxiv.
The enemy turns his eyes toward Jerusalem, the eternal seat of our eternal
people. It will be a savage and merciless battle without retreat. Our fate
will be victory or annihilation. We shall fight to the last man among usDavid Shealtiel, Israeli military Commanderxxxv.
You are not wanted here! –Israeli civilianxxxvi.
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By calling each other “enemies” Commander Shealtiel and the Arab soldier are assigning
a de-humanizing and negative connotation to the out-group. Also, both men use we/they
language revealing group-identification. Perceptual components are present as well. The
Arab civilian believes that Zionists have trained and sent soldiers into Palestine as
covertly as immigrants. This person also infers malicious intent on the part of the UN
Security Council, believing that the cease-fire is intended to give Israelis time to reinforce
their positions. The Israeli civilian reveals emotion when he shouts, “You are not wanted
here”! Also, the use of the word “shall” by General Naguib and Dov Joseph (in the
conflict quotes) reveal the emotion of resolve.
The 1949 armistice marked the beginning of an “inter-war” period, bringing
militarized conflict to a temporary end. Contentious political issues remained unresolved,
however. Primary concerns to the Arabs were that Israel no longer retained 56% of the
Mandate’s land allocation. It now possessed 78% (Dowty, 2008, 87-92). By the end of
the period and events that immediately surrounded the 1948 Israeli War of Independence;
Palestinian refugees had poured into neighboring Arab states, Israel had achieved
international recognition, Jewish immigration continued, and the Arab community saw a
ceasefire agreement as a detriment to their interests and a boon to the Israelis’. Though
the “official” war had ended, physical violence continued through non-state actors and
verbally through elites. Diplomatic tensions remained high and skirmishes occurred
between Israel and neighboring states. Violence continued to exist, not only through
1948, but also into 1953 as well.
1953
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In 1953, every month (except September) had violent conflicts that resulted in
death. In all, there were 23 violent incidents that resulted in over 180 Palestinian and
Israeli deaths. Of the quotes that communicated reasons why acts of violence were
committed, territorial motivations were the most frequently listed, followed by physical
security, and then resources. There were no non-state organizations referenced in the
articles analyzed in 1953. Similarly, all the quotes were from elite actors39.
It is to be expected that the foreign ministers will address their attention to
the only cause of the intolerable state of affairs along the Israel-Jordan
border, which is marked nightly by incursions from Jordan into Israel of
armed bands perpetrating brutal murders, attacking life and attacking
traffic and completely undermining the security of life and property in the
area and which is further exemplified by the unwillingness or inability of
the Jordan authorities to stem this tide of lawlessness in fulfillment of their
clear obligations under the Armistice Agreement –unnamed Israeli
Foreign Ministry Spokesmanxxxvii.
. . .centers of the murderous gangs. . . All the responsibility rests on the
Jordan Government, which for years has tolerated and thereby encouraged
acts of murder and pillage –David Ben-Gurionxxxviii.
While these statements reveal emotion, perception, and group-identification on the part of
the Israelis, statements presenting the Arab perspective on Israeli goals and behaviors
were equally accusatory:
The Jordan armed forces have been instructed to use force as from today
in repulsing any further acts of aggression of the Jews along the 700kilometer-long armistice line between the two countries –Jordanian
Defense Minister, Aswar Nusaibehxxxix.
As soon as we rid ourselves of the enemy in our midst, we shall work for
the liberation of Palestine and hand it back to its inhabitants- General
Muhammad Naguib of the Egyptian Armyxl.
Motivations for political or social power and revenge were not mentioned in the quotes
that were gathered in 1953.
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I noted that the referencing of elite more than non-elite actors was a common occurrence in the earlier
years of this conflict.
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There were 13 statements made that revealed psychological motivation. Of these
statements, emotional and perceptual sentiments were used equally (six times) and groupidentification was mentioned one time. Self-identification was not mentioned at all.
. . .centers of the murderous gangs. . . All the responsibility rests on the
Jordan Government, which for years has tolerated and thereby encouraged
acts of murder and pillage against the inhabitants of Israel. . .The
Government rejects with all vigor the absurd and fantastic allegation that
600 men of the Israeli defense forces took part in the action against Kibya
village. . We cannot conceive that the United Nations would seek
consciously to apply different standards in their judgment of acts of
violence which have been going on for the last five years along the
borders of Israel. . . . They denied them homes in their countries and
compelled the Arab refugees to subsist on the charity of the United
Nations and kept them deliberately in the vicinity of Israel's frontiers for
these pernicious purposes – David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of
Israelxli.
Monstrous murder –Herut Newspaper in reaction to the murder of a blind
Israelixlii.
. . . criminal immigrants from European ghettos – John Glubb, Chief of
Staff of the Arab Legionxliii.
Seven of the statements that had psychological content were from elite actors.
1958
The same pattern of conflict continued through the 1958 time windows. In 1958,
there were 12 violent events (one every month except January) resulting in approximately
71 deaths. Of the 110 articles examined, twelve articles contained direct quotes from the
actors. All of the quotes were from elite actors. There were four statements that revealed
competition-based motives for the conflict. Two statements were about territory and two,
like the statement below, focused on political power.
The state arose not through the decision of the UN but through the
determined will of the Jewish people and the heroism of the
nation's precious sons and daughters who defended Israel's
independence- David Ben- Gurion, Prime Minister of Israelxliv.
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Specific non-state organizations that were associated with the conflict were referenced
three times. The Arab Federation was specifically mentioned as an organization that
either supported or sponsored violent acts. Similarly, “unorganized” groups of Arab
farmers and Shiite Muslims were also named as having participated in violence resulting
in death.
Fourteen statements revealed psychological content. All but one of the quotes
came from elite actors. Of these, five contained emotional components, five had
perceptual statements, and four contained group- identification sentiments.
Arab nationalism will emerge triumphant and the occupation
forces will quit Jordan and Lebanon. We shall certainly not waiver
in offering any sacrifice for the sake of liberating these two
countries- Gamal Nasser, President of Egyptxlv.
. . . act of war. . .grave repercussions . .before the chain of violence is
renewed and extended . . . All that is required from the Syrian forces is
that they leave us alone, and stop using their topographic advantage to
interfere with life and work in the valley below –Abba Eban, Israeli
Ambassador to the United Nationsxlvi.
President Nasser reveals the emotion of determination by using the words “shall” and
“certainly”. Ambassador Eban shows perception when he says that he believes that the
Arabs have a tactical advantage and are purposely using it to hinder Israeli interests. Both
actors use we/they language that reveal group-identification.
1963
The New York Times (NYT) recorded only 32 articles on the Arab/Israeli conflict
in 1963. In these articles, ten acts of political violence were recorded- all of them were
attributed to Arab actors. There were 25 deaths recorded, with 20 of them being
Palestinian. There were no non-state organizations referenced. Also, there were only
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three quotes that revealed competition-based conflict and there were eight statements that
showed psychological motivation. The statements that showed competition-based conflict
reflected territorial-based and security related sentiments. In statements that contained
psychological content, perception was the motivation that was present most often (6)
followed equally by emotion and group-identification (5). There was one self-identifymotivated statement. Of the articles read from 1963, only elite actors were quoted and no
non-state actor groups were identified. Unfortunately, most of the quotes were
surrounding the same set of events. Because of this, 1963 is reported as a development of
this particular exchange between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. Though this is a departure of
the way that I report time windows in this case, it does exemplify the sentiments of both
sides of this PSC.
After an increase in armed clashes in the demilitarized zone that separated Israel
and Syria both sides saw the other as the aggressor. Arab agents were infiltrating into
farming communities along the Lebanese and Syrian borders and committing acts of
terrorism. When Israeli troops entered the demilitarized zone to stop the infiltrations after
an alleged ambush left two Israeli farmers dead (Syria claimed that this attack was an
Israeli “fabrication”), Syria saw this as an act of Israeli aggression: “[o]ur armed forces
are standing by to crush any new Israeli aggression- Major General Abdullah Ziadiah,
Syrian Defense Ministerxlvii. Similarly, Israel accused Syria (which reciprocated in kind)
of aggression before the United Nations on August 20, 1963. After a series of violent
exchanges, the Israeli Cabinet labeled the attacks as “a grave threat to peace” and Israeli
Foreign Minister, Halm Yahil made the following statement regarding Israeli security:
“We feel there is a real danger to peace if the Syrian actions do not stop” xlviii. In his
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testimony before the U.N. Security Council, Michael S. Comay stated that the two
farmers “were butchered for the express purpose of fomenting tension. . .” and asserted
that “[w]e are not prepared to be the whipping boy for the Arab world, and to have its
tensions and turmoil seek facile outlets across our borders”xlix. Beyond the who did what,
who started what, the when’s, how’s, and where’s of what actually happened, this
exchange touches on the nature of PSC. It demonstrates how territorial and security
concerns can become fully entangled (and can even become lost) in endless circles of
finger-pointing, tit-for-tat behaviors, perceptual conclusions, and emotional escalations.
Within these exchanges both actors see threats to their security. However, these concerns
are overshadowed by emotive and perceptual statements (“crush”, whipping boy”, “grave
threat”, “aggression,” “were butchered for the express purpose. . .”). In this exchange,
psychological and “other” issues (“. . . to have its tensions and turmoil seek facile outlets
across our borders”) compete with territorial and security conflict. Because of this, it can
serve as an example of Azar’s point that as a conflict endures over time, the originating
issues of contention can become lost or change: “It is not the abstract “issue” that guides
the conflicts in their development . . . The immediate criterion of identification may be
several stages removed from the original issue” (Azar et. al., 1978, 51).
Overall, reporting on the Arab/Israeli conflict is limited in 1963. Even so, utility
in understanding the nature of PSC can be realized by examining the information that is
provided. At this point, the conflict had been going on for more than 20 years, 25 deaths
were recorded from the conflict, Palestinians (non-state actors) were attributed with
having initiated 10 violent incidents, the “row” between Israel and Syria over the terrorist
incidents and the Israeli incursion into the demilitarized zone are an example of the
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cycles of violence in PSC, there were conflict statements present in the quotes reported,
and the statements also reveal the presence of psychological components. Though data is
limited in this particular year, there is evidence that all of the components that are being
measured for theoretical necessity are present at this time point of the conflict.
SIX-DAY WAR
The period of time between the 1963 and 1968 windows marked an escalation in
non-state-initiated violence between the Israelis and Arabs and contained the Six-Day
War. Palestinians grew weary of waiting for reticent state actors (elites) to come to their
aid. . .
We cannot use force today because our circumstances will not allow us; be
patient with us, the battle of Palestine can continue and the battle of the
Jordan is part of the battle of Palestine. For I would lead you to disaster if
I were to proclaim that I would fight at a time when I was unable to do so.
I would not lead my country to disaster and would not gamble with its
destiny – Gamal Nasser, President of Egypt, 1964 (Oren, 2003, 19).
. . and began to seek other “solutions”. As Fawaz Turki wrote in his “Journal of
Palestinian Exile”:
My generation of Palestinians, growing up alienated, excluded, and
forgotten, rejected this legacy (of waiting for others to act); yet when we
looked around us we could see either the desert to shed our tears in or the
whole world to hit back at. Having nothing and with nothing to lose, we
proceeded to do the latter (Turki, 1972, 16).

As the Palestinian/Arab masses began to increase their involvement, attacks against
Israelis increased. Al-Fatah (Fatah) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
formally organized and carried out cross-border raids/attacks, from Jordan and Egypt
(Beaudoin 2006). In 1966, “Israel recorded –ninety-three border incidents- mines,
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shooting, sabotage- while the Syrians boasted seventy-five guerrilla attacks in a single
month [February]” (Oren, 2003, 27).
Meanwhile, Egyptian President Nasser (1956-1970), was attempting to unite the
in-fighting Arab states (Pan-Arabism) calling for them to put aside their differences to
unite against Israel under the United Arab Republic. On January 14, 1964, Nasser came
close to achieving his goal with the creation of the United Arab Command (UAC) at a
conference in Cairo among Arab leaders. The UAC’s directive was to protect Arab states
and to prepare for an offensive campaign (Oren, 2003, 20). Also approved at this
conference, was the diverting of the Jordan River at its source so to reduce Israel’s water
supply. This was a calculated moved based on the assumption that “Israel would not
watch passively while their country dried up” (Oren, 2003, 20) and would be the first to
strike in an attempt to preserve their water supply.
In the months leading up to the Six-Day War, tensions between Israeli and Arab
actors increased. In April of 1967, there were fourteen violent “incidents” perpetrated
against Israeli citizens (Eshkol 1967). These attacks prompted Israeli Prime Minister,
Levi Eshkol to state in a speech that, “Israel will continue to take action to prevent any
and all attempts to perpetrate sabotage within her territory. There will be no immunity for
any state which aids or abets such acts” (Eshkol 1967). Similarly, on May 19, 1967, in
the face of the withdrawal of peace-keeping troops and the prospect of a blockade of the
Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, Eshkol made the following statements:
Israel will not initiate hostilities. . .until or unless (Egyptian forces) close
the Straits of Tiran to free navigation by Israel (Eshkol 1967).
Israel would stop at nothing to cancel the blockade. It is essential that
President Nasser should not have any illusions (Eshkol 1967).
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Similarly, Israel’s position that it acted defensively was summarized in a televised
broadcast on June 14, 1967:
Wars are not always begun by shots. They are often begun by action and
the action which really created the state of war in an acute sense was the
imposition of the blockade. To try to murder somebody by strangulation is
just as much attempted murder as if you tried to murder him by a shot, and
therefore the act of strangulation was the first violent, physical act which
had its part in the sequence. But also on that Monday morning we acted
against the movement of forces. The Egyptian air force had been making
incursions into Israel before, whether for reconnaissance or for other
reasons, but there had been a pattern of encroachment. One never knows
when aircraft come towards you what their intention is- Abba Eban,
Foreign Minister of Israel, June 14, 1967l.
These quotes by Israeli leaders are an excellent example of how perception can play a
role in sustaining PSC. Eshkol’s statements communicate a heightened perception of
threat to Israeli security and Eban’s statements show how Israel reacted to the perceived
threat. While it is obvious throughout this case, that Israel’s perceptions of threat were
not unfounded, it is the perception of threat, not whether there actually is a threat that
can be the motivation for violence. To the actor, their perception is always correct. Thus,
it is the perception of threat, more than the fact that there really is one, that can be a
motivating factor in the participation of violence and the continued perception of threat
can be a contributing component of PSC.
Similarly, in the month leading up to the Six-Day War, the following statements from
multiple Arab state/“elite” and non-state/“masses” actors clearly reflects the
Palestinian/Arab sentiments towards Israel:
The existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli
aggression. We welcome the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour
has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel - Cairo
Radio, May 16, 1967li.
Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse any aggression, but
to initiate the act ourselves, and to explode the Zionist presence in the
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Arab homeland of Palestine. The Syrian army, with its finger on the
trigger, is united. I believe that the time has come to begin a battle of
annihilation.”- Hafez Assad, Defense Minister of Syria, May 20, 1967lii.
All of the Arab armies now surround Israel. The UAR, Iraq, Syria, Jordan,
Yemen, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and Kuwait. . . .There is no difference
between one Arab people and another, no difference between one Arab
army and another – Hussayn bin Talāl - King of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, May 30, 1967liii.
The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is
our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us
since 1948. Our goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the map – Abdul
Rahman Aref, President of Iraq, May 31, 1967liv.
Taking over Sharm el Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel (and) also
meant that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel. The battle
will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, May 26, 1967lv.
Those who survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them
will survive- Ahmed Shukairy, Chairman of the PLO in Jordan, June 1,
196740, lvi.
These statements no longer speak only of liberating the Palestinian homeland from
Jewish settlers or occupation. The statements also include the political existence of
Israel (a subtle but calculable difference from the territorial dispute) and the complete
“annihilation” of the Jewish people in Israel/Palestine as motives for violence.
The Six-Day War began on June 5, 1967 with a pre-emptive Israeli strike against
Egypt. By the end of the war, Israel had gained control of the Golan Heights in northern
Israel from the Syrians, the Gaza Strip in southwestern Israel along the Mediterranean
from the Egyptians, the West Bank including East Jerusalem from the Jordanians (Oren,
2003, 111-112), and had between 675 and 775 Israeli casualtieslvii, lviii. Calculations of
Arab casualties range from over 9000 to approximately 25,000 (El Gamsay, 1993, 69;
FindTheData.org 2012; Gerner, 1994, 113; Herzog, 1982, 183).

40

This quote is Shukairy’s response to a question asked in a news interview about what will happen to the
Israelis if there is a war.
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The elite Arab response to their loss of Six-Day war was to accuse Israel of
“deliberate genocide” by allowing “tens of thousands” of Egyptians soldiers to die in the
Sinai Desert without food, water, or medical treatment at the U.N. Egyptian diplomat, Dr.
Hussein Khallaf, demand the return of lands taken/won by the Israelis during the warlix.
“What we are interested in now is the withdrawal of the forces of the Israeli aggressor
from our territory,” said Awad el-Kony of the Egytpian delegation to the U.N.lx. Also,
the reaction of non-state-level Arabs to the loss of the War is reflected in the statement of
an unidentified “Lebanese moderate” who said, “[this] means that there will be no real
peace now. Maybe we will have to have a war every 10 years”lxi.
1968
The violence between the Israelis and Arabs continued throughout 1968 with 76
separate violent incidents. Of these, two-thirds were reported as initiated by Arab actors
and resulted in approximately 1014 deaths (726 of which were Palestinians). Of the 318
articles analyzed in 1968, 76 articles contained quotes. Twenty-five conflict statements
were noted, with the majority coming from elite Israeli actors. Territorial motives were
mentioned 21 times, followed by security (8), then political power (3), resources and
social power were referenced one time, and revenge as a motive for violent behavior was
mentioned one time. Also, elite actors were quoted twice as often as non-elite actors. The
following quotes reflect the sentiments of the actors concerning conflict at this time:
As I bear responsibility for the leadership of my country and people, I
shall not agree to permit anyone to provide the enemy of my homeland
with more excuses to inflict more harm than the enemy has already done. .
..to liberate the occupied areas, including Jerusalem, which is holy to
Arabs and Moslems. . .either we do this or become martyrs in the process
– Hussayn bin Talāl, King of Jordanlxii.
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It’s our last wall, our last ditch. The Arab soldiers, the Arab fellahin, they
don’t understand why they are sent to Sinai or to Yemen to fight—
whereas, we know this is our last stay. It’s either/or—either be driven into
the sea or be massacred or killed – or fight for your mere existence. . . We
didn't ask for this war, God knows, god is my witness, we didn't ask for
this war. . . We don't want to continue to live in a warlike situation. . . We
are a people dispelled, tortured, massacred during centuries let's try once
again. Let's try once to come back- to return to the Promised Land to ours.
. . to where we were born as a nation. . . Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of
Israellxiii.
These statements contain psychological components as well conflict statements. In both
statements, King Hussayn and Prime Minister Eshkol demonstrate group-identification
(“our homeland,” We are a people dispelled”. . .). Hussayn refers to Israelis as the
“enemy” (emotion) and Eshkol makes perceptual statements (It’s either/or—either be
driven into the sea or be massacred or killed – or fight for your mere existence. . .)41. It is
interesting to note, however, that while Hussayn makes reference to himself and his role
as king, it is not in direct reference how he personally is connected to the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it is not an example of an actor identifying self
with the conflict. Other quotes from non-state actors in 1968 that contain conflict
statements and reflect the presence of psychological motives:
Over there the Arab commando’s blood has been mixed with the earth,
they are the men who are trying to liberate their homeland; they must fight
on. . . Israelis strike us now because they want to expand; they want to
displace Arabs on this land. . . It is not their land, we want vengeance Ahmed Nazzal, Barley Farmerlxiv.

41

As noted in the literature review, there can be overlap in psychological motivation and words could be
coded different ways. For example, the use of the word, “enemy” that this footnote references could be
coded as an emotive or perceptual statement depending on the context in which it is used in the sentence. In
this instance, because the actor (King Hussayn) uses the word, “enemy” in a negative or pejorative
manner and uses other negative language in the quote towards the outgroup, it is a rejection of the
legitimacy of the outgroup. Thus, it is an emotive statement. If, however, he had used the same word in a
externally directed context (i.e. “the Israelis see us as the enemy”), it would have been coded as a
perceptual statement. To avoid “double dipping” (coding the same word twice or for multiple motives) and
inconsistent coding for this and other components analyzed in this study, clear coding rules have been
developed and are found in the appendix for reference.
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The homeland of the Palestinian is the entire world- In Jerusalem, in Tel
Aviv. . . For as long as the Palestinian is without a homeland, the entire is
his. His home is where the enemy is– Al Nahar Newspaper lxv.
Overall, group-identification had the most incidents (45) followed by emotion (38) and
perception (29).
There was a noticeable increase in the mention of specific organizations that
participated or sponsored violence in 1968. These included the Fadayeen, Fatah, the
Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Arab Nationalist Movement,
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Arab Legion, and the Palestinian
Liberation Army (PLA). These organizations were mentioned 63 times in the articles
assessed. This is more than the previous years combined.
1973 AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
Five hundred forty-seven articles were examined in 1973. There were
approximately 18 violent incidents recorded throughout the year resulting in
approximately 126 deaths42. There were 46 quotes in all that came from Israeli or
Palestinian/Arab actors. These statements contained eight references to competitionbased conflict. The statements were evenly split between elite and non-elite actors. Of the
conflict statements, seven were over territorial issues.
. . To accomplish the historical and sacred mission of liberating occupied
Arab territory . . . the new aggression is part of the collusion between
Israel and United States imperialism against the Arab people – Damascus
Radio, Lebanonlxvi.
What are we to do? Let a Libyan plane roam at will through our airspace?
How could we guarantee that it wasn't a kamikaze plane loaded with
explosives headed for an Israeli city? – Unidentified Israeli Army
Officerlxvii.
42

Deaths resulting from international terrorist events, or Arab/Israeli-led incidents that occurred in states
other than the “original” states that participated in the 1948 war of Israeli independence are not included
annual totals. Incidents from the Lebanese Civil War and deaths resulting from the Yom Kippur War,
which occurred in 1973, are also not included.
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Though these quotes contain perceptual elements, they also contain conflictual
statements. The Arab actor referenced the liberation of occupied Arab territory and the
Israel actor referenced security motives for action.
Also, as in 1968, there was a quote that revealed that revenge was a motive for
violence. Revenge as a motive for violence did not escape the notice of a Lebanese
newspaper editor when he wrote:
"Is, in fact, the recovery of Palestine still the goal, or has the revolution
reached such a point of despair as to be without logic-namely, to carry out
commando action for its own sake?" – Ghassan Tueni, editor and
publisher of Al Nahar newspaper in Lebanonlxviii.
Until 1968, revenge as a motive for violence had been inferred in the articles analyzed,
but it had not been directly declared. However, revenge was specifically stated in both
1968 and 1973- first by an individual and then by a newspaper. Did the motivation of
revenge escalate to the point where it finally reached the level of public consciousness by
1973? If this is so, did the question that Mr. Tueni asked his readers to consider indicate
that there had been an acknowledgement by the actors that there had been a substantive
change in the attitude of the actors? If this is indeed the case, this quote supports my
position that the components of Azar’s theory are not sufficient to explain the enduring
nature of PSC. It can also support the theoretical positions that conflict can devolve into
fights (Coser & Rapoport) where logic is overcome by emotion (Marcus 2003; Pruitt &
Kim 2004; Rapoport 1974) and that the motivations for violence can change or take on
additional components over time (Azar 1980).
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Non-state groups were mentioned 32 different times. Specific groups identified
were the PLO, Fatah, Black September, the Arab League, PLFP, Fedayeen, the Druse43,
and the Lebanese Revolutionary Guard. There were also 44 quotes that contained
psychological motivation. As in previous years; emotion (28), perception (18), and
group-identification (25) were present at high levels and statements that had selfidentification-based remarks were barely present at all (2). However, contrary to previous
years, there were as many statements by non-elite actors as elite- especially Palestinian
non-elites.
Arab threats and hatred of Israel drew inspiration directly from the NazisIsrael Yeshayahu, Speaker of the Parliamentlxix.
They want to hunt us –wife of Kamal Adwan, executive committee
member of al-Fatah in reaction to his assassination by Israeli commandos
before her eyeslxx.
. . . To accomplish the historical and sacred mission of liberating occupied
Arab territory", "the new aggression is part of the collusion between Israel
and United States imperialism against the Arab people – Damascus Radio,
January 8, 1973lxxi.
In the early 1970’s Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had attempted to negotiate land back from
Israel that was lost in the Six-Day War. They were unsuccessful (Gerner, 1994, 115).
Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor was determined to regain their lost territory, however.
I used to tell Nasser that if we could recapture even 4 inches of Sinai
territory. . . and establish ourselves there so firmly that no power on earth
could dislodge us, then the whole situation would change- east, west, all
over. First to go would be the humiliation we had endured since the 1967
defeat (Sadat, 1979, 244).
On October 6, 1973, on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria launched
simultaneous, coordinated, surprise attacks in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Golan

11 While the Druse were primarily actors in the Lebanese Civil War, one member was sentenced by an
Israeli court for spying against Israel (NYT 5/4/73).
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Heights. The attack caught the Israeli completely by surprise and they suffered early
territorial losses. The determination that Arab elites showed to regain Palestine by Arab
leaders in invading Israel was shared by non-elite Arabs as well:
We must never again let our forces be disengaged from the Israeli forces.
A game of fire and cease-fire can no longer be played. . . No one should
underestimate our determination to get our land back and to stay in the
Sinai - Mohammed Hassaniein Keydal, Editor of Al Ahram Newspaper in
Egyptlxxii.
Every time the Fatah fights, they fight for me. We cannot help them. It is
too difficult. But we want our freedom, and we are not free without an
independent Palestine republic – Unidentified young, Arab, male high
school studentlxxiii.
These quotes demonstrate the continued sense of self- and group-identification of the Arab
community concerning Palestine. These quotes also show a sense of the perception of selfhelplessness and that territorial issues remained a motivation for violence.
Israeli non-elite reaction to the Yom Kippur War was different, however. The
Ha’aretz, Israel’s leading independent daily newspaper, which had at one time advocated
for more moderate to liberal foreign policies, changed its position in response to the
attacks when they printed: “. . cut not merely the fingers but the hand which was raised
against us” (Ha’aretz, Israeli newspaperlxxiv). Similarly, an unidentified Israeli soldier
communicates that he is weary of the killing and worries for his son:
I don't care about the Suez Canal, about Ismailia, about Suez, about
winning or losing. We have got to stop these mindless cycles of having a
war with the Arabs every five or ten years, followed by a hate-filled ceasefire and then another war. We have got to find the key to peace. . . I
simply cannot accept the idea that my son, who is 5 now, will have to go
through this after me. . . We have got to learn to live with them. If we do,
this war will have been worth it. If we don't, it will have been mass murder
for no reason - Unnamed Israeli soldierlxxv.
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Though initially successful for the Arabs, by the end of the violence of the Yom Kippur
War (October 25, 1973), the Israelis had regained the land they lost in the first days of the
war and had secured land from both Egypt and Syria (Dowty, 2008, 119). Israel
experienced over 2500 casualties and the Arab forces lost approximately 8000 lives
(Garwich, 2006, 243; Liebman, 1993, 400; Tzabag, 2001, 205)44.
1978
Analysis of 1978 included 416 articles. Of these articles, many focused on the
Lebanese Druse/Christian civil war and on international terrorist events. In the articles
that were germane to my research agenda, there were 23 violent incidents between the
Israelis and Arabs that resulted in approximately 390 deaths. However, no incidents were
reported in January, February, July, September, and October. Also, non-state
organizations were mentioned 37 times in relation to the violence.
There were 58 quotes from actors directly related to the Israeli/Arab conflict. Ten
contained conflict statements. Territorial motives remained the most frequently
referenced reasons for committing acts of violence (5) followed by security and revenge
respectively. Resources, political power, and social power were not mentioned as
motives for committing an act of violence. Interestingly though, nine of the ten
statements came from non-state actors. This is change from the elite-actor dominance in
quotes in previous time windows (1973 had an equal amount of elite to non-elite actor
quotes).
We don't have any interest or desire to stay in southern Lebanon. We are
interested only in our security – an un-named Israeli Foreign Ministry
spokesmanlxxvi.

44

These sources vary as to the exact amounts of casualties. Therefore, the numbers of deaths reported are
the minimum numbers.
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The escalation of our armed struggle against the Zionist enemy inside our
occupied homeland – In a statement released by Fatah claiming
responsibility for terrorist event in Israel that killed 20 peoplelxxvii.
In the article, the Israeli actors stated that they entered into Lebanon in defense of Israeli
(citizens’) security. Fatah claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack because they were
defending their homeland.
There were 44 quotes in 1978 that revealed psychological motivation. Groupidentification was the most often psychological component used with 36, emotion had 23,
perceptual comments were made 22 times, and self-identification was not used at all.
Non-elite quotes that contained psychological motivation also out-numbered elites quotes
for the first time:
"We have gone through all this before. I don't even want to turn on the
radio. We all seem trapped in the same old problem – an “ordinary
resident of Jerusalem” in reaction Menachem Begin’s peace effortslxxviii.
Give them to us! . . . Death to the Arabs! . . . Let's murder them! – Shouts
by an Israeli mob in reaction to a bombing in Tel Aviv that killed one and
injured 50lxxix.
It is not so much this soldier as the Government of Israel going on trial.
We will be judging Israeli aggression through Private Amram. There is no
question of him being sentenced to death as a war criminal, because we
have no firm evidence he killed or tortured anybody – an un-identified
Arab “guerrilla leader”lxxx, 45.
All those dead were not for nothing. About 100 people died for them and
the whole world screamed. They made the Palestinians refugees- and the
world and the United States don’t respond. . . We left because we were
afraid for the lives of the children. When they start screaming and crying,
what do you do? –Ahmed Fawas, Arab farmer and refugeelxxxi.
In/out-group identification (we/they language) is present in all four quotes. Also, the
quotes show that out-group perception is present in both sides of the conflict. Israelis

45

Private Abarham Amram, an Israeli reservist was released by the Lebanese government on March 14,
1979 in exchanged for the release of 76 Palestinians being held by the state of Israel (No Author. “Israel
Exchanges 66 Palestinians for Soldier Captured in Lebanon.” New York Times. 15 March, 1979, A14.
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express sentiments of the perception of the futility at the thought of trying to make peace
with the Arabs and the Palestinians perceive Private Amram as a war criminal without
gathering evidence. Emotion is also present in these quotes. While implicit in the first,
third, and fourth quote, it is blatant in the second Israeli quote. The bombing of a
crowded Tel Aviv market on August 3, 1978 prompted spontaneous riots by Israelis.
Through actions and words, the demonstrators openly displayed strong emotional
sentiments. However, by not stopping at, “Death to Arabs” and including, “Let’s murder
them” reveals the strength of Israeli feelings. “Murder”, as a word-choice in this context,
communicates that the actors were aware that in killing the suspects, they would be
bringing lives to an illegitimate end.
1983
There were 443 articles assessed from 1983. In these articles, there were 23
violent exchanges between Arab and Israeli actors; each month had at least one act of
violence that resulted in over 190 deaths. Twelve acts of violence were attributed to the
Palestinians and eleven to the Israelis. Non-state organizations were referenced 33 times
throughout the year. There were some new organizations mentioned, though. These
included: the Haj Amin, Mufti, Saiqa, Gush Emunim, Moslem Jihad, and the (Islamic)
Amal.
There were numerous quotes in 1983 that revealed conflict motivations. There
were nine conflict statements, and statements were equally distributed between Arabs
Israelis, and elite and non-elite actors.
But we will certainly take steps whenever we feel that our security is
threatened. We have a good army. We don't like to go to war. We don't
like to pay the price of going to war. But whenever we feel we must take a
military action in order to avoid a far worse situation developing in a short
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period of time, we will act, no question about it. – Moshe Arens, Israeli
Defense Minister lxxxii.
[And what is her dream in life?] To get back our land . . . We can't accept
the presence of the Israelis here. We must do everything we can to put fear
in them, to make them get out, violent or not – Eleven-year-old Amal Abu
al-Jamiyya in interview with David Shiplerlxxxiii.
Territory and security concerns dominated conflict statements with four quotes each. One
quote, used below (under emotion) contained languages that revealed the motivation of
revenge. Similarly, there were numerous quotes in this time window that showed the
presence of multiple psychological motivations:
Emotion:
Ansar is Auschwitz! You are Nazis! You are Nazis! P.L.O.! Israel must
go!. . When Begin said about us- animals on two feet- doesn’t it bring an
echo of what Hitler said about the Jews?- Salah Taamri, PLO officer
imprisoned in Ansar Prison in Israellxxxiv.
We are a people of joy and love, but there comes a time for vengeance,
and that time is now- Rabbi Moshe Levinger, calling for retaliation over
an Israeli woman’s deathlxxxv.
Perception:
They have to be afraid of us. . . To tell the truth, we want them to leave.
And if they stay, they have to accept that this is a Jewish country, not an
Arab one. They will have to accept being ruled by us – An un-identified
Jewish mother of fourlxxxvi.
When you say, 'Jew,' they immediately think of a violent policeman. If
you ask a Jew, 'What do you think of an Arab?' they think terrorist or
worse - Khalid Samaar, the principal of an elementary and junior high
school in an Arab village in the Galilee. lxxxvii
Identity:
Then I found out what racism was. How many times I heard ‘dirty Arab’
from her parents, friends. . . even my own girlfriend said to me once, ‘This
will teach me to get close to you barbarians’- Zohar Endrawos, a young
Arab man who dated an Israeli lxxxviii.
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"He looked like a nice boy. . . I could see him clearly and I also saw, when
I hit him, how he doubled up in the car. I shot with a big rifle and that's it.
I saw him and I was sorry for him. I was sorry for myself, too, in that
situation. . . I saw that he was wounded, but he continued to drive. He held
on to his last seconds. He succeeded in doing what he wanted to do" – An
un-identified Israeli soldier stationed in Lebanonlxxxix.
"The Arabs take a life for a life, I say the Jews deserve credit for not
killing any Arabs. . . – Miriam Levinger, Israeli civilianxc.
Most of these quotes reveal overlapping psychological components of emotion,
perception, and identity. Of particular interest though, is how individual actors attempted
to reconcile their individual and group identities while living side by side with members
of the out-group. The first man was willing to try to overcome inter- and intra-group bias
and date a Jewish woman. However, he encountered open bias and antagonistic language
from the very people that he was trying to establish relationships with. The second manthe Israeli soldier, while he performed his duty in trying to stop the boy from committing
an act of terrorism, his word choices indicate that he encountered cognitive dissonance.
The soldier thought that the “boy” seemed like a nice person, he was killing someone that
he regarded as a child (boy, not man), it bothered him that he was the one that shot the
boy, “I hit him” with his “big rifle”, and he regretted being in the position of killing him.
He also indicated that he admired the boy because the boy continued to drive.
Conversely, Miriam Levinger made no efforts to overcome the perceptions, justifications,
generalizations, and sentiments of moral superiority that are hallmarks of contentious ingroup/out-group conflict.
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1988
In 1988, there were 473 articles analyzed. There were 56 violent incidents
resulting in approximately 516 deaths. Thirty-one incidents were attributed to have been
started by the Arabs, whereas the Israelis reportedly initiated 25. Non-state organizations
were referenced 59 times. New organizations mentioned include the Party of God, Army
of God, and Shabiba. Of the 101 quotes gathered from the year, 33 of them had conflict
statements. Twenty of these statements were made by elite actors and the Israel to
Palestinian conflict statement ratio was approximately even. Again, territorial and
security issues were the two most frequently referenced reasons stated for conflict.
Security and revenge were a distant third with four quotes each.
God is great. We will free you, Palestine – Demonstrators leaving the Al
Aksa Mosque in Jerusalemxci.
The PLO's policy is land for peace. . . – Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the
PLOxcii.
We will not abandon the land because murderers want it –Yitzhak Shamir,
Prime Minister of Israelxciii.
Forget about the media. Forget about the world. We have to hurt the
Israelis. That's what's really important . . . - An un-identified Palestinian
leaderxciv.
The first three quotes show that competition for land remains a central contention for
both actors in the dyad. The last quote shows revenge as a motivation for violence.
When assessing articles for components of psychological motivation, 71 statements
with psychological content were found. Group-identity- based statements were the most
frequent with 53 quotes followed by perception with 30, and then emotion which had 27
quotes:
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They are animals not soldiers – Shadi Abdullah, Arab man beaten by
Israeli soldiers in Ha’aretz, Israelxcv.
It is good to have this bad image… That way, the Arabs are frightened of
us. If they weren't frightened of us, they'd kill us – Meir Indor, Israeli
settlerxcvi.
It’s miserable. But at the same time, to be in daily touch with your enemy,
and to do everything against him, makes you feel very good. –Asman
Khroob, a 24 year-old Arab womanxcvii.
. . . he was startled to hear them shouting rhythmically, “In baladna, yahud
kalabna” – In Arabic, “This is our country and the Jews are our dogs.”
“I went over to a woman whose son I helped get out of jail. . . I said,
‘Samiha, this is me, Victor. Samiha, am I your dog?’ She wouldn’t even
look at me. She was in a kind of ecstasy. . . Believe me, I'm not afraid of
the Arab countries. I'm not afraid of the West Bankers. I'm afraid of the
Israeli Arabs. They hate our guts” – Victor Tayar, a leader of the Israeli
Black Panthersxcviii.
These statements reveal the intensity of the emotional sentiment that both the Israelis and
Palestinians have towards each other. The emotional components of fear and anger are
blatantly present. Also, the perceptual statement by the Israeli settler that the Arabs fear
the Jews also reveals his personal fear of the Arabs. He is afraid that the Arabs will kill
him if they lose the fear that he believes they have of Israelis. As in all the windows
examined thus far in the Arab/Israeli PSC, emotion, perception, and group-identification
are strongly represented in the statements of the actors.
1993
There were 718 articles assessed in 199346. Fifty-three violent incidents in the
articles analyzed. Of the 319 deaths, 231 were Palestinian and 88 were Israeli. Non-state
organizations were mentioned 108 times. New organizations mentioned include Holy
Islamic War, Qassam Brigades, The Committee for Security on the Roads, and Red
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Many of the articles were on the Somalia genocide and the U.S. Twin Tower bombings but referenced
the Israeli/Palestinian PSC.
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Eagle. There were 23 direct conflict statements. The majority of which came from elite
(13) Israeli (15) actors. Territorial issues were mentioned 12 times; security 11 times; and
revenge was referenced 4. Resources, political power, and social power had only one
reference between them.
We have confrontations every day, and always on the days when the Army
goes by on patrol. I support the stone-throwing because otherwise we don't
have anything to fight with. We throw stones at them to make them get
out. But they don’t' get out. What's the point? At least we show the world
that we don't accept this occupation at all. . . .In the long term it should not
exist [Israel]. . . It's either Israel or Palestine. It's hard to have both of us.
Ask yourself: If somebody takes over your home by force, are you willing
to give him a room, or two rooms? The land of Palestine is very small.
You can't divide it into two countries – Wael Abd al-Jawad, Palestinian
youth (17 years old) xcix.
We are not seekers of adventure. . . Neither are we shell absorbers. So if
there's shooting, we'll return fire, and do whatever is necessary to protect
the area -Shimon Peres, Israeli Foreign ministerc.
I thought the children would protect me from the army. . . The girl was 4
years old. She never picked up a stone or held a gun. Nobody had attacked
the Jews. They just wanted to kill. They fired at a car full of children.
They hate us . . .I want the Israelis to know that this is precisely what leads
people to go out and stab Israeli citizens and soldiers – Ishak Siyaj, an
unemployed Palestinian carpenter whose child was killed when he failed
to stop at an army checkpoint. He was rushing to take his mother to the
hospitalci.
The quote by the Palestinian youth shows that territorial issues remain salient in the
Israeli/Palestinian PSC. Similarly, the statement by Shimon Peres also demonstrates that
security concerns remain a primary aspect of the conflict. The quote by Ishak Siyaj shows
how misperception can lead to a tragic event that prompts such strong emotions and
perceptions that they can become motives for violence through revenge.
There were 77 statements made in articles analyzed from 1993 that contained
psychological motivation. While there were slightly more elite and Israeli quotes,
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statements by non-elite actors and Palestinians were well represented. In this particular
window, group identification had the highest frequency of references with 65, followed
by perception with 51, and emotion was next with 30 references. Self-identification
statements were a distant fourth with six quotes.
We have no intention of exercising restraint when faced with the firing of
Katyushas at the north. . . There will be no compromise. If they continue
to attack our towns we will pursue them everywhere and not one of them
will be immune. We will attack them without mercy and without pause –
Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israelcii.
Let the word go out: The Jewish people will not tolerate this! Punish our
neighbors for what they have done to us! – an un-identified speaker at the
funeral of a father and son who were shot to death by Palestinian
gunmenciii.
He who seeks to kill us, we will seek to kill him – Sheik Mohammed
Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual leader of the Party of God civ.
Each of these quotes reflects sentiments of group-identification on the part of the people
making the statements. In addition to this, Rabin reveals the emotions of resolve and
elements of anger (without mercy, without pause) in his statement. Similarly, the man at
the funeral clearly demonstrates strong emotion as he calls for revenge. Lastly, Sheik
Fadlallah’s statement shows that he has the perception that Israelis want to kill
Arabs/Muslims and that he wants to reciprocate.
1998
There were over 800 articles assessed in 1998. Of the articles germane to the
Arab/Israeli conflict, 23 violent incidents were recorded. There were 209 deaths as a
result of these incidents, with 114 being Israeli and 95 that were Palestinian. Non-statebased groups were mentioned 26 times during this time window. The groups of Amal,
Kach, and Qssam were mentioned for the first time. Of the 15 conflict statements,
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territorial motives were mentioned seven times followed by revenge, which was
mentioned five times, and then security-based motives were mentioned four. Political and
social power motives were mentioned one time each and resources were not mentioned at
all.
I have nothing to be sorry for. Everything I did was for love of the land of
Israel - Tatania Suszkin, who placed anti-Muslim posters on the doors of
Arab shops in the West Bank, setting off days of clashescv.
Once again the resistance has fulfilled its promise to protect our territory
and our civilians. Violence must be answered with violence. Their blood
must be spilled for ours – a statement released by Hezbollah claiming
responsibility for an attack to avenge “the deliberate killing” of a
Palestinian womancvi.
They are not just laying a cornerstone, these are the gravestones of any
kind of peace. On the ground they are burying it – Hanan Ashrawi,
Palestinian Cabinet member in reference to Israeli settlement expansion
ceremony in Palestinian- dominated Ramallahcvii.
As in years before, territory remains the primary issue of contention between the actors.
This is especially true in the time window of 1998 as this issue is exacerbated by the
onset of Israeli developments in Palestinian areas. In the first two quotes, however, while
the issue of territory is used, inconsistencies make it questionable whether it is really the
behavioral motive. If Tatania Suszkin was motivated by her love for the land of Israel,
why did she post anti-Muslim papers? Similarly, when Hezbollah took responsibility for
their attack, while they began their statement stating that they were defending territory
and civilians, it becomes clear that the real motive for violence is revenge.
There were 50 statements with psychological content in 1998. Statements were
split approximately evenly between Palestinian and Israeli actors and elite and non-elite
actors. There were 29 group-identification statements, 25 perception, 24 emotion, and
four self-identification statements.
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It is clear that the Arabs are not the ones who kill peace and the peace
process, but the Israelis. The whole world knows and says that the Arabs
cling fast to the peace process; others do not – Hafez al-Assad, President
of Syriacviii.
I think this is a very appropriate response to the murder that was
committed. The murderers and those who sent them should know: You
murder people, we will build. We won't be defeated – Yoel Tzur, Israeli
whose wife and son were killed by Palestinian gunmencix.
This demonstrates the terrorist mind of the Zionists. If they kill Khaled
Meshal, they will pay a very high price – Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Hamas
spokesman in Gazacx.
Though the statement made by Assad does not relay group-identity, what it does
communicate is the perception not only that the Israelis do not want peace, but that the
world knows that. Yoel Tzur’s statement shows emotion in using the word “murder”. It
also reveals group-identity sentiments by using “we/they” word choices. Al-Rantisi’s
statement has an emotional component. By using the word “demonstrates”, he is
communicating that prior to this statement he has rejected the legitimacy of Zionists
(Israelis) and that Sharon’s threat to assassinate Meshalcxi is a justification of his position.
A further rejection of Israeli legitimacy ( showing emotive content) is the refusal to call
the out-group Israelis but Zionists. Lastly, by using the word “terrorist”, al-Rantisi is
attributing malicious intent upon the Israelis. Thus, his statement has a perceptual
component. Al-Rantisi’s and Yoel Tzur’s statements both have group-identification
components. Tzur’s statement also reveals emotion as he uses the word “murder” (an
illegitimate act) and resolve by using an if/then statement.
2003
Many of the 1283 articles analyzed in 2003 were about the Iraq war and only mentioned
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in passing. Because of this most of the articles were not
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germane to my research However, there were 99 violent incidents reported in the
Israeli/Palestinian PSC resulting 726 deaths. Sixty-three of the incidents were reportedly
initiated by Palestinian actors. Non-state organizations were mentioned 147 times.
Organizations mentioned for the first time were the Aksa Martyrs Brigade and the
Popular Resistance Committee. Of the 204 quotes analyzed, 28 contained conflict
statements. Palestinian to Israeli and elite to non-elite statements were approximately
equal. Interestingly, security and revenge surpassed territorial motives for violence. There
were three incidents where actors cited territory as a motive for violence whereas security
was mentioned 17 times and revenge 13.
They are trying to stamp our movement with the brand of inhumanity for
the killing of innocent civilians. . . These operations aim to create a
balance of fear. As long as the Israelis kill our civilians, we will respond
by targeting their civilians – un-named spokesman for the al-AksaMartyrs
Brigadecxii.
Sharon, prepare the coffins. Revenge is coming soon, in Tel Aviv and
Jaffa – yelled through loudspeakers during a funeral procession for a
Hamas leader killed by Israeli forcescxiii.
If indeed there is calm, and there is no terror, Israel will make every effort
to avoid taking action against terrorists. If the terror attacks continue,
Israel, feeling itself responsible for the security of its citizens, will surely
take action – Ariel Sharon, Israeli Prime Ministercxiv.
You cannot build a fence on our land, to cage us like chickens and hope all is
well. The conflict will continue, the fire will burn, terror will increase, nobody
will benefit – Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authoritycxv.
In addition to a perceptual component, the statement made by spokesman for the al-Aksa
Martyrs Brigade clearly communicated that revenge would be a motive for violence.
Revenge is also the motive of the funeral attendees in the second quote. Sharon states
that Israel will act to defend its security and the prime minister asserted that land
remained a reason to commit acts of violence.
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There were 169 statements that had the psychological components in 2003.
Palestinian quotes slightly outnumbered Israeli at 91 to 80. Similarly, non-state actor
quotes were used a little more than the statements of elite actors in the articles. Perceptual
comments were the most frequent at 107, followed by group-identification at 103. There
were 74 emotive and six self-identification statements.
Clearly we are going to be very circumspect in the choice of targets in the
moment that we pick. But when we have this clear and present dangerthat the human missile is already about to be launched- we will disrupt the
launching – Raanan Gissin, to aid to Ariel Sharoncxvi.
Instead of a comprehensive incursion, the Israelis will hit the areas one by
one, so they can avoid great losses - Kayed al-Ghoul, a leader of PFLPcxvii.
She has done what she has done, thank God, and I am sure that what she
has done is not a shameful thing. She has done it for the sake of her
people. . . I don't want to talk about my feelings, my pain, my suffering.
But I can tell you that our people believe that what Hanadi has done is
justified. Imagine yourself watching the Israelis kill your son, your
nephew, destroying your house-they are pushing our people into a corner,
they are provoking actions like these by our people – parents of Hanadi
Jaradat, an Arab (female) suicide bomber (affiliated with Islamic
Jihad)cxviii.
Janadi Jaradat was a 27-year-old Palestinian attorney. Her suicide bombing killed 14
“Jews”, including three children and it was one of more than 100 suicide bombings that
occurred between 2000 and 2003cxix. The statements made by her parents clearly reveal
group-identification, in-group/out-group justification, and emotional sentiments. Also,
by using the words “pushing our people into a corner” and “provoking”, they are
communicating that they have the perception that the Israelis are trying to get the
Palestinians/Arabs to commit acts of violence. The statement by Kayed al-Ghoul also
communicates the perception that the Israelis are moving in a calculated manner so that
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they can take more Palestinian land with the least number of casualtiescxx. Lastly, alGhoul’s and Sharon’s statements reveal group-identification sentiments by using
dichotomous we/they word choices.
2008
The final time window where data was collected for analysis was 2008. There
were 471 articles examined during this window. There were 20 violent incidents recorded
with culpability ascribed to the Israelis in 13 of the events and to the Palestinians in
seven. There were no violent events recorded in May. Five hundred thirty-nine deaths
reported in this year alone. Though there were no new non-state- based organizations
mentioned, previously identified organizations were referenced 32 times. There were 34
quotes identified, but only four of the statements revealed conflict motivation content.
Three of these statements were from Israelis and from elite actors. All four statements
were founded in revenge.
I'm prepared to live like this for months, as long as the Army continues
this aggressive line. [The Gazans] have to understand that if we get hit,
they get hit –Oren Idelman, 33, and Israeli investment advisercxxi.
Yesterday, in Bethlehem, we again proved that the state of Israel will
continue to hunt and to strike any murderer who has Jewish blood on his
hands, and those who sent him. It is unimportant how much time has
elapsed, Israel's long arm will reach him – Ehud Barak, Israeli Defense
Ministercxxii.
While the statement of Oren Idelman shows the tit-for-tat mentality that is common the
desire for revenge, the comment by Ehud Barak is a blatant revenge statement from an
elite Israeli actor. There are no references to territory, resources, or security in his
statement, only the motivation of revenge.
There were 29 statements made that had psychological components, 12 were
made by Palestinians and 18 were made by Israelis. There were slightly more elite
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statements (18) than non-elite (12). Eighteen quotes had perceptual components, 15 had
emotive aspects, and 14 reveal feelings group-identification among the actors. None of
the quotes had the self-identification component.
These barbaric crimes reveal the true face of Israel, which speaks loudly
about peace and security all the while committing murderers and
execution against our people – statement by the office of Mahmoud
Abbas, President of Fatahcxxiii.
It was a clear provocation, a thousand percent. – Hanna Tibi, Israeli
resident of Acre, Israelcxxiv.
During Yom Kippur of 2008, the city of Acre, Israel experience four nights of violent
clashes between Israelis and Palestinians. In sharing her memories of these events, Hanna
Tibi said that she felt that the Palestinians did things to provoke the Jews to retaliate. By
saying this, she communicates her perception that the Palestinians orchestrated events
that would evoke Israeli retaliation. In the statement released the office of Mahmoud
Abbas, in addition to calling the Israelis hypocrites by saying one thing and doing
another; their word choices of “barbaric,” “murder”, and “execution” reveal negative
emotional sentiments by the Arabs towards the Israelis.
CASE ANALYSIS
Analysis of the data in the Arab/Israeli and case provides a wide variety of quotes
from the people that were, and are, personally involved in the conflict. In this section of
the Israeli/Arab case, I use the statements that I have collected from these actors and the
information provided in the articles to determine whether the components that I am
assessing are indeed necessary components of this PSC. The first four components ( ≥ 20
years of violent conflict; ≥ 3 cycles of violence and peace; ≥ 500 deaths; and the
participation of non-state actors) are the descriptive aspects of the Israeli/Arab PSC. The
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last two components- (competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation) are
conceptualized as the supporting aspects.
DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENTS OF PSC
Conflict For Twenty or More Years
That violent conflict must be present for an extended period of time for a PSC to
be present is a given. The minimum time that a violent conflict must be present to be
considered a PSC is 20 years in this study. This duration was chosen so that the lapse of
time would be inclusive of the biological and social concepts of a generation.
Though data collection began in 1948 with the establishment of the Israeli state,
the conflict between Zionists/Israelis and Palestinians/Arabs began long before, with the
onset of violence occurring in April 1920 (Gerner, 1994, 25). Because of this, a
reasonable argument can be made that a PSC already existed when data collection began.
Even so, violent conflict between the Israelis and Arabs has been present in every time
window examined from 1948 through to 2008. Because violent conflict is present in
every five-year increment that was measured, it is obviously present in 20-year
increments as well. Thus, Boolean analysis (see table 5.4) of the Palestinian/Israeli PSC
supports the theoretical establishment of a minimum of 20 years of violent conflict as a
necessary component of PSC.
Violence Cycles
PSC is marked by vacillations in violence between the actors. There can be
durations of time in a PSC where there is no violence between the actors only to have
violent conflict erupt again at a later time over the same issue or stimulus. A minimum of
three months between violent episodes or spikes was established to be consistent with the
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Nedler-Mead model of three data points to begin a pattern of non-violence. Violent
incidents were measured using the dates that individual, non-governmental Palestinian or
Israeli or government-based attacks were reported.
In the time-windows examined in this case, violence was consistent across all
time windows on an annual basis and far surpassed theoretical minimums (See figure
5.1).
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Figure 5.1: Violent Incidents Reported in Arab/Israeli Conflict
There were three years out of the 13 examined where violent conflict was not
reported in every single month- 1953, 1958, and 1963. Of these, only 1963 had more than
two consecutive months without a violence incident. There five consecutive months,
from January until June where no violent conflicts were reported. 1953 had two months
were no violent incidents were recorded, but they were not consecutive (September and
December). Similarly, 1958 had three non-consecutive months where no violence-related
deaths were reported.
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Though every year had more than the minimum of three incidents of violence,
fluctuations in the rates of violence were present. For example; 1968, 1988, and 2003 all
had over 50 violent events, but the distributions of these events are different (see figure
5.2). 1968 has one month where over 20% (19 of 92) of the year’s violent events occur
in one month and the rest of the year’s incidents are spread more evenly throughout the
year. 1988 has a cluster of events in the summer months, June through August, that
account for almost a third of the year’s violent encounters (15 of 52). Finally, in 2003,
one of the years that had the most incidents, the pattern of violence is distributed more
evenly.
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Figure 5.2: Israeli/Arab PSC- Distribution of Violent Incidents in 1968, 1988, and 2003
Because there are a substantial number of violent events and only one three-month window
where violence was not reported, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of violence cycles as a
necessary component of (see figure 5.2).
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Casualties
Because violent events are sporadic and tend to have low rates per violent
incident in PSCs, they are harder to measure than militarized conflicts and other eventdriven research. To account for these particular features of PSC but provide measurable
criteria, I have modified Wallersteen’ (2006) parameters for militarized conflicts of 25
deaths per year to 500 deaths over a 20-year time span. In doing so, the actual number of
casualties required for a theoretical minimum remains the same, but the time restraints
are adjusted in consideration of the sporadic and cyclical nature of PSC.
Even when removing the deaths from militarized conflicts (the 1948 Israeli War
of Independence, for example), there were more than 25 deaths in every year examined
(see figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.3: Arab/Israeli Case PSC-Related Casualties
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As every year analyzed met or exceeded 25 deaths, the number deaths exceeded the
500 theoretical minimum at every 20-year PSC bench-mark as well. Therefore, Boolean
analysis supports the establishment of a minimum threshold of 500 directly-relatable
deaths within a 20-year period of time as a necessary component of PSC. In summary,
Boolean supports the inclusion of 500 or more directly-relatable deaths within a 20-year
time-frame as a necessary component of PSC in the Arab/Israeli case.
Participation of Non-State Actors
The participation of non-state actors includes individuals and groups that are not
affiliated with a state that have participated in acts of violence. The minimum theoretical
threshold for a positive Boolean outcome requires that there has to be at least six PSC –
related events that involve the participation of non-state actors for the year coded
positively for having had non-state actors’ participation in the PSC. Lastly, for the case to
be coded positively for having the participation of non-state as a necessary component of
PSC, there had to be at least six years that were coded positively for the participation of
non-state actors. Ten of the 13 years examined resulted in a positive Boolean outcome in
non-state actor participation (See figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4: References to Non-state Actors -Arab/Israeli Case
Though analysis shows Boolean support for the participation for non-state actors as a
necessary component of PSC, it is interesting to note that the frequency that non-state
actors are referenced or make statements themselves increases over time.
SUPPORTING COMPONENTS OF PSC
The supporting components of PSC are components that are not readily observed,
but could be the components that are actually responsible for the enduring nature of these
conflicts. In this and the other cases analyzed in this dissertation, the components from
which data is gathered and assessed are organized into two categories. These are
competition-based conflict and psychological motivation. This is operationalized by
assessing actor statements to determine behavioral motivation47. By assessing the
statements of the actual actors in the conflict, the reason why PSCs are enduring in nature
could be realized.
47

For further explanation of coding rules for content analysis, please refer to the appendix.
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COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT
The components tested in competition-based conflict are territory, resources,
security, political power, social power, and revenge. Theoretical minimum criteria for
coding the presence (positive Boolean outcome) for each component included a
minimum of three quotes in a year where the actors stated that an individual component
was the reason they committed or would commit an act of violence. For the case to be
coded as positive for the existence of competition-based conflict there had to be at least
six years throughout the course of the case that clearly revealed that competition-based
conflict was the motivation for behavior.
Using these parameters, ten of the 13 years analyzed coded positive for the
presence of competition-based conflict (see table 5.2). Thus, Boolean analysis supports it
as a necessary component of PSC. Because Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of the
category of competition-based conflict as a necessary component of PSC, each individual
component is assessed to determine their role in supporting PSC. In doing so,
determination can be made as to which (or all) components, when combined, make
competition-based conflict a necessary component of PSC. Analysis of these
components revealed that some could be supported as necessary components of
competition-based conflict and others could not.
Tangible Assets: Territorial Conflict
The minimum theoretical threshold for coding a year as positive for the presence
of territorially motivated conflict (and other competition-based components) is three or
more references to land/territory in the year. The component had to be present six or
more years for the case to be coded positively for each component. Statements about
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territorial rights were approximately equal at the beginning of the case. As the case
progressed, however, statements made by Arab actors about territorial rights trended
upwards slightly whereas territorially-motivated statements made by Israelis trended
downwards (see figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5: Territorially-Motivated Statements - Arab/Israeli Case
The inclusion of territorial conflict as a necessary component of competition-based
conflict can be supported using Boolean analysis (see table 5.2). Statements reveal that
territorial conflict as a motivation for violent behavior are sufficiently present in 10 of the
13 years analyzed to be coded positively and territorial motives account for 44.7% of all
competition-based conflict statements given in the case. References are repeatedly made
about territory focusing on physical possession and the right of possession of land.
Lastly, though there are vacillations in the frequency of the statements and the overall
trend is downward, territorial motivation is represented consistently throughout the
Israeli/Arab PSC (see figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6: Territorially-Based Violence Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
Resources
The resource conflict that was most frequently mentioned in the Arab/Israeli PSC
is water. Even so, though violence over a resource is mentioned in six of the thirteen
windows analyzed, only one year has resources mentioned frequently enough for it to be
coded as present (1948). Resource competition statements represented 4.3% of all
conflict statements. Thus, the inclusion of resources, as a necessary component of
competition-based conflict, cannot be supported using Boolean analysis.
Physical Security
When security is mentioned by the actors in the Israeli/Arab PSC as a motivation
for violence it is most often made by Israeli actors. Overall, security-based statements
comprise 29.6% of all competition statements and are present in eight of the thirteen
time-windows (see table 5.2). Finally, security-based violence is consistent over the
duration of the case and trending upwards over the course of the case (see figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.7: Security-Based Violence Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
Non-Tangible Assets: Political Power
Statements that included political power as a motive for violence often included
the lack of representation that Arab citizens have in Israel or the lack of legitimacy of the
state of Israel as a political entity. Political power, as a motive for violence was
referenced in 6.1% of all conflict statements and was not coded as present in any of the
thirteen years analyzed. Therefore, it cannot be supported as an individually necessary
component of the competition-based conflict.
Social Power
Statements that referenced social power in the Arab/Israeli conflict have increased
in the in the last 20 years of the conflict with eight of the ten quotes occurring in 1998 or
after. Many of these quotes include religious motives on the part of the Muslim Arabs.
Social-power quotes represented 4.18% of all conflict statements, and are coded as
present in two of the thirteen years analyzed (see table 5.2). Thus, Boolean analysis
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reveals that conflict over social power cannot be supported as an individually necessary
component of competition-based conflict.
Revenge
Revenge was first mentioned as a motivation for violence in 1973 (see table 5.2).
Revenge motives for previous actions by the out-group are stated as motives for violence
by state and non-state actors and by Israelis as well as Arabs. Revenge-based statements
account for 13.9% of all conflict statements and are present in five of the thirteen yearlong windows analyzed (see table 5.2). Thus, it falls just short of being supported as an
individually necessary component of competition-based conflict. However, the frequency
in which revenge is cited as being a motive for violence is trending upwards over the life

Frequency of Revenge-motivated Statements

of the conflict (See figure 5.8).
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Figure 5.8: Revenge -Based Violence Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
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Summary
Competition-based conflict is conceptualized as one of six categorically necessary
components of PSC. Furthermore, in this dissertation, I proposed that the category of
competition-based conflict that is supported by six sufficient components - territory,
resources, security, political power, social power, and revenge. In this portion of the
chapter, I used Boolean methodologies to determine whether the data collected supports
the proposition that competition-based conflict and its sub-components are necessary
components of PSC.
The observation of the changing role of revenge as a motivation for violence
raises an important point about the nature of PSC that merits discussion. Across PSC
scholarship and in the literature review, references are made about the changing nature of
PSC in that the issue(s) of contention between conflictual dyads can change or take on
additional components over time (Marcus 2003; Pruitt & Kim 2004; Rapoport 1974).
When comparing the trend lines of revenge and territory as motivations for violent
behavior, they appear to have an inverse relationship. Similarly, revenge and securitybased comments appear to increase along similar trajectories (see figure 5.9). While it is
premature to make broader implications as to the nature of PSC in general from this one
case, the appearance of a strong negative correlation (inverse relationship) between
revenge and territory and a positive correlation between revenge and security could be
supportive of the assertion that issues of contention can change and take on additional
components over time.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of Territory, Revenge, and Security as Motivations for
Violence - Arab/Israeli PSC
Overall, Boolean analysis shows support for the proposition that competitionbased conflict is a necessary component of PSC, in the Arab/Israeli case. Similarly,
territorial and security-based conflict is supported as significant components of
competition-based conflict and account for 71.9% of all conflict-based statements (see
table 5.2). The radial categories of resources, political power, and social power;
however, fall well short of the established theoretical minimum individual and account
for 14.3% of all of the conflict statements combined. The final radial category, revenge,
falls just short of individual Boolean support, accounting for 13.9% of all conflict
statements. It will be interesting to follow the frequency of revenge-related violence in
the future (in this and other PSC cases) to see if this component plays an increased role in
violence motivation in PSC. In summary, Boolean analysis supports the category of
competition-based conflict as a necessary component of PSC in the Arab/Israeli case.
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Boolean analysis also supports the inclusion of territory and security concerns as jointly
necessary components of competition-based conflict. The role of revenge, while not
supported by Boolean analysis at this time, is increasing in frequency as a motivation for
violent behavior. Thus, additional monitoring/study of this component, within this case
and in other cases over time, is merited.
PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION
Statements that reveal psychological motivation in PSC are well-supported across
time. Through Boolean analysis, the justification for the inclusion of psychological
motivation as a necessary component of PSC is strongly supported in this case.
Statements that revealed presence of psychological motivation in the Arab/Israeli PSC
passed minimum theoretical criteria in all of the thirteen years analyzed (see table 5.3).
Thus, in the Arab/Israeli case, analysis supports my proposition that psychological
motivation is a necessary component of PSC. When analyzing each of the components
individually, however, the results are not as clear-cut.
Emotion
The proposition that the presence of emotion is a necessary component of the
psychological motivation of PSC can be supported using Boolean analysis. Emotionallycharged statements are present in approximately 27.4% of all quotes that contained
psychological sentiments. Boolean analysis shows that emotion is coded as present in 11
of the 13 years analyzed. Thus, it is supported as a necessary component of the category
of psychological motivation in PSC. Emotive statements are consistent across the
duration of the conflict and trend slightly positive (see figure 5.10).
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Figure 5.10: Frequency of Emotive Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of
emotion plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in frequency throughout
the course of the Arab/Israeli conflict could indicate that the role of emotion increases as
the PSC endures over time.
Perception
There is an average of 28 statements per year by actors indicating the presence of
perceived motivational, characteristic, or behavioral attributes of the out-group. Of the
total quotes that contain psychological motivation, quotes that reveal perceptual
motivations on the part of the actors are present in 31.4% of all quotes from the
Israeli/Palestinian case (see table 5.3). In the Arab/Israeli case, 12 of 13 years are coded
positively for the presence of perception in PSC. This is double the required theoretical
minimum for an overall positive outcome for the presence of perception as a component
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of psychological motivation in PSC (see table 5.3). Finally, the presence of perceptual
statements increases over the duration of the Arab/Israeli PSC (see figure 5.11).
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Figure 5.11: Frequency of Perceptual Statements – Arab/Israeli Case
Boolean and logistic analyses support the proposition that the psychological
motivation of perception plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in
frequency throughout the course of the Arab/Israeli conflict could indicate that the role of
perception increases as the PSC endures over time.
Self-Identity
Self-identification is one of the original four necessary components of PSC listed
by Azar. However, of the psychological motivations evaluated, it has the lowest
incidence having an average of only 2.8% of the psychologically motivated statements
(see table 5.3). Boolean analysis fails to support the inclusion of self-identity as a
necessary component of psychological motivation in PSC, as quotes that reveal selfidentity motivations in the Arab/Israeli PSC case is sufficient to elicit a positive outcome
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in only two of the thirteen years measured. This is one-third of the required theoretical
minimum. Because of this, the proposition that self-identity individually contributes to
PSC in a significant manner or is a necessary component of the category of psychological
motivation in PSC cannot be supported.
Group-Identity
According to PSC theory (Azar), self and group-identity are the primary
psychological motivations that contribute to the enduring nature of PSCs. Analysis of the
data supports the inclusion of group identity as a major component of the psychological
motivations measured. Inclusion of group identity as a necessary component of the
psychological motivations supporting PSC is supported by Boolean analysis and logistic
analysis. Group-identity-based statements are specifically mentioned in 37.6% of the
quotes that communicated any type psychological motivation and are the most cited
psychological component in the Israeli/Palestinian case. Boolean analysis supports the
inclusion of group identity as a sustaining psychological motivation in PSC with 10 of the
13 years being coded positively for its presence (see table 5.3). Lastly, statements that
reveal group-identity are present over the duration of the Arab/Israeli PSC (see figure
5.12). The frequency of group-identification statements increases over the life of the
conflict as well.
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Figure 5.12: Group-Identification Statements – Arab/Israeli Case
Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of groupidentification plays a supportive role in PSC48. Also, the positive trend in frequency
throughout the course of the Arab/Israeli conflict could indicate that the role of groupidentity increases as the PSC endures over time.
Socialization in PSC
The role of socialization as a possible component that sustains PSC is referenced
in scholarly literature (Freidman 1999). Examples of how the Arab/Israeli PSC has
impacted the youth that grow up within its shadows are observed across the process of
this conflict and have been used in the quotes throughout this chapter. One year in
particular, though, showed the impact that prolonged exposure to violence can have on
children. This is 1973. Thus, the focus on the role of socialization as a supporting aspect
of the protracted nature of PSC, as it impacts children, will center on the quotes made by
48

Though incidents of group-identification statements decreases in 2008, this is more the result of fewer
overall articles that met search criteria than an actual decrease in group-identification revealing statements.
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Israeli and Arab actors in 1973. The first quote, used in the historical section of this
chapter, takes place immediately after the Yom Kippur War where a father shares his
worries about his son if the conflict endures into the child’s adulthood:
I don't care about the Suez Canal, about Ismailia, about Suez, about
winning or losing. We have got to stop these mindless cycles of having a
war with the Arabs every five or ten years, followed by a hate-filled ceasefire and then another war. We have got to find the key to peace. . . I
simply cannot accept the idea that my son, who is 5 now, will have to go
through this after me. . . We have got to learn to live with them. If we do,
this war will have been worth it. If we don't, it will have been mass murder
for no reason - Unnamed Israeli soldiercxxv.
Though this father demonstrates an aversion to continued violence, the fact that children
are exposed to violence at an early age could indicate that they are socialized into
violence despite the resistance of their parents.
This statement is a real-life example of Toynbee’s War Weariness theory. As
discussed in the literature review, parents who have seen the horrors of war are less prone
to submit their children to the same exposure to violent conflict as they have had to
endure. Thus, it takes approximately 100 years for the cycle to come “full circle” where
new leaders lose their aversion to war because of a lack of first-hand experience
(Cashman, 2000, 152). In light of Toynbee’s theory, it is not surprising that the Israeli
soldier stated that he did not want his son to “go through” what he had. However, if
exposure to the horrors of violent conflict decreases willingness to continue or engage in
future violence, why do PSCs have enduring qualities? In discussing Toynbee’s theory,
Cashman points out a limitation of the theory that may be a salient separation between
war and PSC: “War weariness has relevance for initiation but not necessarily for war
involvement” (Cashman, 2000, 153; emphasis in original). According to Cashman, while
first-hand knowledge of the human costs of violent conflict may be sufficient to deter the
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initiation of violence, it may not be enough to stop violence once it has begun. This may
help to explain why a soldier may continue to fight (so that his child will not have to), but
it is limited in aiding in the explanation as to why violent conflict can become protracted.
Toynbee’s opus was published in a 12-volume series between 1934 and 1961
(Toynbee 1961). During the same period of time, the nature of warfare and political
violence was in a process of change. War “internalized” and moved into areas that are
populated by “non-combatants”. “Wars are no longer confined to definitive battlefields,
but occur more often in populated areas. . .” (Bald, 2002, 2). In light of this, the
following quotes (also from 1973) could help to shed light as to why PSCs endure:
They play at war a lot and are a little more nervous –Shula Wexler, who
ran an Israeli kindergartencxxvi.
My little one, who is four, is constantly killing. He kills all the time. When
a plane flies overhead, he runs out with his revolver and tells us not to
worry, he’ll shoot it down – Marcel Bressier, Israeli whose child attended
the kindergarten run by Shula Wexlercxxvii.
The behavior that the children exhibited in playing war games indicates that they have
been personally exposed to violence in their environments at very young ages.
Similarly, the four-year-old who acts in a protective manner demonstrates that: (1) he
has been exposed to the threat of violence, (2) has witnessed defensive violence, and (3)
has been the recipient of/ has witnessed attempts to comfort fears stemming from the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
As “war” is removed from the traditional battlefield and occurs within the
“civilian realm” in PSC, children are personally exposed to violence and to the reactions
to the violence by the adults in their lives during their formative years.
What we see as very young children, what is modeled for us from the
significant adults in our lives, is what we learn. It is how we see the world,
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how we learn to see the world, and how we interact with it. . . In a war
culture, where violence is in the whole society, everything changes. It is
more than what they learn; it becomes who they are (McAllister 2012).
Thus, could it be that a key component separating PSC from other forms of violent
political conflict be found in explaining who experiences the violence and when
(developmentally)?
While the above quotes may shed light into how and why individuals may
become willing to participate in acts of violence, they only touch on modeling as a
potential aspect of the role of socialization in the generational attributes of PSC. Consider
the following quote where a Syrian novelist wonders at the reaction of Arab mothers who
have lost their sons to the Arab/Israeli conflict: “It is amazing to see that nobody cries.
Even the mothers say that they are proud to have given a son who died for the cause”
(Colette Khoury, Syrian novelistcxxviii). In the article and the quote, the novelist
communicates the perception that the sacrifice of young men has become a societal norm.
Clearly, the Syrian community that this woman was commenting on felt that the death of
young is an acceptable “sacrifice” in the Arab community’s battle against Israel.
However, this quote has another extraordinary feature that goes beyond the
socialization of “acceptable death”. This is the reference to the pride of the Arab mothers.
How deep/strong must the anger and/or commitment (emotionally or through social
compliance) be for a mother not only to be willing to let her child die or be killed for a
cause, but to be proud of it? Is the loss of land that occurred twenty-five years in the past
(at the time of the Yom Kippur war when this statement was published) sufficient for a
mother to embrace a child’s sacrifice? Are affronts to self or group-identity sufficient?
Currently accepted theory indicates that it is so (Azar 1985). The nature of the bond
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between a mother and a child is so strong that it is one of the strongest, most compelling
relationships known to man. In this light, the statement that identity issues alone are
sufficient to explain psychology’s role in the protracted nature of PSC is an extraordinary
one. There must be other motives present for a mother to be willing to irrevocably sever
one of the most precious relationships that she will have in her lifetime. The competing
cause, therefore, must have a greater pull/attachment if it is to overcome the love that a
woman has for her child. It is, therefore, reasonable to assert that other psychological
motivations, such as emotion, are sustaining components of PSC.
The above quotes concerning the behavior of children, society, and parents
towards the Arab/Israeli conflict substantiates the following statement made by conflict
scholar, Gil Freidman about the role of socialization and generational influences on
PSC:
We may thus postulate a positive relationship between conflict duration
and the proportion of the population influenced by the conflict in their
formative years. . . given that the protracted conflict is central for
significant others, later generations of individuals will be socialized by
significant others for whom the external conflict is highly salient. This
dynamic can be viewed as a function of the protracted property of the
conflict (Friedman, 1999, 52).
Given the reactions of the Israeli and Arab parents towards their children and the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict, three possible contributing components as to why PSCs may
endure are presented. First, even though Israeli parents may have indicated that they
wanted the conflict to end, their children have been socialized into having the conflict
being a central part of their core identity because they have been exposed to the violence
of the conflict repeatedly from a young age. Thus, when they are old enough to make the
decision whether or not to commit acts of violence or not, violent behavior is already a
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part of them. Second, the social acceptance of the Syrian community of allowing their
young men to become “lambs for the slaughter” indicates a social acceptance (and
possibly expectation) that the “next generation” will contribute to /participate in their
society’s struggle. Finally, the intensity of the emotional investment into the conflict is so
strong that it overcomes the natural maternal impulse to protect the lives of those most
dear in favor of defeating a hated enemy. As such, in using the quotes from just this one
year alone, it can be seen how psychological motivation could be a reason why PSC
endures over time.
Summary of Psychological Motivation
Analysis of the four proposed jointly necessary components found that emotion,
perception and group identity can be jointly and individually supported as necessary
components of psychological motivation in PSC using both qualitative and quantitative
methodologies (in the Arab/Israeli case). Quotes that revealed emotional, perceptual and
group identity motivations in PSC were sufficient to justify positive/significant outcomes
using Boolean analysis. Hence proposing that emotion, perception, and group identity are
positively jointly necessary components of the category of Psychological Motivation, a
sustaining component of PSC, can be supported in this case. The inclusion of selfidentity, as an individually contributing component of Psychological Motivation in PSC,
cannot be supported in the Arab/Israeli conflict, however.
Emotion, perception, and group-identification each demonstrated trends of
increasing in frequency over the course this case (see figure 5.13).
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Figure 5.13: Statements That Reveal Psychological Motivation – Arab/Israeli Case
The increase in psychologically motived statements in this case could be tangible
support for assertions that PSC changes and takes on additional components and issues of
contention over time49.
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
While Boolean methods can aid in determining theoretical necessity and
sufficiency, what it cannot inform is the relatedness of the components that are being
studied. Because of this, confirmatory factor analysis is used. The six primary categorical
components were initially assessed to determine how many factors best reflects the data
of the Arab/Israeli case. After running a maximum likelihood model and a three-factor
model, the maximum likelihood analysis showed that a two-factor model best reflected
the data and the three-factor model encountered Heywood errors. This indicates that there
49

As with group-identification statements, decreases in incidents that communicate overall psychological
motivation in 2008 are more the result of fewer articles that met search criteria than an actual decrease in
psychologically-motivated statements.
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are problems with negative (co)variance estimates and that three-factor model is not a fit
for the data (Lolenikov and Bollen 2012). Thus, a two-factor model is used in the
Arab/Israeli case (see figure 5.14).
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Figure 5.14: PSC Factor Viability Scores in Arab/Israeli Case
Using the two-factor model, the first factor accounts for 71.5% of the total
variance found in the model (see table 5.4). In fact, all of the components vary together
(having component scores >+0.5), loading on factor 1- with the exception of conflict
duration. Conflict duration has a factor score of 0.18 and is the most unique component
measured (0.71) (see table 5.4).

183

Factor

Eingenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Factor 1

2.68

1.61

0.7147

Factor 2

1.07

-

0.2853

Table 5.4: Two Factor PSC Viability Model (unrotated) - Israeli/Palestinian Case
Accordingly, the second factor, which accounts for 28.5% of the model variance, is
needed to account for conflict duration in this PSC case. The single, underlying
dimension of factor one accounts for 50% of the variation in non-state actors, 52% of the
variation in deaths, 81.6% of the variation in violent incidents, 80% of the variation in
conflict statements, and 90% of the variation in psychological statements (see table 5.5).
Similarly, most of the components in factor 2 load minimally (<0.5 to >-0.5).

Violent
Incidents

Two Factor Model
Factor 1
Factor 2 Uniqueness
0.8162
0.3358
0.2210

Conflict
Duration

0.1842

-0.5058

0.7102

Deaths

0.5197

0.6735

0.2763

Non-State
Actors

0.5032

-0.4118

0.5772

Conflict
Statement

0.8048

0.0883

0.3444

Psychological
Motivation

0.9035

-0.2711

.1102

Table 5.5: Factor Loadings for PSC Viability Model - Israeli/Palestinian Case
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To summarize Factor analysis in this case, violent incidents, deaths, non-state
actors, conflict statements, and psychological statements load together on factor one and
only minimally on factor two. As factor one accounts for 71% of the variation in the
model, the analysis suggests that the components of factor one are rightly associated with
PSC.
Descriptive Components
Throughout the Arab/Israeli case, quotes and statistics support the inclusion of the
descriptive components of PSC proposed in this dissertation. Logistic regressions also
showed support for their inclusion as necessary components except for the participation
of non-state actors. This statistical outcome could be explained by the nature of news
reporting, however.
Supporting Components of PSC: Competition-Based Conflict
Currently accepted PSC theory posits that unresolved security issues (specifically,
territorial conflict) explains the enduring nature of PSC. In testing whether this is the
case, I included other components that, when left unresolved, could also contribute to the
enduring nature of PSC. These include conflict over tangible assets such as territory and
resources; and conflict over non-tangible assets such as security, political power, social
power, and revenge.
As a category, competition-based conflict was coded present in 11 of the 13 years
assessed. Therefore, the proposition that competition-based conflict is a necessary
component of PSC is supported by Boolean analysis. This particular outcome could be
explained by the parameters that I established before I began collecting information and
reporting methods used by news agencies.
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When assessing individual conflict components, though, only territory and
security are supported as individually necessary components of competition-based
conflict. Resources, political power, and social power (even combined) are not sufficient
to justify their inclusion as necessary components. While the frequency of revenge
statements also (narrowly) failed to be supported using Boolean analysis, the increase in
statements that claim that it is a motive for violent behavior warrants further attention to
this particular component. The increasing rates in which revenge is being cited as a
motive for violence could provide tangible support for theoretical assertions that the
issues of contention in PSCs can change and take on additional components. This could
also be an explanation as to why territorial-based violence trends downward over the
course of the conflict.
Psychological Motivation
Boolean analysis of psychological motivation as a categorically necessary
component of PSC is supported. Psychologically-motivated statements were present at
sufficient levels for every year in this case to be coded positively. Similarly, emotion,
perception, and group-identity were individually supported as jointly necessary
components of the category of Psychological Motivation. Self-identity, however, was not.
It is interesting to note that emotion, perception, and group-identity have trended upward
(positively) over time in a manner that is similar to that of the component, revenge (an
emotion-based motive). Could it be that the longer a conflict lasts, the greater the role
psychological motivation plays in its continuation? While this cannot infer causation,
what these findings could speak to is the role that psychological motivation could play in
supporting long-term violence. As such it could be a vital supporting component of PSC.
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It will be interesting to see how development of the role of psychological motivation,
over time, trends in other PSC cases.
SUMMARY
After analyzing the Arab/Israeli case using historical analysis, Boolean analysis,
and Factor analysis, the proposal that the necessary components of PSC ((1) ≥ 20 years
of violent conflict; (2) ≥3 violence/peace cycles; (3) 500 deaths; (4) the participation of
non-state actors; (5) competition-based conflict, and (6) psychological motivation) are
supported. Similarly, conflict over territory and security are supported as jointly
necessary components of competition-based conflict. Lastly, emotion, perception, and
group-identity are supported as jointly necessary components of Psychological
Motivation in PSC. Resources, political power, social power, revenge, and selfidentification failed to meet the minimum requirements for theoretical necessity.
Therefore, as attention turns to examination of the Northern Ireland PSC, final analysis of
the Arab/Israeli case shows a slightly different structure of the theoretically necessary
components of PSC that presented in the theory chapter (see figure 5.16).

187

CompetitionBased Conflict
≥ 20 Years Violent
Conflict

Tangible Asets

Territory

Non-Tangible
Assets

Security

≥ 3 Violence
Peace Cycles
PSC
≥ 500 Deaths
Non-State Actors

Emotion

Psychological
Motivation

Perception
Group Identity

Figure 5.16: Necessary Components of PSC – Arab/Israeli Case
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Table 5.1: Boolean Analysis for the Israeli/Palestinian PSC
Year

1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1973
1978
1983
1988
1993
1998
2003
2008
Outcome

≥ 20
Years50

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9/13
=Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
13/13
=Y

Nonstate
Actors51
96
0
3
0
116
38
54
46
90
146
42
210
39
-

Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
11/1
3 =Y

≥3
Violence/
Peace
Cycles52
108
Y
23
Y
12
Y
10
Y
78
Y
18
Y
23
Y
23
Y
56
Y
53
Y
23
Y
98
Y
20
Y
13/13
=Y

≥ 500
Deaths53

7848
187
71
25
1014
126
1114
1210
516
319
209
726
539
-

50

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
13/13
=Y

Compet
ition-based
Conflict54

Psychological
Motivation
Statements55

36
6
4
12
34
10
9
9
32
28
18
37
4
-

83
13
14
17
118
73
81
64
113
152
83
290
48
-

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
11/13
=Y

Criteria: Y = Violent conflict has been occurring between the actors ≥ 20 years.
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Non-state actors ≥ 6 references to non-state actors committing acts of violence/year.
52
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of conflict is ≥ 3 violent incidents/year.
53
Criteria: Y = Casualties must ≥ 25 deaths/year (equaling 500 deaths over a 20-year window).
54
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Competition-based Conflict Components are ≥ 6 incidents/ year.
55
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Psychological Components are ≥ 6 incidents/year.
51
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Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
10/13=
Y

Presence
of PSC

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-

N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
9/13
=Y

Table 5.2: Boolean Analysis: Table of Competition-based Conflict Statements – Arab/Israeli Case

56
57

Year

All Conflict
Quotes56

Territory57

Resources

Security

Political
Power

1948

36

Y

19

Y

6

Y

7

Y

3

N

1

N

0

N

1953

6

Y

3

Y

1

N

2

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

1958

4

N

2

N

0

N

0

N

2

N

0

N

0

N

1963

3

N

1

N

0

N

2

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

1968

34

Y

21

Y

1

N

8

Y

3

N

1

N

0

N

1973

10

Y

7

Y

0

N

1

N

1

N

0

N

1

N

1978

9

Y

5

Y

0

N

3

Y

0

N

0

N

1

N

1983

9

Y

4

Y

0

N

4

Y

0

N

0

N

1

N

1988

32

Y

11

Y

1

N

9

Y

4

N

3

Y

4

Y

1993

28

Y

12

Y

1

N

11

Y

0

N

0

N

4

Y

1998

18

Y

7

Y

0

N

4

Y

1

N

1

N

5

Y

2003

37

Y

3

Y

0

N

17

Y

0

N

4

Y

13

Y

Criteria: Y= ≥ 6 incidents of competition-based related quotes as a reason for violent behavior in the year.
Criteria: Y= ≥ 3 incidents of quotes from each individual component as a reason for violent behavior in the year.
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Social Power

Revenge

2008

4

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

4

Y

SUM

238

-

95

-

11

-

68

-

14

-

10

-

33

-

%

-

10/13
=

103/23
8=

10/1
3

10/238
=

1/13

68/238
=

8/13

14/238
=

0/13

10/238
=

2/13

5/13

43.3%

=

4.2%

33/238
=
13.9%

/
Boole
an
Outco
me

58

Y

=
N

28.6%

=
Y

5.9%

=

=

4.2%

N

N

N

Y

Table 5.3: Boolean Analysis of Psychological Motivation – Arab/Israeli Case
Year

All Psy.
Quotes59

Emotion60

Perception

Self-Identity

Group-Identity

1948

83

Y

27

Y

25

Y

3

N

28

Y

1953

13

Y

6

Y

6

Y

0

N

1

N

1958

14

Y

5

N

5

N

0

N

4

N

58

Criteria: Y= ≥ 6 positive outcomes for the presence of competition-based related quotes over the duration of the conflict.
Criteria: Y= ≥ 6 quotes revealing psychological motivation in PSC.
60
Criteria: Y= ≥ 6 quotes revealing psychological motivation in each individual component in PSC.
59
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=

1963

17

Y

5

N

6

Y

1

N

5

N

1968

118

Y

38

Y

29

Y

6

N

45

Y

1973

93

Y

28

Y

18

Y

2

N

25

Y

1978

81

Y

23

Y

22

Y

0

N

36

Y

1983

64

Y

13

Y

22

Y

2

N

27

Y

1988

113

Y

27

Y

30

Y

3

N

53

Y

1993

152

Y

30

Y

51

Y

6

Y

65

Y

1998

83

Y

25

Y

25

Y

4

N

29

Y

2003

290

Y

74

Y

107

Y

6

Y

103

Y

2008

48

Y

15

Y

18

Y

0

N

15

Y
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CHAPTER 6
THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE
INTRODUCTION
The Northern Ireland conflict is a critical PSC case in that it appears to be in the
process of achieving long-term, peaceful resolution. Because of this, the behavioral
patterns of the actors and the presence (or lack, thereof) of certain components could
provide information critical to the discovery of the necessary components of PSC. Thus,
analyzing the components that are present in the case and how they change over time
could be a key to discerning what the actual supporting mechanisms are. Pursuant of this
goal, I trace the historical development of the Northern Ireland PSC from a narrative
perspective through to the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. From this point, I utilize
quotes from the actors and the information provided from articles in the New York Times
to determine whether the components under analysis are present in this particular PSC.
Starting with the year 1922, the New York Times’ historical archives are searched
looking for articles relevant to the Northern Ireland PSC. In five-year increments, I
analyze one calendar year of articles that are germane to the conflict. Thus, the years
analyzed in this case include: 1922, 1927, 1932, 1937, 1942, 1947, 1952, 1957, 1962,
1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012. The search criteria that
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I use to identify articles in this are: Northern Ireland, or IRA, or Irish Republican Army,
and deaths, or killed, (and) or casualties61.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHERN IREALND PSC
Seeds of the Northern Ireland PSC can be found in how the island was first
populated. The western and southern parts of Ireland (Cannaught) were populated by the
Gauls (later to be called the Celts by the Greeks), who came from the European mainland
(Bardon 1992). The northern part of Ireland, specifically in the six county Ulster region,
was originally populated by immigrants from the regions in northern Britain. Just prior to
1215, the English began to exert (marginal) political control over Ireland by extending
the liberties that were written into the Magna Carta to their Irish “subjects” and by
eventually establishing a parliament in Dublin in 1297 (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 98-99;
Bardon, 1992, 44-47). It was not until the Anglican break from the Catholic Church
under King Henry VII, however, that the components of the Northern Ireland conflict
began to foment.
The Protestants- A Land United Now Divided
When the 16th century ushered in the Protest Reformation and creation of the
Anglican Church by King Henry VIII of England, Ireland became a key interest to
Britain. Up till this point, the English crown had maintained only minimal interest and
control over the Emerald Isle. When Henry broke away from the Roman Catholic
Church, solidifying control over Ireland became a religious, political, and security
61

For specific exclusions and other information on and collection parameters, please refer to the appendix.
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imperative. Because Ireland’s population was divided between those who identified with
mainland Europe (Catholicism) and others who were sympathetic to the English
(Protestantism), The English crown feared that the Pope and European leaders (French
and Spanish) would use Ireland to undermine the crown or as a launching-pad for
invasion (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 101; Bardon, 1992, 68-72). Over the next century,
the internal political turmoil that England faced over religion also played out in Ireland.
Land was seized from those who opposed the policies of the English crown and was
given to English cronies. This, in turn, resulted in rebellions and uprisings by displaced
Irishmen (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 101-2).
The Catholic/Protestant conflict came to a head in Ireland in July of 1690.
William of Orange, a Protestant loyal to King William led a group of young men (the
Apprentice Boys/Orange Men/Williamites) against forces loyal to Catholic King James
(Jacobites) at the Battle of Boyne (Cain 2011; Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 102). The battle
and the war was a decisive victory for the Protestants.
Protestant Supremacy and Catholic Repression
The victorious Protestants, though a minority of the population, secured political
supremacy and legislated privileges for themselves with the aid of the British. They
prohibited non-Protestants from holding public office, from serving in the military,
demanded loyalty oaths to the crown, prohibited formal education, prohibited land
ownership, prohibited weapon ownership, and denied legal defense (Cain 2011; Shivers
& Bowman, 1984, 103). Thus, when direct British control over Ireland began to wane
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towards the end of the eighteenth century, fearing that the Catholics were stock-piling
arms, northern Protestants created local “groups” called the Peep-O-Day Boys. The
“Boys” broke into Catholic homes in search of arms (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 103). In
response, the Defenders and the Whiteboys were organized by the Catholics to protect
their homes and families from Protestant aggression and economic exploitation (Cohen,
1994, 4; Hoppen, 1994, 601; Kenney, 1998, 13). Attacks against wealthy Protestant land
owners and reciprocal violence marked relations between Catholic and Protestant
Irishmen as tit-for-tat violence between the (non-state) groups endured throughout the
eighteenth century. In response to Catholic aggression, the Orange Boys (also known as
Orange Men), named after William of Orange, was established in 1795 (Cain 2011)62.
Fueled by a failed Catholic uprising to gain independence in 1798, the British and Irish
Parliaments voted to unite Ireland under Britain’s rule (Bardon, 1992, 238-9). In an
attempt to relieve tensions between Catholics and Protestants, the legislation included
reforms. Catholic/Protestant tensions continued throughout the first half of the nineteenth
century, though. As Catholics attempted to gain religious, political, and economic parity
with Protestants; the Catholic Association was formed for the purpose of achieving
Catholic emancipation in Ireland (Cain 2011). The ensuing riots and violence between
Catholics and Protestants resulted in further legislative attempts to stem the violence.
As the Great Famine of 1845-1850 approached, however, the overwhelming
majority of business and land owners remained Protestant. Protestants retained their
62

By 1835, there were over 200 Orange lodges in County Down62 alone. County Down is one of six
counties in Northern Ireland (Cohen, 1994, 5).
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superior social status as many were land and business owners, shopkeepers,
professionals, skilled-laborers, and lower-level managers. Catholics were subsequently
the poorest demographic, making livings as subsistence farmers who rented plots and
homes from absent landlords, low-skilled laborers, innkeepers, and barmen (Cohen,
1994, 6). There was little opportunity for advancement for the Catholic population.
According to a “former machine boy” and labor union organizer at Dunbar McMaster &
Co, “[y]ou wouldn’t have been told you weren’t getting it [a job] because you were a
Catholic. It was concealed. You’d a been told you hadn’t got the job . . . it wasn’t openly
told to you, but everyone, of course, knew the reason” (Cohen, 1994, 7). In this
environment of discrimination, the Ribbonmen63 were establishedcxxix (Cain 2011). The
Ribbonmen were rural, agrarian Catholics who organized in response to attempts to
commercialize cattle farming (the reallocation of crop land) and to the deplorable living
conditions that they, as tenant farmers and rural workers, were forced to endure (Garvin,
1982, 135; Kee, 1972, 299).
On the eve of the potato famine, many Irish Catholics still made their livings from
tenant farming where the potato was not only a staple crop for their landlords to export,
but it was also a cornerstone of the subsistence-level diet for the tenant farmers. As crops
failed and tenants were unable to pay rents, absent landlords re-allocated fields and tenant
lands to crops that were not impacted by the blight. Tenant farmers were evicted when
they were unable to pay rent or were displaced by crop reallocation, faced starvation, and
63

Also spelled “Ribandmen”.
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got little to no help from Britain. Those who survived were faced with the choice of
continuing to struggle through the famine on their own or immigrate.
While Catholics suffered in the southern parts of Ireland, Northern Ireland, which
was predominantly Protestant, was not impacted by the potato blight to the extent of their
southern countrymen. Rather than send food and aid, however, they exported their crops
for cash (White, 2012, 191). Thus, in the wake of the Irish Famine, Catholic sentiment
was that of “hatred of Britain, often with convictions that the use of revolutionary
violence was justified” (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 105). As the they emerged from the
potato famine, the resentment of Irish Catholics, from perceived exploitation and
discrimination, was blatant:
The facts, in bare outline are as follows: at various periods between the
English invasion and the end of the 17th century, the English without a
shadow of moral right, confiscated the land of Ireland, giving it to their
soldiers and adventurers for services against the Irish people. The new
landlords and their successors, as the body, never came really to regard
themselves as Irishmen. In their dealing with the Irish people, they acted
as alien conquerors whose interest was to bring you as much as they could
from their tenants. By means of extortionate rents, they kept the tenants at
the barest subsistence level. They gave no security of tenure, and
whenever it seemed to suit their selfish interests. They evicted the rightful
owners of the land by the thousands, indifferent to the fact that in most
cases there was no hope of alternative means of livelihood in the countrySean T. O’Kelly, head of the Irish Free State Delegationcxxx, 64.
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A dual referencing system is used for the remainder of the chapter. Though a-typical, my citation style
remains in compliance with APSA citation guidelines and serves a unique purpose (in keeping sources
clearly identified and differentiated) that complements my research goals. In-text citation indicates
information retrieved from “traditional” scholarly sources (APSA, 2006, 18-24). Because newspaper
articles are to be referenced in a notes section rather as “traditional” references (“Information on citations
of newspaper articles, interviews, and personal communications should be included in the notes, not the
references” (APSA, 2006, 24)), the citation for each quote referenced from newsprint is included at the end
of the chapter. Actor quotes are a foundation of my data-collection technique and each chapter can contain
well over 100 references to newspaper articles. Therefore, a dual referencing system is utilized to
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From the Irish Catholic perspective, to rectify the illegitimacy of British exploitation,
Ireland had to become a free and independent state.
The Rise of Non-state Organizations
During the last half of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Peep-O-Day Boys and
Protestant Orangemen were joined by other organizations as violence continued in the
Northern Ireland conflict. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (the Fenians) was
established in 1858 with one goal in mind- independence from Britain (Hoppen, 1994,
601; Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 105). Similarly, the Royal Black Institution was
organized during the same time to counter emergent Catholic organizations (Cain 2011).
As expected, violence erupted. Protestant Orangemen would (provocatively) march each
July in commemoration of the Battle of Boyne and violence would ensue. Depending on
the year, days, weeks, or months of rioting, home burnings, incarcerations, injuries, and
deaths would lay in the wake of July parades. In 1886, the July Orangemen parade led to
sporadic violence that lasted through to mid-September and resulted in at least 31 deaths
(Cain 2011). During this time support for home rule amongst the Catholic population
grew as the Irish Republican brotherhood carried out bombing campaigns in Ireland and
England and assassinated many political leaders (White, 2012, 194).

distinguish news print information from other sources. This method also aids in the ease of data verification
because articles that are cited in each case are referenced at the end of each chapter rather than in one large
section for all the newsprint quotes in the appendix.
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In 1905, the Catholic Sinn Féin was organized in support of home rule65 (Shivers
& Bowman, 1984, 108) and Catholic lobbying for home rule increased66. Most
Protestants (Loyalists), especially in the north, did not support home rule, though. They
preferred to remain British citizens (White, 2012, 191-2). However, Britain, facing its
own internal political crisis, began to warm to the prospect of Irish home rule. A bill for
was brought before the British House of Commons in 1914. The divisive bill had a
tumultuous course through parliament as it failed initially, then was passed, but then had
its implementation postponed due to the onset of World War I67.
Upon the delay of the implementation of home rule, Irish Catholics placed their
hopes on the Irish Republican Brotherhood to fight for their freedom. The Easter
Rebellion68 occurred between April 24 and April 30, 1916 (Wilson, 2/28/32, NYT). It
was led by the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Cumann na MBan69, cxxxi. By the end of
the conflict, a minimum of 450 people had lost their lives in the conflict (Bardon, 1992,
452). The British executed the male leaders of the rebellion and imprisoned the females.
Executed leaders, such as Patrick Pearce and James Connolly, became martyrs for the
cause of Irish independence and (Catholic) public sympathy for Irish autonomy increased
dramatically (White, 2012, 194). Sinn Féin ran on an “Irish Republic” platform of an
65

Sinn Fein literally means “we ourselves” or “ourselves alone” (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 108).
Home rule meant that Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom and citizens would swear
allegiance to the British Crown. Autonomy would be exercised through an independent legislative body
and Prime Minister (White, 2012, 191).
67
As Ireland was already preparing for civil war, the onset of World War I served only to delay the
inevitable (Bowman, 1984, 109’ Purcell 1982).
68
The Easter Rebellion has also been referred to as the Easter Rising and the Sinn Fein Rebellion.
69
Cumann na MBan was a Catholic women’s para-military organization formed in 1914.
66
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independent Ireland and made dramatic political gains (Beiner, 2007, 378; Bowman,
1984, 109).
Towards an “Independent” Irish State
Though the Easter Rebellion was put down, violence between Catholics and
Protestants continued through to the war that led to Irish independence70 in 1921. Michael
Collins organized the IRA and began to carry out selective, purposeful assassinations and
terror attacks against government buildings, governmental officials, policemen, and
police buildings (Bardon, 1992, 462-476). The British response to the violence was to
send hastily assembled and prepared soldiers to Northern Ireland to control the violence.
The lack of preparation on the part of the British resulted in officers wearing “nonuniform” uniforms. Some were black and others were tan. Hence, the name the Black and
Tan War of 1920 (White, 2012, 196).
Ultimately, the British failed to suppress the impending revolution. Non-state
violence continued in the interim months between the end of the Black and Tan War and
the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty. In the months leading up to the Anglo-English
Treaty, “one horrific incident followed another” as non-state actor violence left 109 dead
(Bardon, 1992, 483). Thus, when the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed on December 6,
1921, though the Irish Catholics achieved their goal of home rule, they knew that knew
that the treaty would not bring the peace they desired.

70

The Irish War of Independence actually began in 1919 with the Anglo-Irish War. It was also called the
Black and Tan or The Tan War (White 2012).
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. . . and now came the final treaty of peace. Would it be signed? . . .
unutterably wearied Ministers faced the Irish delegation themselves in
actual desperation, and knowing well that death stood at their elbowsDavid Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1916-1922
(Bardon, 1992, 483).
The treaty designated 26 counties of Ireland as part of the Irish Free State. Northern
Ireland would remain a protectorate of the British Crown. Counties that remained under
British protection included Down, Antrim, Armagh, Fermanagh, Tyrone, and
Londonderry (Bowman, 1984, 110) (see map 6.1). Sinn Féin, the political arm of the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) had rejected previous proposals that included partitioning
Ireland. To get the leaders of Sinn Féin to agree to the partition, the British made a
provision that allowed for a boundary commission to be established.
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Map 6.1: Map of 1921 Partition of Ireland (Europa 2012)
While Irish politicians saw the reality of the violence that lay before them, British
politicians had the perception that the treaty would bring peace to Ireland.
I am overjoyed to hear the splendid news you have just sent me. I
congratulate you with all my heart on the successful termination of these
difficult and protracted negotiations which is due to the patience and
conciliatory spirit which you have shown throughout, and I am indeed
happy in some small way to have contributed by my speech in Belfast to
this great achievement –King George of the United Kingdomcxxxii.
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That is good news. . . I think Ulster will accept. The blockade had done a
great deal of harm to trade in the north of Ireland. Belfast used to be the
centre for shipping goods to England and abroad, but it has been doing
practically nothing. This is one reason why I think Ulster will fall into
line. The business people there are tired of the blockade and the political
squabbling – Earl Ganard of the United Kingdomcxxxiii.
British politicians failed to recognize the deep-seated division between Loyalist and
Unionist sentiment in Ireland. While the provision of a land commission granted a
political victory in getting the Sinn Féin to agree to a divided Ireland, it left Protestant
Loyalists convinced that it would be used to wrest the Northern counties out of their
control. Thus, they rejected the agreement.
. . . contemporaneously with the functioning of the Treaty, Loyalists may
declare independence on their own behalf, seize the Customs and other
Government Departments and set up an authority of their own. Many
already believe that violence is the only language understood by Mr.
Lloyd George and his Ministers – Captain Charles Craig (Bardon, 1992,
483).
A surrender is always a surrender and a betrayal a betrayal and a
condonation of a crime a participation in the sin of the criminal, though
these things be called peaceful settlements and hope for the future and
dawning of a new era and so forth. The event of yesterday is but the
culmination of the steady policy of yielding to threats and of intriguing
with rebels. It is hailed as a co-triumph we wish we could join in these
very natural, but deluded transports – The Morning Post, United
Kingdomcxxxiv.
Similarly, though the political leaders of Sinn Féin had agreed to the treaty, many hardliners within the organization rejected the agreement wanting nothing short of full Irish
autonomy.
The agreement between the Irish representatives and the British Cabinet
simply amounts to a promise of increased power to Ireland over her
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domestic government- home rule, in other words, with Northeastern Ulster
still in a position to destroy the unity of Ireland if England wants Craig
further to play that game. With Irish coastal fortifications under British
control, with power in the hands of the English Government to appoint a
Governor-General for Ireland, with the Irish Government restricted in a
dozen different ways by England, the use of the term “Irish Free State” is
an insult to the dead who died fighting for an independent Irish Republic.
It is also an insult to the intelligence of the living men and women in
Ireland who will still continue to fight for absolute separation from
England and to . . . – Diarmuld Lynch, National Secretary of the Friends
of Irish Freedomcxxxv.
At the end of 1921, when Ireland was granted (semi) autonomy by the British
government, the political leaders hoped that the concessions and political compromise
would bring peace to the Emerald Isle. However, Protestants in the north feared a
political take over from their southern, Catholic brothers and felt betrayed by the British
government. Similarly, Catholics living in the Ulster region would settle for nothing less
than full autonomy for Ireland and rejected the political compromise that Sinn Féin
leaders had made.
Summary
As Ireland emerged as an “autonomous” state, it was already fully immersed in
the conflict between Catholic unionists and Protestant loyalists. At this point in the
development of the Northern Ireland conflict, violence between the same groups of actors
has already spanned centuries. From the qualitative development of this particular case
thus far, violent conflict could be attributed to religious differences, economic
discrimination, political discrimination and disagreements over the legitimacy of rule.
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MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PSC
1922 and the War of Independence
As Ireland struggled to achieve sovereignty throughout 1922, the year brought
violence and civil war to the fledgling state. By the end of January, the Boundary
Commission was at an impasse and the Separatists and Unionists were on the brink of
outright war (Bardon, 1992, 486). In the months leading up to the official declaration of
war (January through May), 236 people had died in Belfast alone (Bardon, 1992, 494).
The Irish Civil War officially began in June of 1922 and lasted ten months. Modest
estimates attribute approximately 3000 military and civilian deaths in the Irish Civil War
(Hopkinson, 1988, 273; Walsh 1998).
There were 454 articles analyzed in 1922. Six violent incidents were reported and
Separatists71 were attributed to having been entirely responsible for initiating the
violence. In all, 16 deaths were reported for the year. Non-state organizations and groups
were referenced 16 times. Among those mentioned were the Irish Republican Army
(IRA)/Sinn Fein, Republicans, Representatives of Ulster, Irregulars, and Orangemen.
There was one conflict statement made in 1922. It was made by, Liam Cosgrave.
Cosgrave turned to politics after he fought in the Easter Rising in defense of the Catholic/
Separatist position (Bardon 1992). Serving as a member of Sinn Féin, once in office as

71

Separatists can include Catholics, the IRA, IRA derivative organizations, and those acting to achieve
complete autonomy for all of Ireland. The term Unionist can include Protestants, Orangemen, similar
derivative organizations, and those acting to preserve Northern Ireland’s protectorate relationship with
Great Britain.
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Prime Minister, he denounced political violence and supported the death penalty against
his former comrades that continued to fight for Catholic equality (Jordan, 2006, 63-4).
. . . continue indefinitely if the nation was to live. The irregular leaders
made no secret of the fact that the production of chaos was the means they
look to, to make the Government impossible and to prevent the Free State
from being finally established. The Dail Elreann, therefore, resolved to set
up military courts empowered to inflict the death penalty for specific
offenses. But, before these courts were operated, amnesty was offered to
all willing to surrender arms before a certain date. A long period was
allowed to elapse before any sentences were carried out – William
Cosgrave, President of the Dáil Éireanncxxxvi.
In his statement, Cosgrave communicates two reasons for the execution of the IRA
members. First, in using the words, “chaos” and “nation was to live”, he shows that the
government’s actions were motivated by the need for physical security. Secondly,
Cosgrave also references the state: “. . . to make the Government impossible and to
prevent the Free State from being finally established”. This shows that the executions
were motivated by the need to establish or maintain political power. When referring to
Catholic fighters, Cosgrove called the Irregulars. Other groups mentioned include the
Republicans, Representatives of Ulster, IRA, and Orangemen. In all, non-state
organizations were referenced 16 times in 1922.
Overall, there were 13 quotes that contained psychological motivations. They
were split approximately evenly between mass and elite actors. However, only three of
the quotes were from Separatist/Catholic actors. The overwhelming majority of the
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quotes were from Protestant/Unionist actors72. Perceptual and group-identificationrevealing comments were the most numerous with eleven references each. Emotive
statements followed with nine incidents. There were no self-identification statements
made in the articles analyzed from 1922.
To the simple, common people of Ireland, whose good-will is being
assailed and resisted, who are the martyrs and victims not of aliens or of
invaders, but of a contumacious minority that have shown themselves
prepared to go to any length, and to adopt any methodology in their
determination to wreak vengeance on their countrymen for having refused
to accept their domination – quoted from The Irish Timescxxxvii.
Through the choice of words, the Irish Times (located in Dublin) showed emotion,
perception, and group-identification as they praised the IRA/Catholic cause. By using
word such as martyrs and victims in describing the IRA/Catholics, they demonstrate
positive emotion towards them. Similarly, the statement, “have shown themselves
prepared to go to any length and to adopt any methodology in their determination to
wreak vengeance” communicates a two-fold perception of motive on the part of the
Protestants. It is the perception of the Irish times that the Protestants will go to “any
length”, a perception of willingness, and to wreak vengeance, a perception of intent.
Finally, in using “their countrymen” the Irish Times shows in/out-group categorization of
the Protestants.
72

Because many organizations arise, splinter, and re-organize under different names in the NorthernIreland case, for the sake of clarity, they will be presented dichotomously by their position in the conflictual
dyad. Actors (individuals and groups) that are sympathetic to the separatist or Catholic position will be
referred to as IRA/Catholics. Actors who are sympathetic to the unionist or Protestant position will be
referred to as the Protestant/British. Individual organizations are discussed when their name first appears as
an actor in the conflict. and are subsequently referenced only by the frequency of their name being
mentioned in association with the conflict.
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1927
Of the 752 articles that the search criteria identified, only four articles were found
to be directly related to the Northern Ireland conflict. As such, only one violent incident
was record. Culpability was attributed to the IRA and nine deaths were reported as a
result of the violence. There were two articles that had germane quotes. Neither of the
quotes had conflict statements and only one non-state organization (the IRA) was
mentioned. The two quotes had psychologically-motivated content and both were made
by elite British actors.
This crime will fail in its object. We will meet at this form of terrorism as
we met other forms of terrorism, and we shall not falter until every vestige
of it is wiped out from the land – Irish President Liam Cosgrave in
response to the assassination of Irish Vice President Kevin
O’Higginscxxxviii.
We have at all times endeavored to arrange, while safeguarding our
national status and rights of action, a policy which would promote friendly
relations. Our policies based on the belief that there can be no real reunion
of Ireland until there is better understanding in greater friendship between
the peoples, until old hatreds are allowed to die out and Northern Ireland,
of its own volition, recognizes that this island is too small an entity to be
divided, and that our peoples of the North and South possess a common
heritage. A policy of irritation and nagging toward the North won't bring
that about - Irish President Liam Cosgravecxxxix.
When responding to O’Higgin’s murder, Cosgrove showed strong negative emotion by
using the words “crime” and “terrorism”. Similarly, he showed the emotion of resolve by
using absolute language (“shall not falter”). In the second quote, Cosgrave pleads for
national unity. Here, he shares his perception that Ireland cannot realize unity until
hatreds are removed from the public consciousness. In both of these quotes, though,
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Cosgrave uses the terms “we” and “our” in the context of Ireland as a whole. Thus, they
are not coded positively for the presence of group-identification statements.
1932
There were six violent incident recorded in 1932. IRA/Catholic actors were
reportedly responsible for four of the incidents. There were a total of two deaths that were
directly attributable to the Northern Ireland conflict. Non-state groups were referenced
five times. The only new group mentioned was the Order of the Hiberians (Sean Ordú na
nÉireannach), an Irish, Catholic patriarchal organization.
There were twelve quotes that were germane to the conflict in 1927. Two
contained conflict statements. While both statements were made by mass-level actors,
there was a statement made from each side of the dyad. Both conflict statements
contained language that revealed that motives were based in the desire to retain political
and social power.
…our determination to maintain inviolate the ties of the Empire and to
resist by every means in our power. Any attempt to force us into the Free
State, the majority of whose people have shown [that] they are not in
sympathy with us, either politically or religiously –Viscount Craigavon,
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland addressing some 50,000 Orangemen
gathered for their annual paradecxl.
In this statement, the viscount states that the Orangemen’s motivation for violence is to
prevent their forced inclusion in a unified, predominantly Catholic, Irish state. As
framed, because he references politics and religion, this is a statement motivated by the
desire to maintain political and social power.
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There were 12 statements that had psychological components. Seven were made
by IRA/Catholic actors and five were made by British/Protestants. Quotes that were made
by masses-level actors versus elite actors were distributed evenly. There were eight
perceptual, seven emotional, and six group-identification statements. Again, there were
no self-identification statements made.
…steps to be taken to voice the national League resentment at the latest
English act of defiance of the rights and liberties of the Irish people in a
further attempt to stabilize the partition – statement issued by Sinn Féin
about the forthcoming visit by the Prince of Whalescxli.
Boycott British Goods. We will crown De Valera King of Ireland – on
banners displayed in streets of Dublin as police “battled mobs of young
hooligans”cxlii.
These quotes show elements of emotion, perception, and group-identification. Sinn Féin
showed emotion by using the word “resentment” in their statement. Similarly the
“hooligans” communicated that they rejected the legitimacy of the British crown and
British goods. The motivation of perception is demonstrated as Sinn Féin stated that the
British had acted in defiance of the rights of the Irish. Finally, in using we/they language,
the “hooligans” showed that they communicating as a group (group-identification).
1937
In 1937, there were three violent incidents in the Northern Ireland conflict. All of
which were reportedly perpetrated by the IRA. No deaths were reported. Non-state actor
groups were referenced six times. However, no new groups were referenced.
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While there were 10 quotes germane to the conflict, none of them were conflict
statements. Nine of the statements revealed psychological impetus. Eight of which were
made by British/Protestant actors. The elite to non-elite ratio was approximately even
with four elite and five masses-level statements. Perceptual statements were the most
prevalent with six followed by emotion and group-identification statements, which had
five each. Yet again, self-identification –based statements were not reported.
We will never yield or betray our birthright. I tell him today he will be
disappointed. We will ever remain citizens of the United Kingdom and the
Empire. Act as he may, de Valera will find [that] the loyalists will stand
firm. We do not care about his propaganda drive and it will not influence
us. I do not believe Britain will ever desert us – John M. Andrews, acting
Premier of Northern Irelandcxliii.
In this statement, Andrews is responding to Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Eamon de
Valera’s, public efforts to bring Ulster into the Irish Republic. He reveals strong emotion
in his word choices, “. . .never yield or betray our birthright”. He also shows his
perceptions about the Unionists when he states that de Valera is attempting to
propagandize and influence his in-group. Interestingly, though, he also reveals his
perceptions about his own in-group when he asserts that they will “stand firm”. Andrew’s
group-identification is clear in his quote as he uses we/they language several times.
1942
Ireland saw an increase in violence in the Northern Ireland conflict in 1942.
There were eleven violent incidents reported and 14 deaths. By this time, the IRA had
been made illegalcxliv. However, though Ireland was officially neutral in WWI, there was
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a growing effort to put down/control the violence in Northern Ireland for fear of
IRA/Nazi collaboration and to protect the American soldiers that were billeted in
Irelandcxlv, cxlvi. The majority (eight) of the incidents were reported to have been
instigated by the British/Protestants. Though there were eight quotes from the year, none
of them contained conflict statements. The IRA was referenced 18 times and was the only
non-state organization that was mentioned in reference to the violence.
There were three articles that contained statements that revealed psychological
motivation in the conflict. The following quote was a note that was seized and used as
evidence against IRA militants:
Let me know as soon as you get the present strength of all British and
American forces in the north. Give me approximate figures on: (a) British,
and colonial forces; (b) American troops; (c) auxiliary armed police
forces; (d), the total armed enemy forces in the north." Reply communiqué
includes: ‘I received the information Saturday night that JJ will be in
Dublin tomorrow night. This presents an opportunity for holding a
meeting. AC this is to inform you that such a meeting will be held
tomorrow night. The notification is very short, but it's the best we can do
under the circumstances’ – Note used as evidence in the trial of Henry
Lunbergcxlvii.
While the quote is too lengthy to include in its entirety, the portion of the note that is used
shows emotional and group-identification components. The way that the IRA used the
word “enemy” reveals a rejection of legitimacy rather than a perceptual assessment of
intent. It is therefore, coded as an emotive statement. Also, there is use of groupidentification terminology when the note said, “it’s the best we can do.”
1947
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After World War II, with many of the IRA’s leadership in prison, IRA
membership and activities declinedcxlviii. There were no violent incidents or deaths as a
result of the Northern Ireland conflict reported in 1947. Similarly, only one non-state
group, the IRA, was mentioned and it was referenced only one time. Of the 76 articles
examined, articles mentioned the hunger strikes of imprisoned IRA members, their deaths
(in 1946), the political pressure the British government received as a result of the deaths,
and the success of this strategy on gaining the release of David Flemingcxlix, cl.
There were two quotes reported. While neither was a conflict statement, both
contained psychologically revealing statements. Both were made by IRA/Catholic actors.
One statement was from an elite actor. Perceptual and group-identification quotes
occurred twice, and emotion-revealing statements occurred once. Self-identification
statements were not reported.
. . . [The freedom of Northern Ireland can be achieved only73] by the use
or the threat of force. . . England’s difficulty is our opportunity. We don't
want a country which is a hanger-on of a decadent Republic. . .under the
impelling threat of a superior force. England, by subsidy or otherwise, has
maintained this partition over the voice of the overwhelming majority of
the people of Ireland- Partrick Maxwell, member of the Northern Ireland
Parliamentcli.
Maxwell’s quote has numerous perceptual statements. It is his perception that only
force, or the threat of force, will free Ireland from Britain, that they threaten Ireland, and
that Britain muzzles the voice and will of the people of Ireland. He also uses groupidentification language in using terms such as “our” and “we”.
73

These are the word of the author or the article.
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1952
There was one violent incident reported in 1952, but no deaths that were related to
the Northern Ireland conflict. The conflict occurred on St. Patrick ’s Day as antipartitionists attacked police, injuring nine in the processclii. While no new organizations
were identified, non-state organizations were mentioned three times. There was one
quote that was relevant to the conflict, but it did not reveal conflict or psychological
motive.
1957
There was a resurgence of violence in Northern Ireland in 1957. There were 33
violent incidents throughout the year that resulted in nine deaths. Culpability was
assigned to the IRA/Catholics in all but one of the incidents. Non-state organizations
were referenced 42 times. Questions regarding Sinn Féin’s knowledge of and/or
complicity in the violence were also raisedcliii.
Of the articles analyzed, ten contained quotes related to the Northern Ireland
conflict. None of them were conflict statements, however. Seven statements revealed
psychological motivation. Five were made by British/Protestant actors and all of the
statements, but one, were made by non-elite actors. Five perceptual and groupidentification and four emotive statements were made. There was one self-identity
statement reported.
Within the past week, three young Irishmen have been killed in the course
of attacks on police stations in the six-county area. Two men from the
twenty-six counties, the third was a young policeman in the service of the
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six-county authorities. The consequences that would follow a continuance
of these attacks must be now clear to the whole nation. It is the earnest
conviction of my colleagues in the government and myself that partition
cannot and never will be ended by force. We believe that even if it were
practicable to subdue by arms and hold to in subjection, those Irishmen
who wish to remain apart from us, the resentment that they would feel
would thereafter divide us more deeply and more lastingly than ever
before. No self-appointed group has any shadow of right to decide on a
policy of war. We could not have a second body, assuming to his self the
prerogative of government, deciding national policy in maintaining an
armed force to carry out its dictates - Republic of Ireland Prime Minister,
John A. Costello, in reaction to raidscliv.
Costello statements about the deaths of the policemen are descriptive and do not reveal
emotional content. Similarly, though the adjective “earnest” could be coded as emotion,
in this context, it is in reference to his perceptual belief. Thus, it is not coded as a
statement that contains emotion, either. However, when he states that, “No selfappointed group has any shadow of right to decide on a policy of war,” he is rejecting
the legitimacy of the out-group to make policy because he sees them as self-appointed.
Thus, this is an emotive statement.

He shows perception in stating that the conflict will

not end with force as resentment and deeper division will ensue. Finally, by saying that
he, personally, and the members of his in-group reject the violence of the out-group, he
is making a self- and group-identifying statement.
1962
Of the 185 articles that matched the search criteria in 1962, not a single article
contained incidents of violent conflict related to the Northern Ireland conflict and no
deaths were reported. At this point, the Northern Ireland PSC and the IRA appeared to be
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in decline. The majority of the articles focused Irish trade and textiles. The IRA was
mentioned in two articles. The first article was in reference to IRA members being
released from prisonclv. The second article, titled, Curtains for the IRA”, announced the
(original) IRA’s decision to end their “campaign of sabotage and violence”clvi. The article
discusses the decline of Sinn Féin and public indifference to the IRA’s agenda. The final
statement by article’s anonymous author states, “Let us put a wreath of red roses on their
grave – and move on”clvii.
1967
Like 1962, 1967 reported no deaths in the Northern Ireland conflict. There were
three violent incidents recorded, however. The (Protestant) Orangemen held an annual
parade in July commemorating the Battle Boyne. The Orange Walks would often
increase tensions in Northern Ireland and end in violence. As a preventative measure, the
Northern Irish Parliament passed legislation (The Public Order Act) forbidding the
annual parade and outlawing 40 organizations that they saw as extremist. Reverend Ian
Paisley was identified as a leader among extremist Protestant organizationsclviii. This
action by the Northern Irish government sparked a clash between youth and fire fighters
in March clix, simultaneous bombings of Army Reserve bases as the Duke of Edinburgh
visited Northern Ireland in May clx, and George Forrest, a member of the Northern Irish
Parliament, was injured as he was heckled from a crowd that grew violent during his
speech at the (illegal) Orangemen Parade on July 12clxi. While there were violent
incidents reported, the articles did not contain quotes.
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The Troubles
Though dyadic tension was present in Northern Ireland after World War II by the
early 1960’s it appeared that the conflict was coming to an end. In the late 1960’s,
though, the intensity of the conflict increased dramatically with a vast increase in violent
incidents and deaths. This period of time, through to the signing of the Belfast or Good
Friday Agreement in 1998 is known as “The Troubles”. Approximately 3,480 people
died in the Troubles. This is an average of 116 per year (Sutton & Melaugh 2012).
In response to perceived economic and political discrimination against the
Catholic population in Northern Ireland in the mid 1960’s, organizations, such as the
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) began to form to take corrective
action. These Catholic/Unionist organizations enjoyed initial success in bringing
attention to their plight. This motivated Protestant/Loyalist organizations, such as the
Ulster Volunteer Force, to form and take counter measures. In October of 1968, as
Catholic protesters marched through a traditionally Protestant neighborhood,
Protestants/Loyalists saw the presence of Catholics/Unionists as a provocation74. The
ensuing conflict was televised. Catholics saw the police’s efforts to separate the two
groups as police brutality and yet another attempt to silence their voices. From these
incidents, violence in the Northern Ireland conflict began anew. From 1969 through to
the end of 1971, 213 people were killed in the troubles (Sutton & Melaugh 2012).
74

Marches by both sides of the dyad were scheduled for the same day and for the same
parade route. Attempts were made by the Northern Ireland government, to no avail, to
avert conflict by banning both parades (Thomas, 1999, 36-38).
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1972
There were 230 violent incidents resulting in 530 deaths in 1972. The
IRA/Catholics were reported as being responsible for initiating 151 or 65% of the
violence. Non-state actors were mentioned 222 times in the New York Times as being
associated with the violent conflict in Northern Ireland. Organizations mentioned for the
first time included the Official IRA, Provisional IRA, Irish of Bay Bridge, Protestant
Unionist Party, Protestant Ulster Vanguard, Real IRA, People’s Democracy, Tartans,
Taigs, Willowfield Youth Club, Loyalist Association of Workers, IRA Keighley,
Protestant Ulster Defense Association, Ulster Volunteer Force, and Catholic ExServicemen’s Association.
There were 226 quotes germane to the conflict. Twenty-three contained conflict
statements. Of these statements, 16 were made by IRA/Catholic actors. All but one of the
quotes were made by non-elite actors. Political power was mentioned ten times, security
seven, revenge six, and social power twice. Territorially-based violence was mentioned
one time. Conflict over resources was not mentioned at all.
Our purpose is to unite workers throughout Ireland behind the struggle for
the reconquest of their country – Statement released by the Official
IRAclxii.
They keep threatening to take more money from me and it’s a bloody
shame. We are in this strike because of the internment. I’ve got two
relatives interned. No trial, nothing, just internment. It breaks my heart.
Everyone knows someone who's been interned, either a relative or a
friend. It strikes so deep in the heart of the community. The damages are
irrevocable. Our aim in this strike is purely and simply to smash
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internment and abolish legislation that made internment possible –
Kathleen O’Sullivan, no affiliation or other information providedclxiii.
Because the language of the first quote is framed in terms conquest and country, it is a
conflict statement based in the desire to gain political power. The second quote revealed
two conflict components that motivated Irish Catholic/Unionist behavior. According to
O’Sullivan the internments had social and political implications. She indicated that the
damage that the internments had caused to her community were irrevocable, hence her
motivation to “smash internment”. Second, she clearly stated that the second goal of the
strike was to abolish the legislation that made the internments possible. This is a
statement motivated in the desire to gain sufficient political power to control (internment)
policy.
There were 193 statements made that reveals psychological motivation in 1972.
The statements were divided approximately evenly between IRA/Catholic and
British/Protestant actors. The number of masses-level statements far out-numbers those
of elite actors with 162 statements as opposed to 34. There were 137 incidents of
perceptual language, 131 incidents of group-identification, 68 emotion-revealing
statements, and nine comments that revealed that the actor personally (self) identified
with the conflict.
Our trust is completely broken. This situation is desperate. The only
alternative is mass pressure, and this is what's taking place - Kevin
McCorry, organizer for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Associationclxiv.
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I have no comment to make at the moment. I am in too violent a temper to
comment. We may issue an official statement in the next day or two –
Sean MacStiofain, Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRAclxv.
In the first quote, McCorry shows the psychological motivation of perception when he
states that there is only one solution to the conflict, that the trust of his entire in-group is
broken, and that situation of his in-group is desperate. Also, by using the term “our”, he is
revealing that he identifies himself as part of a group. In the second quote, MacStiofain
is clearly showing emotion by saying that he is too angry to comment. He is also showing
that he is personally upset by the arrest of seven IRA members. This reveals selfidentification relevant to the conflict.
1977
There were 104 deaths in 1977 as a result of 38 violent incidents. Non-state
organizations were mentioned 32 times. No new organizations were referenced in relation
to the violence. Below, is the one quote that was coded as a conflict statement for 1978.
It was made by the Provisional IRA as it claimed responsibility for a string of London
bombings.
The Provisional IRA claims responsibility for the bombings in London.
The campaign will continue throughout England until the British
Government announces a declaration of withdrawal of its army out of
Northern Ireland –Statement released by the Provisional IRA clxvi.
On January 29, 1977 thirteen bombs detonated at 4:45AM75 in London’s shopping
district. On the same day, 17 others went off in cities across Northern Ireland. Thirteen

75

It has been noted that actors in the Northern Ireland conflict have made it a point to injuring people who
were not explicitly involved or related to the conflict. In this, active belligerents, government actors, and
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others were discovered and defused. This particular date marked the fifth anniversary of
“Bloody Sunday” where British troops shot and killed 13 Irish Catholics at a protest.
Thus, revenge as a motive for the bombings is probable. However, as the quote does not
specifically state revenge as a motive for the bombings, it is not coded as such. What the
statement does communication, though, is the desire to gain territory. The note
specifically states that the Provisional IRA will continue to commit acts of violence until
the party that they see as possessing their territory (Northern Ireland) leaves.
Of the articles analyzed in 1977, 16 psychologically-motivated statements were
noted. Six were made by IRA/Catholics and10 by British/Protestant. Similarly, six
statements were made by elites and 10 by masses-level actors. In all, there were 14
perceptual, nine group-identification, three emotive, no self-identification-based
statements made.
England takes out Irish wealth. She is here for profit. What IRA can do is
cut that profit. Instability creates a lack of confidence in capital here.
People are not interested in investing if they know their investment is
going to run dry on them – A “spokesman” at the Republican Press Center
clxvii
.
They can do whatever they want over there. They wanted us to react to
come over there so we will be perfect targets for snipers. That's just an
invitation to aggro- to trouble. So that's exactly what we won't do –Major
Nick Jenkinsclxviii.
The assertion by the IRA spokesman that Britain is in Ireland purely for money is a
perceptual statement. Similarly, the language choice by Major Jenkins about a stand-off

government buildings have typically been the targets of selective terrorism. The timing of the detonation
would indicate support of this assertion (White, 2012, 196).
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between British and IRA forces relates his perception that the IRA’s behavior is
calculated to elicit a specific response. He also communicates group-identification
sentiments by using we/they language.
1982
In 1982, there were 30 violent incidents resulting in 67 deaths. The IRA was
attributed responsibility in all but four of the incidents. Non-state organizations were
referenced 39 times. New organizations referenced included the Red Hand Commandos,
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and the Official Unionist Party.
There were 23 articles with quotes about the Northern Ireland conflict. Two of
them contained conflict statements. Both were made by masses-level IRA members. One
statement revealed revenge as a motive for violence and the other was a statement
revealing that violence was used to gain political power.
[Thomas Cochrane] was executed for involvement in a number of serious
crimes- anonymous caller to a Belfast radio station claiming responsibility
for Cocharane’s deathclxix.
According to the article, Cochrane’s “execution” was one in a series of the tit-for-tat
kidnappings that had, to that date, claimed three lives. Cochrane’s murder had been in
response to the killing of Peter Corrigan a few days prior. The same day, reportedly in
response to Cochrane’s kidnapping, Catholic Joseph Donegan was kidnapped and found
slainclxx.
There were 23 statements made that revealed psychological impulses. Three of
them were made by IRA/Catholic actors and 20 were made by British/Protestant actors.
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The elite to non-elite actor statement ratio was approximately even. There were 20
perceptual, 10 emotive, eight group-identification, and one self-identification comments
made.
. . .The IRA is here to stay. The words of the chief Constable cost livesReverend Ian Pasleyclxxi.
I feared something like this and I am satisfied that it is the intention of the
terrorists to continue with their killings. My immediate reaction is one of
or in sadness. Those men were the victims of debased tribalism- Jack
Hermon, chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabularyclxxii.

At the time of this statement, Free Presbyterian minister Ian Paisly had been a leader in
the Loyalist movement for a number of years. The article highlights the ambush-style
shootings and deaths of three British soldiers by IRA members. According to the article,
the IRA killings were in response to Constable Hermon’s statement that the IRA was on
the decline. Thus, it is the perception of (Protestant) Reverend Paisly that the actions of
the IRA were to make a statement about their resolve or vitality. Similarly, Constable
Hermon’s reaction to a bombing reportedly perpetrated by the IRA reveals perceptual and
emotive attribution. It is his perception that the IRA’s violent behavior will continue and
by calling the behavior of IRA “debased tribalism,” he is revealing his personal negative
emotions towards the organization.
1987
There were 12 violent incidents reported in1987. Six were reported to have been
perpetrated by IRA/Catholics and two by British/Protestant actors. There were 82 deaths.
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Non-state organizations were mentioned eight times. There were no new organizations
mentioned, however. Of the 11 quotes germane to the Northern Ireland conflict, none
were conflict statements.
There were seven separate quotes that revealed psychological components. Six
were made by British/Protestant actors and all of them were made at the masses-level.
Emotive and perceptual components were mentioned five times each and groupidentification had four incidents. There was no language that revealed self-identification
to the Northern Ireland conflict in 1987.
Why don't you interview Sinn Fein? We are fed up with condemning this.
Let's see the guilty men come down the steps and answer your questions.
The whole world wants to see that – Ray Fergusonclxxiii.
The blatantly hostile comment made by Ferguson was directed at reporters who were
trying to get a statement for him about a bombing that killed 11 and wounded 61. The
IRA claimed that the bomb had gone off prematurely and that it was intended for
“security forces”. Ferguson’s anger towards Sinn Féin was shared by the Protestant
community as bystanders shouted “murders” as they entered the Ulster town hall to
discuss the bombingclxxiv. He also shows group-identification by using we/they language
and perceptual thought by assuming that the whole world found the IRA/Sinn Féin guilty
for the bombings.
1992
In 1992, there were 29 violent incidents that were reportedly responsible for 134
deaths. Culpability was attributed to the IRA/Catholics for 19 of the incidents while the
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Protestants/British were reported as responsible for 10. Non-state organizations were
mentioned twelve times with the Protestant and Ulster Freedom Fighters being mentioned
for the first time.
Of the 60 quotes reported regarding the Northern Ireland, only two of them were
conflict statements. The first article contained statements made by each side of the dyad.
Both statements were made from masses-level actors. One attributed violence to the
desire for political power where the other showed revenge as a motivation.
Over the past 48 hours active service units of the IRA have struck on three
occasions in the very heart of the British capital. These attacks signal our
determination and resolve to focus the government’s attention on their war
in Ireland. As they face a general election, our volunteers will continue to
force their occupation of part of our country into the British political
agenda – IRA statement released regarding London bombingsclxxv.
Because the IRA stated that their behavior was specifically to impact/influence
Britain’s policies and elections, it is coded as violence to gain political power.
There were 52 psychologically motivated statements in 1992. Seventeen were
made by IRA/Catholics, 35 were made by British/Protestants. The elite to masses ratio of
statements made was approximately equal. There were 36 perceptual, 26 emotive and
group-identification, and two self-identification statements.
Sheer luck prevented our operation from bringing you a fiery Christmas.
You will not be so lucky in 1993. We will bring in 1993 with a bang – A
statement released by the (Protestant) Ulster Freedom Fightersclxxvi.
If we made it through the blitz during World War II, I can guarantee you
this: we are not going to be brought down by this sorry lot of ignorant
terrorists – Frank Smith, Christmas donation collector interviewed in
downtown Londonclxxvii.
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In the first quote, the Ulster Freedom Fighters show emotion, by saying, “you will not be
so lucky” as it communicates, in context, clear intent to inflict harm. They also show
group-identification by communicating with we/they language. Smith also shows groupidentification with the same language usage in the second quote. He also reveals the
presence of the perception of resolve on the part of his in-group against the out-group
when he talks on behalf of the British/Protestant by saying that he believed that his ingroup would not “be brought down”. Finally, he shows emotion by labeling the
IRA/Catholics as “ignorant terrorists.”
1997
In the year before the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the agreement that
marked the intent to end the conflict by political actors, there were 33 violent incidents
resulting in 20 deaths. Twenty-five of the incidents were attributed to IRA/Catholic
actors and eight to the British/Protestants. Non-state groups were mentioned 67 times.
The Shankhill Butchers and the Catholic Continuity Army Council were mentioned for
the first time. Of the 85 quotes collected, none of them contained conflict statements.
There were 69 quotes that contained psychological components. The
IRA/Catholics made 24 of these statements and the Protestant/British made 45. Masseslevel actors made 40 of the statement while elites made 29. There were 56 perceptual, 27
group-identification, 24 emotive, statements made. There was also one self-identification
statement made.
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. . .an evil mafia. . . [Adams and McGuineness] have for over 25 years,
been active with in the IRA as activists, commanders, and presently as
godfathers. . . Today begins the trial of New Labor on the charge that it
has diminished democracy; sacrificed the freedom of the people of
Northern Ireland to the terrorist and elevated an evil Mafia to the status of
what would shame any other country in Western Europe. . . - Ken
Maginnis, Irish Member of Parliamentclxxviii.
We have no allusions about the character of Sinn Fein. We did not invite
them to the table, but we are not afraid of them and we’re not going to run
away. We are not here to negotiate, but to confront and expose the fascist
character of Sinn Fein- David Trimble, head of the (Protestant) Ulster
Unionist Partyclxxix.
Maginnis’ statement reveals emotive components by calling the IRA and its leaders
“evil”, “godfathers,” and “terrorist”. Similarly, Trimble’s defiant language and labeling
the IRA as fascist reveals his emotions. He also showed group-identification by using
we/they language.
2002
In 2002, the first time window analyzed after the signing of the Good Friday
Agreement, there were a total of 12 violent incidents and 34 deaths reported. Eight of the
incidents were attributed to British/Protestant and four to IRA/Catholic actors. There
were 21 non-state organizations referenced in 2002. However, there were no new
organizations noted. While there were 41 quotes relevant to the Northern Ireland
Conflict, none of them were conflict statements.
There were 40 statements that revealed psychological components. Twenty-six of
the statements were from British/Protestant actors and 14 were from people associated
with the IRA or Catholicism. Masses-level quotes accounted for 25 of the statements
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made. There were 31 perceptual, 17 emotive, and 15 group-identity motivated
sentiments revealed.
We accept that Sinn Fein's good intentions and the long distance they've
come in bringing the Republican movement into politics. But we now
have charges in three different jurisdictions that stand in direct contrast
with these intentions, and it is undermining everyone's confidence. The
time it is taking to rein in this kind of activity is taking longer than any of
the other parties in the power-sharing arrangement can reasonably be
asked to bear – John Reid, Secretary of Northern Irelandclxxx.
. . . mindless thugs. Children should not have to pay the price for the
failure of adults to live together – Jane Kennedy, Britain’s Security
Minister for Northern Ireland.
The assertion by Secretary Reid that the charges against Sinn Féin have compromised
“everyone’s confidence” is a perceptual statement. The claim that time that was needed to
control rogue actors was unreasonably long is also a perceptual statement. Minister
Kennedy’s emotive statements of “mindless thugs” and “should not have to pay the price.
. “ were in reaction to violence perpetrated against Catholic parents they brought their
daughters to school.
2007
There was one violent incident reported in 2007. It was reportedly initiated by
British/Protestant actors and resulted in ten deaths. Non-state organizations were
mentioned two times. No new organizations were referenced. Though there were only
four articles about the Northern Ireland conflict for the year, there was one quote
reported.

228

The quote was made by a masses-level British/Protestant actor and it reveals the
psychological components of perception and group identification. “They will be judged
by their actions, not their words”- Shaun Woodward, British Secretary to Northern
Irelandclxxxi. The statement was made in response to the announcement that the
(Protestant) Ulster Defense Association had decided to disband all of its armed units.
However, they made their decision conditional on the IRA continued commitment to not
commit acts of violence. To that end, they stated that they would keep their armaments.
By using “wait and see” language, Secretary Woodward reveals that he is not convinced
that the Ulster Defense Association is acting in good faith. His statement shows his
perception that that they cannot be completely trusted. Also, his use of we/they language
reveals group-identification sentiments.
2012
The search parameters of the project identified 19 articles for analysis. However,
none of the articles contained information that was relevant to my research agenda. Thus,
2012 provided no useful analysis information.
Summary
Looking back over the Northern Ireland PSC at the end of the qualitative
component of the case, though data was collected starting in 1922, it is clear that this is
not when the conflict actually began. In reality, this particular PSC can trace some of its
roots back to the Protestant Reformation. Thus, many of the components of PSC that are
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being tested in this project were already present before the Ireland became a sovereign
state.
Over the duration of this case, however, some of the descriptive and supporting
components, such as deaths and conflict statements, are present in some of time windows
and not at all in others. Other components, like self-identification, are absent an
overwhelming amount of the time. Because of this, and the indications that this
particular PSC is in the process of resolution, seeing which components are supported
and which are not in this case will be particularly salient in forming a theoretic
conceptualization of PSC.
CASE ANALYSIS
Analysis of the data in the Northern Ireland PSC provides a wide variety of quotes
from the people that were personally involved in the conflict. In this section of the
chapter, I use the statements that I have collected from these actors and the information
provided in the articles to determine whether the components that I am assessing are
indeed necessary components of this PSC. The first four components ( ≥ 20 years of
violent conflict; ≥ 3 violence and peace cycles; ≥ 500 deaths; and the participation of
non-state actors) are the descriptive components of the Northern Ireland PSC. The last
two components (competition-based conflict and psychological motivation) are
conceptualized as the supporting components.
DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENTS OF PSC
Duration of Violent Conflict
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Equal to or Greater Than Twenty Years
The length of time that a conflict endures is a distinguishing component of PSC.
The minimum time that a violent conflict must be present to be considered a PSC is 20
years in this study. This duration was chosen so that the lapse of time would be inclusive
of the biological and social concepts of a generation. Though data collection began in
1922 with the establishment of the Irish state, the conflict between Unionists and
Loyalists began long before. Because of this, a PSC may have already been in place
when data collection began.
The data shows that there were lapses in time of time between violent incidents.
However, the presence of violent conflict is sufficient to support the theoretical
conceptualization of a minimum of 20 years for violent conflict to have existed to be
considered a PSC. In the window from 1922 through 1942, there were 16 violent
incidents. In every 20-year increment examined, there were sufficient violent incidents
(a minimum of six) to code each window positively for the presence of violent conflict
over that span of time. However, because data collection started in 1922, the first four
five-year time windows were coded negative automatically. Because Boolean analysis
recorded 15 of the 19 time windows positively for the presence of 20 years or more of
violent conflict, it can be supported as a component of PSC (see table 6.1). My proposal
that this component is a necessary component of PSC can be supported in this case.
Violence Cycles
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PSC is marked by vacillations in violence between the actors. There can be
durations of time in a PSC where there is no violence between the actors only to have
violent conflict erupt again at a later time over the same issue(s) or stimuli. A minimum
of three months between violent episodes or spikes was established to be consistent with
the Nedler-Mead model of three data points to begin a pattern of non-violence. Violent
incidents were measured using the dates that individual, non-governmental actors or
government-based attacks were reported.
There were three time windows in the Northern Ireland case where no violent
incidents occurred at all. These years were 1947, 1962, and 2012. Even with the three
years that had no violent incidents, 13 of the 19 years examined coded positively because
the frequency of incidents surpassed the minimum threshold of three incidents per year
that were at least three months apart (see figure 6.1). In the time-windows examined in
this case, violence was present across time and on an annual basis, it surpassed theoretical
minimums.
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Figure 6.1: Violent Incidents Reported - Northern Ireland Conflict
While there were ten years where there were three month gaps in violence (1927, 1937,
1942, 1947, 1952, 1962, 1967, 2002, 2007, and 212), when violent incidents did occur,
they occurred in high enough frequencies to result in an average of 23.63 violent
incidents per year. Even on an annual level, cycles of violence are evident and showed
marginal increase over time (see figure 6.1). The increasing pattern is demonstrated in the
trend line in figure 6.1 as it shows that violent incidents increase over the life of the case.
Even when removing the year with the highest number of violent incidents as a possible
outlier, the average violent incidents per year was 11.52. This by far exceeds the
proposed theoretical minimum of 3. Thus, Boolean analysis supports my proposition that
a three or more violent/peace cycles are a necessary component of PSC.
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Casualties
In PSCs, violent events tend to be sporadic and can have lower death rates per
violent incident as compared to militarized conflict. Thus, they are harder to measure
than militarized conflicts in event-driven research. To account for these particular
features of PSC but provide measurable criteria, I have modified Wallersteen’s (2006)
parameters for militarized conflicts of 25 deaths per year to 500 deaths over a 20-year
time span. In doing so, the actual number of casualties required for a theoretical
minimum remains the same, but the time restraints are adjusted take into consideration of
the sporadic and cyclical nature of PSC.
In six of the 19 years examined, the directly relatable deaths in the Northern
Ireland conflict met or exceeded the 25-person minimum (see table 6.1). Thus, Boolean
analysis support my proposition that an average of 25 casualties per year within a 20-year
window are a necessary component of PSC. The number of casualties just barely met the
proposed theoretical minimum, however.
It is interesting to note that the number of deaths in every year up to the Troubles
(1972) failed to meet the minimum criteria (see figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2: Casualties- Northern Ireland Case
As noted earlier in the chapter, it is documented that actors in the Northern Ireland PSC
have historically made a concerted effort to avoid inflicting casualties on people that are
not directly involved in the conflict. The majority targets in planned terrorist events in
this case have been active participants in the conflict, governmental officials, buildings,
and commodities. The fact that the number of casualties across time meets the minimum
(proposed) theoretical criteria even when there was a conscious effort to specifically
avoid the shedding of “innocent” blood, could speak to the true intensity of this conflict.
It could explain why violent incidents exceed the minimum threshold by nearly four-fold,
but barely met theoretical minimums in casualties.
Participation of Non-state Actors
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The participation of non-state actors includes individuals and groups that are not
affiliated with a state that have participated in, or are associated with, acts of violence.
There is a moderate increase over time in the referencing of non-state actors as a party to
the violence in the Northern Ireland PSC (see figure 6.3). The minimum theoretical
threshold for a positive Boolean outcome requires that there has to be at least six PSC –
related events where non-state actors are referenced in the violence for the year coded
positively for having had non-state actors’ participation in the PSC. Lastly, for the case
to be coded positively for having the participation of non-state as a necessary component
of PSC there had to be at least six years that were coded positively for the participation of
non-state actors. In the Northern Ireland case, 12 of the 19 years examined were coded
positive for the presence of non-state actors. Thus, Boolean analysis supports the
inclusion of the participation of non-state actor as a necessary component of PSC.
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Figure 6.3: References to Non-State Actors - Northern Ireland Case
Supporting components of PSC
The supporting components that this project proposes are components that are not
readily observed, but could be the components that are actually responsible for the
enduring nature of PSC. In this and the other cases analyzed in this dissertation, the
components from which data is gathered and assessed are organized into two categories.
These are competition-based conflict and psychological motivation. This is
operationalized by assessing actor statements to determine behavioral motivation76. By
assessing the statements of the actual actors in the conflict, the reason why PSCs are
enduring in nature could be realized.

76

For further explanation of coding rules for content analysis, please refer to the appendix.
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Competition-based Conflict
The components tested in competition-based conflict are territory, resources,
security, political power, social power, and revenge. Theoretical minimum criteria for
coding the presence (positive Boolean outcome) for each component included a
minimum of six quotes in a year where the actors stated that an individual component
was the reason they committed or would commit an act of violence. For the case to be
coded as positive for the existence of competition-based conflict there had to be at least
six years throughout the course of the case that clearly revealed that competition-based
conflict was the motivation for behavior.
Using these parameters, only one of the 19 years analyzed coded positive for the
presence of competition-based conflict (see table 6.2). Also, no single component was
present sufficiently to justify its inclusion as a necessary component of the category of
Competition-Based Conflict in PSC. Even with the spike in competition-based conflict
quotes in 1972, the trend line for this component remains flat. When 1972 is removed, the
trend line is negative (see figure 6.4)77.

77

To test whether trends across this case were due to the unusually high frequency of incidents in 1972, I
removed the year from consideration from all of the components tested. All components still showed
overall trends of increasing over time, except for competition-based conflict statements. Thus, I put 1972
back into final tables.
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Figure 6.4: Conflict-Based Violence Statements - Northern Ireland Case
The components measured for competition over tangible assets included territory,
control over resources, and physical security. Not a single one of these components were
present sufficiently to be coded as being present in the Boolean analysis. Together, they
were mentioned nine times across nineteen, one-year, data-collection windows that
spanned the duration (ninety-years) of the conflict. Security-motivated violence was the
most highly mentioned tangible asset with eight references, seven of which were in 1972
(one territorial reference was also made in 1972). Conflict over resources was not
mentioned a single time as a motive for violent behavior.
Components measured for competition over non-tangible assets included political
power, social power, and revenge. Though there was a higher frequency of reference to
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non-tangible assets being a motive for violence, they were still insufficient to be coded
positively for their overall presence in the Northern Ireland conflict. Conflict to gain
political power and revenge were both coded positively once (in 1972). Throughout the
span of the case, violence to gain political power was mentioned 24 times. This is 51.1%
of all of the competition-based motivated statements for violence and it has three times
the references made about any other competition-based conflict motivation. (The next
most frequent references were revenge and physical security with eight references each.)
Violent behavior to gain social power was mentioned a total five times across in the case.
Competition-based conflict is proposed as one of the six categorically necessary
components of PSC. In this case, however, that proposition cannot be supported. With
over half of the statements that were reported being about violence acts that were
committed to gain political power, the role of competition-based conflict and politicallymotivated violence should not be summarily dismissed, though. The failure of Boolean
methods to support my proposition may be more the result of data collection criteria, the
nature of the data that I am collecting, and reporting practices, though. In this project, I
have made a concerted effort to let the words of the actors who are directly involved in
the conflict to speak for themselves. In this case in particular, there were many articles
where the author told readers in their own words what the motivation for the violence
was. They either did not use any quotes or used quotes to illustrate other points that they
were making. Because the reason given for the violence was written in the author’s
instead of the participants’ voices, it was not included in the data. Also, committing acts
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of terrorism is considered a criminal act and many of the non-state organizations that
participated in (or were associated with) the conflict were outlawed. Hence, actors in
illegal organizations may not have been as readily available to give statements. Similarly,
as members of illegal organizations, they may not have been given the opportunity/access
to media that would have been needed for me to gather more information. Any of these
limitations may have impacted the results of this component.
PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION
Through Boolean analysis, the justification for the inclusion of psychological
motivation as a necessary component of PSC is strongly supported in the Northern
Ireland PSC. Statements that revealed presence of psychological motivation passed
minimum theoretical criteria in 11 of the 19 years analyzed (see table 6.3). Thus, in the
Northern Ireland case, analysis supports my proposition that psychological motivation is
a necessary component of PSC. When analyzing each of the components individually,
however, they were not all supported as necessary components.
Emotion
The proposition that the presence of emotion is a necessary component of the
psychological motivation of PSC can be supported using Boolean analysis. Emotionallycharged statements are present in approximately 23.14% of all quotes that contained
psychological sentiments. Boolean analysis shows that emotion is coded as present in
eight of the nineteen years analyzed. Because the theoretical minimum of six years is
surpassed, it is supported as a jointly necessary component in the category of
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psychological motivation in PSC. Also, emotive statements are consistent and trend
slightly positive across the duration of the conflict (see figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.5: Emotive Statements - Northern Ireland Case
Even with the large gaps in violent behaviors across the case, the overall trend in the
frequency of emotive statements increases over time. The positive trend in frequency
throughout the course of this case conflict could indicate that the role of emotion
increases as the PSC endures over time.
Perception
Of the total quotes that contain psychological motivation in the Northern Ireland
case, 42.93% are statements that reveal perceptual motivations (see table 6.3). Ten of the
nineteen years are coded positively for the presence of perception in PSC. Finally, the
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presence of perceptual statements increases over the duration of the Northern Ireland PSC
(see figure 6.6).
160
140

Frequency

120

100
80
60

40
20
0

Year

Figure 6.6: Perceptual Statements - Northern Ireland PSC
Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of perception
plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in frequency throughout the
course of this case could indicate that the role of perception increases as the PSC endures
over time.
There were well over 1000 articles that my search criteria identified in 1932 in the
Northern Ireland Conflict. A large number of these articles fell into two categories that do
not coincide directly with the components that I am researching, but they are noteworthy.
Both sets of articles spoke to the perceptions of the actors in the Northern Ireland
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conflict. The first set of articles focused on a disagreement between the Irish and the
British governments regarding how the British government handled the issue of land
annuities when Ireland gained its independence in 1922. Though the ensuing quote is
lengthy, it shows the (continuing) Irish resentment of (perceived) British imperialism and
profiteering. It is also demonstrates how the conflict within the dyad has a very long
history that remained salient to the actors:
As this is a matter of life and death to the Irish Free State, I would like to
explain that Mr. Wilson has not told the whole story. It is not true that the
financial equities seem to be clear in favor of the British government.
Neither in history, nor in law is there a solid basis for the British claim to
the land annuities. The facts, in bare outline are as follows: at various
periods between the English invasion and the end of the 17th century, the
English without a shadow of moral right, confiscated the land of Ireland,
giving it to their soldiers and adventurers of every war for services against
the Irish people. The new landlords and their successors, as the body,
never came really to regard themselves as Irishmen. In their dealing with
the Irish people, they acted as alien conquerors whose interest was to bring
you as much as they could from their tenants. By means of extortionate
rents, they kept the tenants at the barest subsistence level. They gave no
security of tenure, and whenever it seemed to suit their selfish interests.
They evicted the rightful owners of the land by thousands, indifferent to
the fact that in most cases there was no hope of alternative means of
livelihood in the country. Ultimately, these conditions and the resolve of
the people to regain possession of the land led to the 'land war' of 50 years
ago. The land war resulted in the passing of various land-purchase acts.
The landlord's interests were bought out by means of state credit. The
tenants became owners of their holdings are subject to annual payments to
the state intended to cover the interest and sinking fund of the stock issued
to finance the purchase schemes. (The state was the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland.) In 1920, the Government of Ireland Act, passed
by the United Kingdom Parliament, made the interest in sinking fund of
244

land stock a charge on the revenues of Great Britain alone and gave the
land annuities unconditionally to the two Irish Parliaments created by the
act. (The annuities in the six counties of Northern Ireland have ever since
been collected and retained by the parliament of that area.) The sole
financial liability toward Great Britain imposed by the treaty was
contained in article V, which was made. The Irish Free State liable for
upper portion of the United Kingdom public debt and war pensions to be
determined by agreement or arbitration, having regard to any just claims
of Ireland by way of set-off or counterclaim. Article V was canceled in
December 1925, by the boundary agreement, which was subsequently
ratified by both Parliaments. The cancellation ended all legal financial
obligations of the Irish Free State to the British Government, with the
exception of a payment of ₤250,000 a year, which was imposed by the
boundary agreement itself, and which is now in dispute. I think it will be
clear from this brief summary of the facts that we are simply refusing to
allow the British Government to fasten upon the Irish Free State, the cost
of undoing an injustice done to our country in the past by its British rulers:
we are refusing to pay a debt which is not ours, a debt which the
Parliament of the United Kingdom, overwhelmingly British in its
membership, solemnly placed upon Great Britain herself in 1920 – Sean
T. O’Kelly, Head of the Irish Free State Delegation in response to
statements made by P.W. Wilsonclxxxii.
In this and other articles during 1932, the Irish were taking the British to task over their
perception of history concerning land seizure, land use, annuities, and unfair debt
burdens.
The second groups of articles are about economic discrimination by Protestants in
Northern Ireland towards the Catholic community. Because no casualties, quotes, or
other information that I was coding was reported, the majority of this important
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component of the dyad’s conflict, was not included in my data. However, the frequency
that economic discrimination/disparity was mentioned in the articles gives me pause78.
Out of the road with this! It is only an emblem of hypocrisy. I will not
stand here and allow this sort of thing to continue – John Beattie, Member
of Irish Parliament, in reaction to Parliament’s refusal to accept a motion
to discuss unemploymentclxxxiii.
Beattie was so angered by the Parliament Speaker’s decision to refuse to accept his
motion to discuss unemployment that he threw a mace across the room and had to be
forcibly removedclxxxiv. Similarly, on October 6, there was a riot in Belfast that the New
York Times attributed to anger from unemployment and economic discrimination against
Catholicsclxxxv.
The actors in both sets of articles show great emotion over their perceptions of
unfair economic practices. Though outside of the pre-determined search criteria, because
of how the events unfolded and how they were reported, these two sets of articles show
emotion and group-identity sentiments that are based in their perceptions of reality
concerning their economic well-being. While these could be supportive of the proposition
that the perception of economic discrimination/disparity could be a sustaining component
of PSC, could this actually reveal a “deeper” truth about the nature of PSC? Could it be
that enduring perceptions of reality, whether based fact or not, are what drives emotion

78

Though the issue of economic discrimination and disparity brought-up in the Northern Ireland case, I
also noted several articles in the Arab/Israeli case about the same issue. There were several articles where
Palestinians stated that they believed that the did not get jobs or certain positions in the Israeli economy
because of their ethnic identity.
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and identity as rallying points for violent behavior? Could perception be the vital
component that sustains the psychological component of PSC?
Self-Identity
Self-identification is one of the original four necessary components of PSC listed
by Azar. However, of the psychological motivations evaluated, it has the lowest
incidence. Overall, self-identification statements were an average of only 1.67% of all of
the psychologically motivated statements in the Northern Ireland PSC (see table 6.3).
Boolean analysis fails to support the inclusion of self-identity as a necessary component
of psychological motivation in PSC in this case. Only one of the nineteen years analyzed
was coded positively for its presence. Because of this, the proposition that self-identity
individually contributes to PSC in a significant manner or is a necessary component of
the category of psychological motivation in PSC cannot be supported in the Northern
Ireland case.

Group-Identity
In the Northern Ireland case, group-identity-based statements are specifically
mentioned in 32.26% of the quotes that communicated any type psychological
motivation. Eight of the nineteen years assessed were coded positively for the presence of
group-identity. Because only six years were needed, to fulfill the minimum theoretical
requirements, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of group identity as a sustaining
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psychological motivation in PSC (see table 6.3). Lastly, statements that reveal groupidentity are present over the duration of the Northern Ireland PSC and the frequency of
group-identification statements increases over the life of the conflict (see figure 6.7).
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Figure 6.7: Group-Identification Statements - Northern Ireland PSC

Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of groupidentification plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in frequency
throughout the course of the conflict could indicate that the role of group-identity
increases as the PSC endures over time79.
Summary of Psychological Motivation
79

To test whether the increasing trend was due to the unusually high frequency of incidents in 1972, I
removed the year from consideration. The table still showed a clear trend of increasing over time.
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Analysis of the four proposed jointly necessary components found that emotion,
perception and group identity can be supported as jointly necessary components of
psychological motivation in PSC in the Northern Ireland case using Boolean analysis.
Hence, proposing that emotion, perception, and group identity are jointly necessary
components of the category of Psychological Motivation, a sustaining component of
PSC, can be supported in this case. The inclusion of self- identity, as an individually
contributing component of Psychological Motivation in PSC, cannot be supported in the
Northern Ireland PSC, however.
Emotion, perception, and group-identification each demonstrated trends of
increasing in frequency over the course this case (see figure 6.8).
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Figure 6.8: Statements that Reveal Psychological Motivation – Northern Ireland Case
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The increase in psychologically motived statements in this case could be tangible support
for assertions that PSC changes and takes on additional components and issues of
contention over time.
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
While Boolean methods can aid in determining theoretical necessity and
sufficiency, what it cannot inform is the relatedness of the components that are being
studied. Because of this, confirmatory factor analysis is used. The six primary categorical
components were initially assessed to determine how many factors best reflects the data
of the Northern Ireland case. A maximum likelihood model, two-, three-, and four-factor
models were assessed. The maximum likelihood analysis showed that a (retained) twofactor model best reflected the data. Thus, a two-factor model is used in this case (see
figure 6.9).
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Figure 6.9: PSC Factor Viability Scores - Northern Ireland Case
Using the two-factor model, the first factor accounts for 88.51% of the total variance found in
the model (see figure 6.10).

Factor

Eingenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Factor 1

2.55

1.95

0.8851

Factor 2

0.61

0.48

0.2102

Figure 6.10: Two Factor PSC Viability Model (unrotated) – Northern Ireland Case
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In fact, all of the components vary together (having component scores > +0.5), loading on
factor 1- with the exception of conflict duration and deaths. The single, underlying
dimension of factor one accounts for 83% of the variation in non-state actors, 76% of the
variation in deaths, 81.6% of the variation in violent incidents, 84% of the variation in
conflict statements, and 84% of the variation in psychological statements (see figure
6.11). The components that load in factor 1 load only minimally in factor two (<0.5 to >0.5).
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Figure 6.11: Factor Loadings for PSC Viability Model – Northern Ireland Case
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The second factor accounts for 21% of the model variance. Conflict duration and
deaths load on factor two. Thus, the second factor is needed to account for conflict
duration and deaths in the Northern Ireland PSC. Conflict duration has a factor score of
0.09 and is the most unique components measured (0.85). Similarly, the component,
“deaths”, has a factor score of 0.31 and is the second most unique component (0.61) (see
figure 6.11).
The components that load on factor one - violent incidents, non-state actors,
conflict statements, and psychological statements; load together very strongly and only
minimally on factor two. As factor one accounts for over 88% of the variation in the
model, and the majority of the individual components load strongly on factor one,
analysis suggests that the components of factor one are rightly associated with PSC.
CONCLUSION
The Northern Ireland PSC is a conflict that has seen the same sets of actors
engage in periods of violence for over 400 years. In the last two decades, however, this
PSC has made significant strides towards resolution. Though this dissertation focuses
more on the theoretic aspects of what the components are that sustaining conflict,
identifying the (behavioral) patterns of those components could inform how PSCs can
end.
Boolean analysis showed that 20 or more years of conflict, the participation of
non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more directly relatable
deaths, and psychological motivation can be supported as necessary components of PSC.
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However, the inclusion of competition-based conflict as a necessary component cannot
be supported in this case. While there are potential reasons why this particular component
failed to be supported as a necessary component, the data did reveal items of interest
about the conflict statements that were identified. Of the reported statements that
contained competition-based sentiments, 51% of them were about gaining political
power. Though this particular category failed to be supported by Boolean Analysis, the
fact that nearly half of the statements that were identified were about gaining political
power speaks to what issue(s) are driving the violent behavior. Also, factor analysis
indicates that competition-based conflict is rightly associated with PSC. As such, the
component cannot be summarily dismissed in this case.
When assessing the potential psychological motivations in the Northern Ireland
PSC, all but one of the proposed individual components are supported as contributing to
the conflict. Boolean analysis supports the proposition that emotion, perception, and
group-identification are jointly necessary components of the Northern Ireland conflict.
Self-identification fails to have the necessary minimum frequency of references to justify
its theoretical inclusion. Overall, self-identification-revealing statements represent only
1.67% of all of the statements that revealed psychological impetus in this conflict.
Factor analysis shows that violent incidents, non-state actors, competition-based
conflict statements, and psychological motivation all load on the same factor and account
for almost 90% of the variation in this case. Conflict duration and deaths load on a
second factor. This demonstrates that violence, the participation of non-state actors,
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conflict statements, and psychological motivation are predictive of PSC and are rightly
associated with PSC.
The theoretical role that competition-based conflict plays as a sustaining
component of the Northern Ireland PSC cannot be clearly determined using Boolean
analysis in this case. However, using factor analysis, it does load strongly on factor 1
(0.84) indicating that it plays a role in predicting conflict duration and deaths. Thus, the
role that competition-based conflict plays in PSC cannot be clearly determined in this
case. Even so, 20 or more years of conflict, the participation of non-state actors, three or
more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more directly relatable deaths, and psychological
motivation can be. Thus, the best pictorial representation of the (pre) theoretically
necessary components of PSC in the Northern Ireland conflict is as follows:
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Figure 6.12: Necessary Components of PSC – Northern Ireland Case
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Political Power

Table 6.1: Boolean Analysis for the Northern Ireland PSC
≥ 20
Years80

Nonstate
Actors81

1922
0 N
1927
0 N
1932
0 N
1937
0 N
1942
1 Y
1947
1 Y
1952
1 Y
1957
1 Y
1962
1 Y
1967
1 Y
1972
1 Y
1977
1 Y
1982
1 Y
1987
1 Y
1992
1 Y
1997
1 Y
2002
1 Y
2007
1 Y
2012
1 Y
Boolean 15/19 =
Outcome
Y

16 Y
1
N
5
N
6
Y
18 Y
1
N
3
N
42 Y
2
N
7
Y
222 Y
32 Y
39 Y
8
Y
12 Y
67 Y
21 Y
2
N
0
N
12/19 =
Y

Year

≥3
Violence/
Peace
Cycles82
6
Y
1
N
6
Y
3
Y
11
Y
0
N
1
N
33
Y
0
N
3
Y
230
Y
38
Y
30
Y
12
Y
29
Y
33
Y
12
Y
1
N
0
N
13/19 =
Y

≥ 500
Deaths83
16
N
9
N
2
N
0
N
14
N
0
N
0
N
9
N
0
N
0
N
530
Y
104
Y
67
Y
82
Y
134
Y
20
N
34
Y
10
N
0
N
6/19 =
Y

Comp.based
Conflict
Stat.84
1
N
0
N
3
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
27
Y
1
N
3
N
2
N
2
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
1/19 =
N

Psycholo
gical85

Pres.
of
PSC

31
Y
3
N
21
Y
16
Y
8
Y
15
Y
0
N
14
Y
3
N
0
N
345 Y
26
Y
39
Y
14
Y
90
Y
107 Y
63
Y
2
N
0
0
11/19 =
Y

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1/19
=N

86

80

Criteria: Y = Violent conflict has been occurring between the actors ≥ 20 years (as determined by the
presence of violent incidents and of deaths
81
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Non-state actors is six or more references to non-state actors
(individuals and organizations) committing acts of violence or being made in reference to the violence/year.
82
Criteria: Y = Overall presence conflict cycles is three or more references to violent behavior that are at
least three months apart/year.
83
Criteria: Y = Casualties must equal 25 or more deaths/year (and equal 500 or more deaths over a 20-year
window).
84
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Competition-based Conflict Components are six or more incidents/
year.
85
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Psychological Components are six or more incidents/year.
86
Criteria: Y = Overall presence of each component must be present in six or more windows analyzed.
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Table 6.2: Boolean Analysis: Competition-Based Motives Conflict Statements- Northern
Ireland PSC
Year
1922
1927
1932
1937
1942
1947
1952
1957
1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007
2012
Sum/Outco
me

Territor
y
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
1
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0/19 =
N

Resource
s
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
1/19 =
N

Security
1
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
7
Y
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
1/19 =
N

Political
Power
1
N
0
N
2
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
19 Y
0
N
1
N
0
N
1
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
1/19 =
N

Social
Power
0
N
0
N
2
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
2
N
0
N
0
N
1
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0/19 =
N

Revenge
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
6
Y
0
N
1
N
0
N
1
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
1/19 =
N

Conf.
Pres.
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1/19 =
N

% of
1/14 =
0/47 =
8/47 =
24/47 =
5/47 =
8/48 =
Conflict
2.1%
0.0%
17.0%
51.1%
10.6%
17.0%
Statements
* Criteria: Y = Minimum threshold for coding the presence of individual
Competition-based Conflict components in given year is ≥ 6 incidents/ year. For
each component to be coded positively of its overall presence in the conflict there
must be ≥ 6 positive Booleans outcome from annual summaries.
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Table 6.3: Boolean Analysis: Psychological Motivation - Northern Ireland PSC
Year
1922
1927
1932
1937
1942
1947
1952
1957
1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007
2012
Sum/Outcom
e

Emotion
9
1
7
5
1
1
0
4
0
0
68
2
10
5
26
24
17
1
0
180

Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
8/1
9
=Y

Percep.
11
1
8
6
3
2
0
5
0
0
137
14
19
5
36
56
31
0
0
334

Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
10/1
9
=Y

%
Psychologica
l Statements

Self-ID
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
13

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
1/1
9
=N

Group-ID
11
1
6
5
0
2
0
5
0
0
131
9
8
4
26
27
15
1
0
251

Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
8/1
9
=Y

Psy.
Pres.
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
11/19
= Y*

180/77
13/77
251/77
334/77
8
8
8=
8=
=
=
32.3%
42.9%
23.1 %
1.7%
* Criteria: Y = Minimum threshold for coding the presence of individual components
in the category of Psychological Motivation are six or more recorded incidents/ year.
Criteria: Y = For each component to be coded positively for its overall presence in
the conflict, there must be six or more positive Boolean outcomes from that
component’s annual summaries.
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CHAPTER 7
ANALYSIS OF PSC CASES
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I use the data that is collected from the Arab/Israeli and Northern
Ireland PSCs to determine which proposed components assessed are supported as
necessary components of PSC. Boolean analysis is the primary method used for the
determination of necessity. Factor analysis is also used to assess the relatedness of the
components measured. By using two critical PSC cases, it is hoped that the support for
the sustaining elements of PSC can be identified.
Analysis of these cases is done in two sections. The first section assesses the
descriptive components of PSC. These are 20 or more years of conflict, the participation
of non-state actors, 500 or more deaths that are directly relatable to the PSC, and three or
more violence/peace cycles in the conflict. The second section assesses the proposed
supporting components of PSC. These are components that may not be readily observed,
but could contribute to the enduring nature of PSC. These components are conceptualized
as competition-based conflict and psychological motivation. Competition-based conflict
is conflict over tangible assets (territory, resources, or physical security) and/or nontangible assets (social and political power or revenge). Finally, I will be assessing the
components in the category of psychological motivation (emotion, perception, selfidentification, and group-identification) to determine whether any or all of the proposed
psychological components can be supported as necessary components of PSC.
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DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENTS OF PSC
Twenty or more years of violent conflict
Though data was collected for less than 100 years in each case, dyadic violence in
both the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland conflicts has spanned centuries. Twenty-four
of the 32 time-windows evaluated had six or more violent incidents within the past 20
years. Thus, Boolean analysis supports the presence of 20 or more years of violent
conflict as a necessary component of PSC (see tables 5.1 and 6.1). Even with data
collection parameters that did not cover the entire time-span of the conflicts, conflict
patterns clearly demonstrated contiguous and cyclical conflict that exceeds the theoretical
minimums (see figure 7.1)87. The patterns of violent incidents in the two PSC cases
analyzed support the proposition twenty or more years of violent conflict is a necessary
component of PSC.

87

In this chapter, the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases are charted together unless the differences
between the cases are so great that being charted together will result in obscuring the findings in one of the
cases.
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Figure 7.1: Violent Incidents in PSC Cases
Violence/Peace Cycles
Nineteen of the thirty-two time-windows assessed for cycles of violence
and peace met or exceeded the minimum theoretical threshold using Boolean analysis.
Thus, my proposal that three or more violence/peace cycles are a necessary component of
PSC can be supported. In almost 60% of the years analyzed, there were violent incidents
that occurred at least three months apart from each other. While violent incidents were
more numerous in the Arab/Israeli case and violence was more consistent across time,
there are spikes and low-points in the violence pattern (see figure 7.2). 1948, 1968, and
2003 experienced marked increases in violence.
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Figure 7.2: Violence/Peace Cycles- Arab/Israeli Case
Similarly, the Northern Ireland conflict experienced cyclical violence. In this case,
however, the frequency of violence is much lower (see figure 7.3). With the exception of
1972, there were no years saw more than 50 violent incidents (as opposed to the
Arab/Israeli conflict that had five years with more than 50 violent incidents and also had
a shorter data collection time-span). There were two years in the Northern Ireland
conflict, prior to the Good Friday Agreement, that saw no violence at all (1947 and
1962), only to have violence resume in subsequent time windows.
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Figure 7.3: Violence/Peace Cycles- Northern Ireland Case
Even given the differences in the frequency in which violent events occurred in these
critical cases, the cyclical nature of the violence patterns is evident.
Casualties
The proposed theoretical minimum deaths that are directly-attributable to PSC is
an average of 25 deaths per year over any given 20-year period of the PSC. Of the 32
time-windows analyzed, 19 of the years were coded positively of more than 25 deaths per
year (see figures 7.4 and 7.5).
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Figure 7.4: Casualties – Arab/Israeli Case
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Figure 7.5: Casualties – Northern Ireland Case
Overall, the Arab/Israeli case had a mean rate of 1,111 deaths per year and the Northern
Ireland case had an average of 54. The Arab/Israeli case experienced large casualty rates
than the Northern Ireland case. In the Arab/Israeli case, casualties are more consistent
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across time. In the Northern Ireland case, however, casualty patterns are more clustered.
This difference could be a critical.
As discussed in chapter six, in the earlier years of the Northern Ireland conflict,
actors who committed acts of violence made efforts to exact “surgical” strikes, hitting
only governmental officials and buildings. They would give advance warning so that no
“innocent life” was lost. During the troubles, however, warnings before bombings
decreased and actors started accusing each other of ethnic cleansing (Barnes, 2005, 148).
This change in policy is evident in the comparison in the pattern changes of violent
incidents to casualties across the conflict (see figure 7.6).
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Figure 7.6: Change in Violence and Death Patterns - Northern Ireland Conflict
Using a three-period moving average, the overall trend of violent incidents to number of
deaths showed that violent incidents were approximately equal to or surpassed the
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number of deaths88 prior to The Troubles. During the troubles, however, where efforts to
avoid the loss of “innocent” life were not specifically avoided, the number of deaths far
surpassed the number of violent incidents. In this, the violent incidents to deaths pattern
more closely resembles the ratios of the Arab/Israeli conflict (see figure 7.7)89 .
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Figure 7.7: Change in Violence and Death Patterns in the Arab/Israeli Conflict
What prompted this change and how is it relevant to understanding the supporting
mechanisms of PSC? In the Arab/Israeli conflict, Arab/Palestinian actors reject the
legitimacy of the Israeli people to establish the land of Israel/Palestine as a homeland.
While this PSC began over a territorial dispute, chapter five clearly demonstrates existing
animosity between the two groups (as evidenced by the stated increase in the motivation
of revenge in violence and the emotionally, perceptually, group-identification charged

8888

In this figure, data from 1972 was not included so that the trend lines of violent incidents and deaths in
years with lower intensities/frequencies can be better examined.
89
As with the Northern Ireland PSC, the casualty levels for 1948 in the Arab/Israeli conflict were so high,
that if they were included, the patterns in other years with lower conflict intensity would not be as
discernible. Therefore, 1948 is not included.
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statements). Chapter six also reveals increasing trends in revenge-based violence and
emotional, perceptual, and group-identification sentiments. If Bane’s statements that
(non-state) actors in the Northern Ireland conflict stopped showing concern for the loss of
innocent life in the out-group and that ethnic cleansing was being attempted are correct,
this shows a change in the psychology of the actors where the legitimacy of the out-group
to exist is now rejected.

If accurate, this could indicate that psychological motivation

plays a strong role in supporting the continuation of PSCs.90
Non-State Actors
In both PSCs analyzed, non-state actors were referenced in relation to the conflict
and violence consistently across time. In fact, the references of non-state actors increased
over time in both cases. However, the rate of increase is greater in Arab/Israeli case than
the Northern Ireland case (see figures 7.8 and 7.9).
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Figure 7.8: Participation of Non-State Actors- Arab/Israeli Case

90

If changes in the psychology of the actors can help explain the increases in violent incidents and deaths
in the Northern Ireland conflict during The Troubles, can it help explain why this particular PSC looks like
it is ending? Though this question is beyond the scope of this particular project, it is a fascinating question
to ponder. If unexplored, would be an excellent follow-on project.

260

250

Frequency

200
150
100

50
0

Year

Figure 7.9: Participation of Non-State Actors- Northern Ireland Case
Of the 32 windows assessed, 23 years had sufficient references to the
participation of non-state actors in conflict to be coded positively. Because this surpasses
the minimum theoretical requirement of 12 references, Boolean analysis supports the
inclusion of non-state actors as a necessary component of PSC. Existing scholarly
literature asserts that the participation of non-state actors is a distinguishing quality of
PSC. The actual frequency of non-state actors that are coded positively in Boolean
analysis is almost double the theoretical minimum. This lends support to the scholarly
position that non-state actors are a necessary component of PSC.
SUPPORTING COMPONENTS OF PSC: COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT
Competition-based conflict is measured based on the statements of the actual
actors in each PSC analyzed. As with other components, 12 or more of the 32 year-long
windows had to be coded positively for this category to be considered a necessary
component of PSC. There were exactly 12 time-windows between the two cases that
were coded positively for the presence of competition-based conflict. Therefore, Boolean
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analysis supports my proposition that competition-based conflict is a necessary
component of PSC. However, not all of the components in the sub-categories of conflict
over tangible and non-tangible assets were supported.
The incidence of conflict statements that directly identified why acts of violence
were committed were limited in relation to the total number of quotes that were collected.
Of the 1275 quotes that were analyzed, only 16.9% (216) of them contained conflict
statements. This is an average of 6.75 statements per year across the 32 time-windows
assessed in the two cases. Thus, with a minimum theoretical threshold being six quotes,
for any single component to achieve the minimum theoretical threshold is a challenging
task.
Before analyzing specific radial components, possible reasons as to why there
were so few conflict statements must be addressed. The low incidence for conflict
statements could be for several reasons. First, as a design feature of this project, I
purposely let the words of the actors who are directly involved in the conflict speak for
themselves. Thus, if an actor was not completely clear as to why an act of violence was
committed or if a reporter paraphrased or gave the reason for a violent act, it was not
included in the data. Because of this, there were numerous articles in both cases that
were rejected. Another possible reason for a lower number of conflict statements could be
access to the actors committing the acts of violence. A large amount of the violence that
was committed in both cases was committed by non-state actors such as Fatah, Hamas,
Hezbollah, the IRA, or the Orangemen. Because of this, these actors may not have had
the same access to news outlets as state actors. This is particularly true of the Northern
Ireland case where both sides of the dyad (especially in the later years) had active non-
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state actor components (see figure 7.11). In the beginning windows in the Arab/Israeli
case, the number of state-level actors (elites) that had their statements published
outnumbered the non-state (masses-level) actors. During this time, Israel, Syria, Lebanon,
Egypt, and (Trans-) Jordan were involved in the conflict. Over time, much of the conflict,
on the Palestinian side of the dyad, has been largely sustained by non-state organizations.
Thus, as the case progressed the number of non-state actor statements that revealed
reasons for violence increased (see figure 7.10).
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Figure 7.10: Elite to Non-Elite Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
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Figure 7.11: Elite to Non-elite Conflict Statements- Northern Ireland Case
Yet another potential reason why the number of conflict statements is low is that
committing acts of violence (terrorism) is considered a criminal act and many of the nonstate organizations that participated in (or were associated with) the conflicts were
outlawed or considered illegitimate to state actors. Hence, actors in illegal or targeted
organizations may not have been as readily available to give statements. While any or all
of these reasons could help explain why the numbers of conflict statements are limited,
the fact that conflict statements are not as numerous as I had hoped is a limitation to my
project.
Tangible Assets
Conflict statements that revealed that acts of violence were committed over
control of tangible assets included statements that referred to violence to gain control of
land (territory), physical resources, and physical security.
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Territory
Territorially motivated conflict was strongly represented in the Arab/Israeli PSC.
Ten of the 13 years analyzed were coded positively for the presence of territoriallymotivated violence. Of all the conflict statements, territorially-based conflict accounted
for 43.3% of all the conflict statements in the Arab/Israeli PSC. In the Northern Ireland
conflict, however, not a single year met the minimum theoretical threshold. In in 1972,
the year with the most violence was recorded of the years analyzed, there was only one
conflict statement that reflected territorial sentiments and it represented only 2.8% of all
conflict-based statements that year. Hence, conflict over territorial control does not play
the same role in the Northern Ireland conflict as it does in the Arab/Israeli PSC. Because
territorially-motivated statement failed to reach the theoretical minimum of 12 positively
coded windows, Boolean analysis does not support the inclusion of territory as an
independently contributing component of competition-based conflict in PSC. However,
the fact that it accounts for 43.3% of Arab/Israeli conflict statement cannot be ignored.
Thus, it is included as a jointly necessary component of the category of competitionbased conflict.
Of interest, though, is that the trend of claims that territory is a motive for
violence in the Arab/Israeli case decreases over time (see figure 7.12).
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Figure 7.12- Territorially-Based Conflict Statements -Arab/Israeli Case
As territorial claims have been (and remains) a central point of contention between the
Palestinians and Israelis since before the period of time that I began collecting data, why
do territorially-based conflict statements decrease as the conflict progresses over time?
The answer may be found in analyzing the conflict patterns of the next component,
security.
Security
Of the 32 time windows, nine years were coded positively for the presence
of security-related conflict statements. Thus, security cannot be supported as an
individually supporting component of competition-based conflict in PSC.
However, it was referenced as a motive for violent behavior across both cases.
Also, its presence increased as time progressed in the Arab/Israeli case (see figure
7.13) and was supported as an individually significant component of competitionbased conflict in the Arab/Israeli PSC.
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7.13: Security-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
What is of interest is that as territorially-based conflict statements decreased in the
Arab/Israeli Case security-based conflict statements increased (see figure 7.14).
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Figure 7:14: Changes in Trends in Security and Territorially-based
Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
The change in these patterns of conflict statements are found primarily in
changes that are made by the Israeli actors. As time progressed, the number of Israeli
statements that asserted that violence was committed to gain or protect land decreased.
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However, the number of acts of violence over territory by Palestinian actors remained
roughly the same over the course of the conflict (see figure 7.15).
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Figure 7.15: Territory-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli PSC
Similarly, the number of statements made by Israeli actors claiming that they committed
an act of violence to protect their physical security had a marked increase while securitybased violence statements made by Palestinians remained approximately the same (see
figure 7.16).
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Figure 7.16: Security-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli PSC
Boolean analysis fails to support security as an individually supporting
component of PSC across the cases. However, the increase in the conflict pattern of
security-motivated violence in a critical PSC cannot be readily dismissed out of hand.
Thus, the potential role that violence for the sake of physical security plays in the
supporting the enduring nature of PSC needs further exploration. Until other PSC cases
are analyzed, security is considered a jointly necessary component of competition-based
conflict in PSC.
Non-tangible Assets: Political Power
Violent incidents that were attributed to the desire to gain political power failed to
be supported as an individually supporting component of competition-based conflict
using Boolean analysis. Its occurrence was present sufficiently to be coded positively in
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only one of the 32 time-windows91. Even so, it was the most frequently referenced
reason given for acts of violence in the Northern Ireland PSC. Because of this it merits
closer attention. Violence that was committed for the sake of gaining political power
represented 16.9% of all the conflict statements. It made up only 5.9% of the conflict
statements in the Arab/Israeli conflict but it accounted for 51.1% of all of the conflict
statements in the Northern Ireland conflict. Over half of the statements in the Northern
Ireland conflict that clearly communicated why an act of violence was committed
claimed that it was to gain political power. While quotes revealing political power as a
motive for violence spiked during The Troubles, it was also referenced in 1922, 1932,
1982, and 1992. 1992 was the last year that any competition-based violence statements
were noted in the articles analyzed. Also, only political power and revenge-related
violence statements were found in the quotes by the actors in 1992.
While Boolean analysis does not support the inclusion of violence to gain political
power as an independently supporting component of conflict competition, because of the
strength of its presence in the Northern Ireland conflict, it cannot summarily dismissed.
Until further PSC cases can be assessed, the role that politically motivated violence plays
in PSC cannot be rightly determined. Thus, it will be considered as a jointly necessary
component until further information can be gathered and assessed.
Social Power
Conflict to gain social power failed to be coded positively in any of the years
analyzed. There were only ten references to social power as a motive for violence of and
accounts for only 0.78% of all conflict statements across both cases. Thus, it cannot be

91

Even when adjusting the minimum criteria to three incidents per year and three positive years across each
case (so that it indicates a pattern rather than a trend), the overall outcome remains the same.
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supported as an individually supporting component of competition-based conflict in PSC
and will not be included as a jointly necessary component at this time.
Revenge
At the beginning of the data collection phases of both PSC cases, revenge was not
mentioned as a motive for violence. It was not until at least two decades into the data
collection that the actors began to cite revenge as a motive for violent behavior (see
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figures 7.17 and 7.18).
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7.17: Revenge-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case
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7.18: Revenge-Based Conflict Statements - Northern Ireland Case
While both graphs show positive trend lines, it is interesting to note that revengemotivated violence is virtually flat and was not mentioned in the Northern Ireland PSC
until 50 years after data collection started. It is the spike in The Troubles that gives
revenge any presence at all as a motive for violence in the Northern Ireland case. Why is
this?
Before The Troubles began, the conflict had low-intensity violence and low death
rates in comparison to the Arab/Israeli PSC. The revenge-based conflict statements
started with The Troubles -the same time that scholars assert that actors set aside regard
innocent life. Could The Troubles represent a fundamental shift in how the conflict was
viewed by the actors? If so, this could be another component that supports Azar’s (and
his collaborators) assertions that PSCs change and take on components over time. In
addition to this, could this be a real-life example of Rapoport’s (1960) “Fights, Games,
and Debates”? Before The Troubles, the “game” of war was played between the Unionist
and Loyalists and the “game” had rules that they followed. One of these rules was that
only those who were active participants (and their property) were fair targets in the
conflict. Women, children, and those who were not directly associated with the out-group
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were “off limits” to the violence. Once this barrier was removed and loved ones became
casualties of the conflict, the “game” became a “fight” and revenge became a motive for
violence.
While idea that the Northern Ireland conflict devolved from a game to a fight is
plausible, it cannot be proven in this project. What the proposition does speak to, though,
is the deeper meaning of stating that revenge is a motive for violence and how it can be a
sustaining component of PSC. Though it is categorized as part of competition-based
conflict because actors specifically stated that they perpetrated an act of violence in
retaliation for a previous act, the deeper truth is that revenge is a behavior that stems the
psychological motivation of emotion. Across time in both cases, acts of violence were
increasingly committed to punish or get-back at the out-group for perceived wrongs. As
such, revenge-motivated violence may speak to the role that psychological motivation
plays in supporting the enduring nature of PSC.
Revenge, as a motive for violence, failed to achieve the minimum number of
years required for Boolean support. Overall, statements that revealed revenge-motivated
violence represented 13.9% of all conflict statements. However, of the years that had
revenge-motivated violence statements, the proportion was much higher (see table 7.2).
What is also of interest is that revenge-motivated violence statements decreased in the
waning days of Troubles leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. The rise and fall of
revenge-based violence statements coincides with the rise of the most violent period of
the Northern Ireland conflict and the agreement to end it. As such, more exploration into
the role that revenge could play in the sustaining of PSC is merited.
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Figure 7.19: Revenge Statements – Across PSC Cases
Because the frequency of revenge statements increases as the cases progress
through time and they are a significant proportion of conflict statements in the latter
windows of the cases, its potential role in sustaining PSC warrants further examination.
As such, it should not be summarily dismissed as a theoretical component of PSC.
Examination of other PSC cases may shed further light into the role that revenge plays in
PSC. Until such time, it is included as one of the jointly necessary components of PSC.
SUMMARY OF COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT
Across the PSC cases analyzed, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of the
category of competition based conflict as a sustaining component of PSC. When
analyzing the individual components, however, no single component has the required
frequency to justify their inclusion as an individually contributing component. Looking
within each case, however, territory and security-based conflict statements are supported
as necessary components in the Arab/Israeli case but not the Northern Ireland case (see
tables 5.2 and 6.2). Together, they account for 63.2% of all the conflict statements
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between the two cases analyzed. As such, they are considered as jointly necessary
components of the PSC category of competition-based conflict.
In the Northern Ireland conflict, violence that is attributed to the quest for political
power is the most oft cited reason for committing an act of violence. While failing to
meet theoretical minimums for necessity, it accounts for 51.1% of all Northern Ireland’s
conflict statements and 13.3% of all of the conflict statements across the cases. As the
Northern Ireland conflict is a critical PSC case, the potential role that conflict for political
power could play in the enduring nature of PSC cannot be ignored. Further examination
of other PSC cases are needed to fully determine what role, if any, conflict for political
power plays as a sustaining component PSC. Until such time, it is considered a jointly
necessary component of PSC because if its role in the Northern Ireland conflict.
Finally, the component of revenge failed to have the required frequency to be
supported as an individually sustaining component of competition-based conflict.
However, it narrowly missed individual support in the Arab/Israeli case and increased
over time in both cases, particularly in the latter years of the cases. Because its presence
increased in actor quotes in both cases as conflicts progressed over time, and it narrowly
missed individual Boolean support, it is included as a jointly necessary component of
PSC.
There is another aspect frequency patterns of the components in this theoretical
category that merits mention. Over time, the frequency in which territory, security, and
revenge are referenced as motives for violence changes. While territorially-based conflict
statements show an overall decrease in the in the Arab/Israeli case, security and revenge
statements increase over time. Similarly, in the Northern Ireland conflict, revenge, as a
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motive for violent behavior, increases. While identifying how conflict patterns in PSC
change is not a primary goal of this project, this finding does speak to the changing
nature of PSC that Azar and his compatriots alluded to when they said, “[i]t is not the
abstract “issue” that guides the conflicts in their development . . . The immediate criterion
of identification may be several stages removed from the original issue” (Azar et. al.,
1978, 51). Though slightly beyond the scope of this project, finding empirical support for
theoretical assertions is useful in that it could add to the body of knowledge on PSC. As
such, it is worthy of note.
In conclusion, Boolean analysis supports the theoretical necessity of the category
of competition-based conflict in PSC. Conflict that was attributed to gaining resources or
social power was not supported within or across cases and did not show evidence of
increasing in frequency. Hence, at this time, they are rejected as sustaining components
competition-based conflict in PSC. Territory, security, political power, and revenge were
either supported individually within cases or showed increases in frequency sufficiently
to warrant support their inclusion as jointly necessary components of competition-based
conflict in PSC.
PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION
Analysis of the data in the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases reveal a
plethora of quotes that reveal psychological motivation in PSC. In both cases, over 80%
of the quotes contained statements that revealed psychological impetus. When using
Boolean analysis, the justification for the inclusion of psychological motivation,
categorically, as a necessary component of PSC is supported (See tables 7.1 and 7.3).
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When analyzing each of the components individually, however, the results are not as
clear-cut.
Emotion
The proposition that the presence of emotion is a necessary component of the
psychological motivation of PSC can be supported using Boolean analysis. In both cases,
analysis indicates a positive outcome for the presence of emotion and has a mean of 15.4
incidents per month, per year. This is more than double the incidents needed to satisfy the
minimum theoretical threshold. Both cases reveal that emotionally-charged statements
account for 27.4% of all quotes that contained psychological sentiments. Interestingly, in
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, emotional motives coded positive for 84.6% of the years
surveyed, as opposed to the Northern Ireland conflict that had a rate of 47.4% (see table
7.3) Also, emotional motivations were more consistently represented over time in the
Arab/Israeli case than that of Northern Ireland’s (see figure 7.20).
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Figure 7.20: Emotive Statements - Across PSC Cases
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While the trend lines clearly show that emotive statements increased over time in both
cases, the frequency in which the emotive statements increased in the Arab/Israeli case is
much greater. A difference was also noted during data collection, as well. There was also
a difference in the intensity of the statements. The actors in the Northern Ireland conflict
made statements that reflected their anger over perceived wrongs, but legitimacy of the
out-group to exist was largely not addressed. The actors in the Arab/Israeli case
communicated a sense of anger, frustration, and even hatred at times92 with an intensity
that was not present in the Northern Ireland case. There were statements made in the
Arab/Israeli conflict where the legitimacy of the out-group to exist was rejected.
Give them to us! Death to Arabs! Let’s murder them! – Israeli mob
demanding the release of 6 Palestinian being held for questioning in
relation to a bombing that killed one and injured 50clxxxvi.
Death to Arabs! - Israeli mob in reaction the stabbing of six youth while
at schoolclxxxvii.
Death to Israel. Death to America! – Palestinians marching in opposition
to Israeli/Palestinian peace talksclxxxviii.
Statements of this intensity were not noted in the years analyzed in the Northern Ireland
conflict. While this is a subjective observation, the difference in the strength of emotion
between the two cases is also alluded to in figure 7.19. The Arab/Israeli conflict is a
critical PSC case because it is considered to be the most “unsolvable” PSC in the current
international environment. The Northern Ireland conflict is a critical PSC case because it
appears to be ending. Given that both are critical PSC cases, the difference in their
emotive trend lines could be informative as to a component that sustaining PSC. As
emotive statements increase dramatically overtime in the Arab/Israeli case, could

92

They communicated the intensity of their emotion through the use of stronger language in their word
choices and the adjectives they used.
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emotion be a key supporting component in the enduring nature of PSC? While this is an
interesting and potentially valuable question, two cases, even critical cases, are too few to
make a determination. Given the findings of this project, however; the question at so
emotion’s role as a sustaining component of PSC merits further exploration.
While this is an interesting observation, there are some differences between the
cases that could account for the differences in the intensity of language. First of all, is that
in the Arab/Israeli case there is a language barrier that does not exist in the Northern
Ireland case. The reason that this may be important is that language can be a barrier to
communication. When there is contention between two groups, if there is no language
barrier, as in the Northern Ireland case, everything that is said is understood by the ingroup and the out-group. This may have a moderating effect on language and word
choice in that language that is meant for private communication can be more easily used
in the public arena and could be used against the actor(s) (Dubinsky 2013). When there is
a language barrier between the two groups the probability of this occurring is lower.
Thus, there is less self-censorship and when actors are “amongst one’s own.” Language is
“more hyperbolic than what would be said to the outside world” (Dubinsky 2013).
Another potential reason why the Arab/Israeli PSC has more “colorful” language
is that there are cultural differences in rhetoric between the two cases. According to Stan
Dubinsky, Professor of Linguistics at the University of South Carolina, it is well-known
that the Arabic language is more “colorful” than the English language. Because of this,
“you start out with the volume being higher in the first place.”
Language barriers and cultural communication differences could account for
some of the differences in intensity in language choices between the two cases. The
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cultural rhetoric of the Arab/Israeli case could indeed play a role in the intensity of word
choices between the actors. As such, it should not be ignored. However, on a fundamental
level, the actors in both cases are human. They “feel” in a similar matter. I am doubtful
that language barriers and differences in cultural rhetoric can fully account for the open
and overt hatred that the Arab/Israeli actors repeatedly expressed towards each other.
Perception
Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of perception as an individually
supporting component of the supportive category of Psychological Motivation in PSC.
Twenty-two of the 32 years analyzed are coded positively for the presence of perception.
Also, there is an average of 20.97 perceptual statements per year. As the minimum
threshold is six incidents per year, the fact that the frequency of perceptual statements is
actually more than three times the minimum theoretical requirement could speak to the
strength of this particular component as a supporting component of PSC. Actor
statements that reveal perceptual sentiments center on the motivational, characteristics,
and/or behavioral attributes of the out-group. Of the total quotes that contain
psychological motivation, quotes that reveal perceptual motivations on the part of the
actors are present in 30.12% of all quotes from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and in
42.93% of all the quotes in the Northern Ireland case. Boolean analysis shows that the
Israeli/Palestinian case has more quotes that contained perceptual attributes across time
with 76.92% and that the Northern Ireland case has 52.36% (See tables 7.1 and 7.2). The
majority of the perceptual statement made in the Northern Ireland case occur in The
Troubles, the time where the most violence and deaths occurred in the Northern Ireland
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conflict (see figure 7.21). In fact, though perceptual statements are present at the
beginning of case, both show signs of significant increases as the cases progress.
Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of perception as a psychological
motivation in PSC and both trend lines show an increase in the frequency of perceptual
statements. Thus, at this time perception is included as a necessary component of the
sustaining category of psychological motivation in the theoretical conceptualization of
PSC.
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Figure 7.21: Perceptual Statements - Across PSC Cases
Self-identity
Self-identification is one of the original four necessary components of PSC listed by
Azar. However, of the psychological motivations evaluated, self-identity has the lowest
incidence with an average of only 2.36% of the psychologically motivated statements.
Furthermore, Boolean analysis fails to support the inclusion of self-identity as a
necessary component of PSC in either case. In fact, quotes that reveal self-identity
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motivations in the two PSC cases are sufficient to elicit a positive outcome in only three
of the 39 years measured –on quarter of the required minimum. Because of this, the
proposition that self-identity individually contributes to PSC in a significant manner
cannot be supported.
Group-identity
According to PSC theory, self and group-identity are the primary psychological
motivations that contribute to the enduring nature of PSCs. The data supports the
inclusion of group identity as a necessary component of the category of psychological
motivations in PSC using Boolean analysis. In total, 21 of the 39 windows analyzed were
coded positive for the presence of group-identity sentiments. This is almost double the 12
required for the theoretical minimum. In both individual cases, the inclusion of group
identity as a necessary component is supported by Boolean analysis and is specifically
mentioned in 35.4% of the quotes that communicated any type psychological motivation
(see tables 7.1 and 7.3). The Israeli/Palestinian case shows a slightly stronger affinity to
group-identity with 37.6% of the quotes containing language that communicated ingroup/out-group identification as opposed to Northern Ireland’s 32.3%. Also, groupidentity is the most cited psychological component in the Israeli/Palestinian case and is
consistent across time with 76.92% of the years examined coded positive for its presence.
Similarly, the Northern Ireland case coded positively for group identification in 47.37%
of the years. Likewise, the mean frequency of quotes containing group-identity
sentiments was 30.37 per year. This is five times the theoretical minimum.
The patterns of group-identification statements differ between the two
cases, however. While both cases have trend lines that show increases over time,
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the increase is much more pronounced in the Arab/Israeli case (see figures 7.22).
Also, the presence of group-identification quotes is more consistent across the
Arab/Israeli than it is in the Northern Ireland conflict. Perceptual statements tend
to be more clustered in The Troubles in the Northern Ireland conflict.
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Figure 7.22: Group-Identification Statements - Across PSC Case
Summary of Psychological Motivation
Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of emotion, perception, and groupidentification as individually supporting components the sustaining category of
Psychological Motivation in PSC. The inclusion of self-identification as an individually
contributing component to the category of Psychological Motivation cannot be supported,
however. The frequency in which it was referenced failed to meet theoretical minimums
in cases individually and across cases. Beyond determining whether the category of
psychological motivation should be considered as a necessary, supporting component of
PSC, other potentially valuable information about the nature of PSC in general and the
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role that psychological motivations may play in enduring nature of PSC may have been
identified as well.
Though the determination that emotion, perception, and group-identity can be
supported as jointly sustaining components of PSC, when a closer look is taken at how
each of these components “behave” over time, it becomes clear that the presence of each
one of these components increases as the conflict progresses. Each component, in both
cases increases over time without exception (see figures 7.20, 7.21, and 7.22). Because
an increase in frequency is found in all three components across both PSC cases, this
finding could be supportive of Azar et. al’s (2000) assertion that PSCs change over time
by altering or taking on additional nuances and/or issues of contention. The role of
psychological motivation in PSC has been minimized beyond identity in PSC
scholarship. Thus, the discovery that specific psychological components increase in
presence over time may provide insight as to what components are actually supporting
the intracted nature of PSC93.
While emotion, perception, and group-identification trend positively in both
cases, there is a distinct difference between the cases in how much they increase. In the
Northern Ireland case, each component increases at a moderate rate over time. In the
Arab/Israeli case, however, increases in the presence of psychologically-motivated
sentiments are at a greater rate for each of the three components. The most dramatic of
which is the increase in emotive statements (see figure 7.20). There difference in the
rates of increase in sizeable. Emotive statements are followed by group-identification

93

This observation is in no way intended to infer causation of PSC. Rather, as time passes and the presence
of psychologically-motivated statements increases, the “arrival” of negative psychological stimuli (a
component that was not salient at the beginning of the conflict) could become a sustaining component of a
PSC. Hence, support for the changing nature of PSC.
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statements that have a moderate increase over that of Northern Ireland’s quotes that
contain group-identification-revealing sentiments (see figure 7.22). The component in the
Arab/Israeli conflict that differs least from that of Northern Ireland is that of perceptual
statements (see figure 7.21). Given the differences in the statuses of these two critical
cases, could the categorical component of psychological motivation, which has received
limited theoretical consideration up to this point, be a key component in the enduring
nature of PSC?
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
While Boolean methods can aid in determining theoretical necessity and
sufficiency, what it cannot inform is the relatedness of the components that are being
studied. Because of this, confirmatory factor analysis is used to determine the relatedness
of the components assessed in the two critical PSC cases. The six primary categorical
components are initially assessed to determine how many factors best reflects the data in
the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases. After running a maximum likelihood model
and a three-factor model, the maximum likelihood analysis showed that a two-factor
model best reflects the data. The three-factor model encounters Heywood errors. This
indicates that there are problems with negative (co)variance estimates and that three or
more-factor models are not a fit for the data (Lolenikov and Bollen 2012). Thus, a twofactor model is used (See figure 7.23).
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Figure 7.23: PSC Factor Viability Scores - Across PSC Cases

Using the two-factor model, the first factor accounts for 77.4% of the total
variance found in the model (see table 7.4).
Factor

Eingenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Factor 1

2.69

1.91

0.7737

Factor 2

0.79

0.64

0

.2263

Table 7.4: Two Factor PSC Viability Model (unrotated) Across PSC
Cases

286

Combined Cases

Component

Arab Israeli Case

Northern Ireland Case

Factor
1

Factor
2

Uniqu
-eness

Factor
1

Factor
2

Uniqueness

Factor
1

Factor
2

Uniqueness

Violent
Incidents

0.84

0.00

0.29

0.82

.34

0.22

0.83

0.045

0.26

Conflict
Duration

0.08

-0.34

0.87

0.18

-0.51

0.71

0.09

-0.37

0.85

Deaths

0.37

0.59

0.51

0.52

0.67

0.28

0.31

0.52

0.61

Non-State
Actors

0.77

-0.44

0.29

0.50

-0.41

0.58

0.76

-0.34

0.31

Conflict
Statement

0.73

-0.34

0.36

0.81

0.09

0.34

0.84

0.26

0.42

Psych.
Motiv.

0.85

-0.12

.27

0.90

-0.27

0.11

0.84

-0.34

.31

Table 7.5: Factor Loadings for PSC Viability Model –Across and Within Cases
Of the components measured, violent incidents, conflict statements, non-state
actor involvement, and psychological statements vary together on factor one (having
component scores ≥ +0.5) (see figure 7.5). Factor one accounts for 84.8% of the
variation in psychological motivation, 84% of the variation in violent incidents, 77.5% of
the variation in non-state actors, 72.6% of the variation in conflict statements, and 37% of
the variation in deaths (see figure 7.5).
In the Arab/Israeli case, deaths loads primarily on the first factor with all of the
components save conflict duration. In the Northern Ireland case, however, deaths loads
more strongly on factor two than it does on factor one. A reason for this change could be
because the comparatively lower intensity of the Northern Ireland conflict and the fact
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that they purposely avoided the shedding of “innocent” blood” for the vast majority of the
conflict.
Note that there appears to be an inverse relationship between deaths (0.67) and
conflict duration (-0.51) in the second factor of the Arab/Israeli case but is mitigated in
the combined cases’ second factor (see figure 7.5). This is a perplexing finding. An
explanation for this finding could be found in the timing of intense periods of violence in
both cases. In the Arab/Israeli conflict, the years that have the most PSC deaths are 1948,
1968, 1973, and 1983 (see figure 5.3). These roughly coincide with Israeli War of
Independence, Six-Day War, Yom Kippur War, and the Israeli/Lebanese “Conflict”.
Also, the year that has the most casualties is 1948. In this case, a greater numbers of
deaths occur in the initial years in which data is collected. Of the 60-year window
analyzed in the Arab/Israeli case, the vast majority of deaths occurred in the first 35 years
of the conflict. Thus, the casualties in this case are skewed towards that beginning of
data collection and could explain why there appears to be an inverse relationship between
the two components.
In the Northern Ireland case, however, the greatest numbers of casualties are
during The Troubles. 1972, 1978, 1982, 1988, and 1992 reflect the highest number of
casualties in the Northern Ireland case (see figure 6.2). As I started collecting data in this
case in 1922, The Troubles are decidedly in the latter years of the data collected. As the
Arab/Israeli case has more intense violence over the course of the conflict, the conflict
patterns and casualties from the Northern Ireland conflict could explain why Northern
Ireland mitigated but did not “correct” the inverse relationship in Arab/Israeli PSC. As
such, the differences in the timing and the intensity across each conflict, as demonstrated
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by the number of deaths, could explain why deaths and conflict duration appear to have
an inverse relationship in the Arab/Israeli case.
While factor one accounts for 37% of the variation in deaths, it also accounts for
over 77% of all variation in the model. Thus, the second factor is needed to account for
the remaining variance in deaths across the two critical PSC cases (see tables 7.4 and 7.5
Conflict duration, however, loads minimally on factors one and two. It has a score of 0.08
and it is the most unique component in this model (uniqueness score = 0.87) (see table
7.5). As violent incidents, non-state actors, conflict statements, and psychological
motivations load together strongly on factor one and that deaths loads on both factors one
and two suggests that the components of factor one (and two) are predictive of the
component that does not load on either factor- conflict duration. As factors one and two
account for approximately 99% of the variation in the model, the analysis suggests that
the components of: non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more
deaths, competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation are predictive of
conflict duration and are rightly associated with PSC.
CONCLUSION
The Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs have seen violence that spans
generations. However, the actors, the intensity and frequency of their violence and the
issues of conflict differ between the two cases. Yet, they are both hallmark PSC cases.
Thus, when striving to build a theoretical conceptualization of what PSC is and what its
necessary components are, the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases are a natural point
of departure. Using Boolean analysis and factor analysis methodologies, I now present a
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theoretical structure of the necessary components of PSC that is based on empirical
findings.
According to Boolean analysis, the proposition that twenty or more years of
violent conflict, the participation of non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles,
500 or more deaths, competition-based conflict and psychological motivation can be
supported. Each categorical component had or surpassed the theoretical minimum
requirements to support its inclusion as a necessary component of PSC. The first four
components, the descriptive components, have no radial categories that required further
examination. However, the two sustaining categorical components, competition-based
conflict and psychological motivation contain radial categories that are presented as
jointly necessary components of PSC.
Competition-based conflict is conceptualized as statements that are made by
actors in a conflict that clearly communicate why an act of violence has been committed.
It is divided into two radial components, conflict over tangible resources and conflict
over non-tangible resources. Tangible resources includes: territory, security, and natural
resources. Conflict over non-tangible resources includes: political power, social power,
and revenge. While factor analysis reveals that competition-based conflict is rightly
associated with PSC, of the components tested, only territory, security, political power,
and revenge were referenced sufficiently by the actors to warrant their inclusion as jointly
necessary components of the sustaining category of competition-based conflict across the
two PSC cases.
Psychological motivation in PSC is conceptualized as statements that are made by
the actors in each conflict that reveal emotion, perception, self-identification, and group-
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identification sentiments in relation to the conflict. Factor analysis shows that these four
components, when measure together categorically, are rightly associated with PSC.
However, when examined individually using Boolean analysis only emotion, perception,
and group-identification are found to be supported as contributing components of the
category of Psychological Motivation in PSC. Self-identification was not represented in
sufficient quantities to merit its inclusion.
Based on Boolean and factor methods of analysis the following model represents
the necessary components of PSC as determined by the two critical PSC cases, the
Arab/Israeli conflict and the Northern Ireland conflict (see figure 7.24):
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Figure 7.24: Model of Theoretically Necessary Components of PSC- Across Cases
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Appendix
Table 7.1: Boolean Analysis - Across PSC Cases
Year

Cas
e
#

≥ 20
Years

Nonstate
Actors

1948
1953
1958
1963
1968
1973
1978
1983
1988
1993
1998
2003
2008
1922
1927
1932
1937
1942
1947
1952
1957
1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007
2012
Outc
ome
*

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
-

0 Y
0 Y
0 Y
0 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
0 N
0 N
0 N
0 N
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 N
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
1 Y
28/32
=
Y

96
Y
0
N
3
Y
0
N
116 Y
38
Y
54
Y
46
Y
90
Y
146 Y
42
Y
210 Y
39
Y
16
Y
1
N
5
N
6
Y
18
Y
1
N
3
N
42
Y
2
N
7
Y
222 Y
32
Y
39
Y
8
Y
12
Y
67
Y
21
Y
2
N
0
N
23/32 =
Y

≥3
Violence
/ Peace
Cycles
108 Y
23 Y
12 Y
10 Y
78 Y
18 Y
23 Y
23 Y
56 Y
53 Y
23 Y
98 Y
20 Y
6
Y
1
N
6
Y
3
N
11 Y
0
N
1
N
33 Y
0
N
3
Y
230 Y
38 Y
30 Y
12 Y
29 Y
33 Y
12 Y
1
N
0
N
26/32 =
Y
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≥ 500
Deaths
7848 Y
187 Y
71
Y
25
Y
1014 Y
126 Y
1114 Y
1210 Y
516 Y
319 Y
209 Y
726 Y
539 Y
16
N
9
N
2
N
0
N
14
N
0
N
0
N
9
N
0
N
0
N
530 Y
104 Y
67
Y
82
Y
134 Y
20
N
34
Y
10
N
0
N
18/32 =
Y

Comp.based
Conflict
Stat.
36 Y
6
Y
4
N
12 Y
34 Y
10 Y
9
Y
9
Y
32 Y
28 Y
18 Y
37 Y
4
N
1
N
0
N
3
N
0
N
0
N
5
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
0
N
27 Y
1
N
3
N
2
N
3
N
0
N
0
N
1
N
0
N
14/19 =
Y

Psych.
Motivation
Stat.

Pres.
of
PSC

83
Y
13
Y
14
Y
17
Y
118
Y
73
Y
81
Y
64
Y
113
Y
152
Y
83
Y
290
Y
48
Y
31
Y
3
N
21
Y
16
Y
8
Y
15
Y
0
N
14
Y
3
N
0
N
345
Y
26
Y
39
Y
14
Y
90
Y
107
Y
63
Y
2
N
0
0
21/32 =
Y

N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
-

*Positive outcome criteria- For components to meet minimum criteria in individual
cases (except for three or more violence/peace cycles and deaths), a minimum of six
incidents were required for the year to coded positive. For the component to be coded
positively across the duration of the conflict, at least six years must be coded positively
for all components. Because multiple cases are being examined at this point, having
minimum criteria of six incidents is too lenient. As there are two cases being examined,
the theoretical minimum criteria will be doubled. Therefore, a minimum of 12 years
must be coded as present for ≥ 20 years, non-state actors, ≥ violence/peace cycles,
deaths, competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation to be coded as
positively across PSC cases.
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Table 7.2: Boolean Analysis: Competition-Based Conflict - Across PSC Cases
Case

Year

Territory

Resources

Security

Political
Power

Social
Power

Revenge

1

1948

19

Y

6

Y

7

Y

3

Y

1

N

0

N

Y

1

1953

3

Y

1

N

2

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

Y

1

1958

2

N

0

N

0

N

2

N

0

N

0

N

Y

1

1963

1

N

0

N

2

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

Y

1

1968

21

Y

1

N

8

Y

3

Y

1

N

0

N

Y

1

1973

7

Y

0

N

1

N

1

N

0

N

1

N

Y

1

1978

5

Y

0

N

3

Y

0

N

0

N

1

N

Y

1

1983

4

Y

0

N

4

Y

0

N

0

N

1

N

Y

1

1988

11

Y

1

N

9

Y

4

Y

3

Y

4

Y

Y

1

1993

12

Y

1

N

11

Y

0

N

0

N

4

Y

Y

1

1998

7

Y

0

N

4

Y

1

N

1

N

5

Y

Y

1

2003

3

Y

0

N

17

Y

0

N

4

Y

13

Y

Y

1

2008

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

4

Y

N

2

1922

0

N

0

N

1

N

1

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1927

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1932

0

N

0

N

0

N

2

N

2

N

0

N

N

2

1937

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1942

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1947

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1952

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1957

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

#
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Conf.
Stat.
Pres.

2

1962

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1967

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1972

1

N

0

N

7

Y

19

Y

2

N

6

Y

Y

2

1977

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1982

0

N

0

N

0

N

1

N

0

N

1

N

N

2

1987

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

1

N

0

N

N

2

1992

0

N

0

N

0

N

1

N

0

N

1

N

N

2

1997

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

2002

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

2007

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

2012

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

Bool.

-

Out.

11/32

2/32 =

=

N

N
% of
all
Conf.
State.

-

3/32

3/32

6/32

13/32

9/32 =

=

=

=

=

N

N

N

N

Y
-

104/257

10/257

76/257

17/257

12/275

38/257

=

=

=

=

=

=

40.5%

4.0%

29.5%

6.6%

4.4%

14.8%
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Table 7.3: Boolean Analysis: Psychological Motivation - Across PSC Cases
Case

Year

Emotion

Perception

SelfIdentity

GroupIdentity

#

Psy. Pres.

1

1948

27

Y

25

Y

3

N

28

Y

Y

1

1953

6

Y

6

Y

0

N

1

N

Y

1

1958

5

N

5

N

0

N

4

N

Y

1

1963

5

N

6

Y

1

N

5

N

Y

1

1968

38

Y

29

Y

6

N

45

Y

Y

1

1973

28

Y

18

Y

2

N

25

Y

Y

1

1978

23

Y

22

Y

0

N

36

Y

Y

1

1983

13

Y

22

Y

2

N

27

Y

Y

1

1988

27

Y

30

Y

3

N

53

Y

Y

1

1993

30

Y

51

Y

6

Y

65

Y

Y

1

1998

25

Y

25

Y

4

N

29

Y

Y

1

2003

74

Y

107

Y

6

Y

103

Y

Y

1

2008

15

Y

18

Y

0

N

15

Y

Y

2

1922

9

Y

11

Y

0

N

11

Y

Y

2

1927

1

N

1

N

0

N

1

N

N

2

1932

7

Y

8

Y

0

N

6

Y

Y

2

1937

5

N

6

Y

0

N

5

N

Y

2

1942

1

N

3

N

0

N

0

N

N
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2

1947

1

N

2

N

0

N

2

N

N

2

1952

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1957

4

N

5

N

0

N

5

N

Y

2

1962

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1967

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

2

1972

68

Y

137

Y

9

Y

131

Y

Y

2

1977

2

N

14

Y

0

N

9

Y

Y

2

1982

10

Y

19

Y

1

N

8

Y

Y

2

1987

5

N

5

Y

0

N

4

N

Y

2

1992

26

Y

36

Y

2

N

26

Y

Y

2

1997

24

Y

56

Y

1

N

27

Y

Y

2

2002

17

Y

31

Y

0

N

15

Y

Y

2

2007

1

N

0

N

0

N

1

N

N

2

2012

0

N

0

N

0

N

0

N

N

Outco
me

-

%
Psy.

18/32 = Y

22/32 = Y

3/32 = N

18/32 = Y

21/32 =
Y

497/1928

698/1928

46/1928

687/1928

= 25.8%

= 36.2%

= 2.3%

= 35.6%

297

-

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This study endeavors to contribute to the body of knowledge on PSC by
presenting and testing a clearer, more measureable and comprehensive conceptualization
of the theoretically necessary components of PSC. Protracted social conflict has distinct
actors and patterns of violence that separate it from other forms of enduring conflict.
Because of these unique features, conceptualizing PSCs or approaching PSC intervention
with the same methods and approaches that are used in other forms of conflict could have
limited benefit or be a waste of time. Thus, clearly determining what PSC is and how it is
sustained is no mere, trivial academic exercise. The real-life economic and human costs
are too great to form policy and conduct research based conceptualizations that fit other
forms of long-term conflicts or on assumptions that have not been vetted. In an everchanging and developing world, if there is ever to be a “solution” to PSC, it must first be
conceptualized correctly. Thus, this study has taken the currently accepted theoretical
components (effective participation, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity,
and security), expressed them in more concrete and measurable terms, and tested them it
to determine whether any or all of the proposed components are indeed necessary for a
PSC to occur.
To achieve this, I built an original data set. Using data from newsprint, I collected
information and quotes from each case as they were reported in the New York Times.
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Data was gathered from two critical PSC cases, the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland
conflicts. Only statements of fact and quotes from the actors directly involved in the
conflicts were used. The data was used to test assertions as to what the descriptive and
supporting aspects of PSC are. Descriptive aspects assessed were: who participates, how
they participate, when they participate, and how many deaths were a direct result of the
PSC. To discover sustaining components, quotes from the actors in each conflict were
analyzed to discern why the PSC is enduring in nature.
I used qualitative and quantitative methodologies in my analysis of the cases.
Boolean methods were used to determine which components were present across cases
sufficiently to be considered as necessary components of PSC, and which components
were not. While Boolean methods can help to determine necessity and support or refute
theory, it is limited in its utility to show the relatedness of the components that are being
assessed. Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine whether the
variations in the components over the duration of the conflicts were related and whether
they are associated with PSC.
In assessing the descriptive aspects of PSC, I proposed that there are four
independently necessary descriptive components. These are: participation in twenty or
more years of conflict, three or more violence/peace cycles, five hundred or more
directly-relatable deaths, and the participation of non-state actors. Boolean analysis
supports my proposition that each of these components is an independently necessary
component of PSC. As such, they explain the “effective participation” (Azar, 1985, 29)
of the actors in that they explain what being is seen when a PSC is being observed. What
these components fail to explain, however, is why PSCs are enduring in nature. To gain
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theoretical understanding as to what component(s) is/are sustaining PSC over time two
other components are assessed- competition-based conflict and psychological motivation.
The component of Competition-Based Conflict is conceptualized as conflict over
control of tangible assets (territory, [physical] security, and [natural] resources) and nontangible assets (political power, social power, and revenge). Analysis supports the
proposition that the categorical component of competition-based conflict is a necessary
component of PSC. However, tangible and non-tangible assets were found to be jointly
necessary components of competition-based conflict rather than individually supporting
components. Statements that reflected violence that was motivated over resources and
social power were not sufficient in quantity to be found to be playing a significant role in
supporting the continuation of PSCs. As such, only territory, security, political power,
and revenge were found in sufficient quantities to be considered as jointly contributing
components to conflict-based competition in PSC.
The categorical component of Psychological Motivation was conceptualized as
emotional, perceptual, self-identification, and/or group-identification–based sentiments in
PSC. As psychological impetus is not readily observed, it is conceptualized as a
supporting component. Analysis supports my proposition that Psychological Motivation
is a necessary component of PSC. However, self-identification is not supported as a
sustaining component of Psychological Motivation. The frequency of self-identification
statements across both cases accounted for only 2.3% of all psychologically motivated
statements. Emotion, perception, and group-identification were found to be present
across the cases in sufficient amounts for each to be included as necessary components of
the category of Psychological Motivation.
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The categorical inclusion of Psychological Motivation into the theoretical
structure of PSC marks a departure from existing PSC theory literature. While current
scholarship identifies self- and group-identity as necessary components, the potential role
that emotion and perception could play, as far as their necessity, is limited in PSC theory
literature. Thus, the finding that emotion, perception and group-identity could be
components that are sustaining PSC may be a significant finding. Also the finding that
self-identification plays only a minimal role in PSC could also be informative if
intervention is being built around currently accepted theoretical parameters.
Another significant and potentially useful finding is that when data collection
began, the presence of statements that revealed revenge as a motive for violence and
emotion, perception, and group-identification- based comments were minimal. As the
cases progressed through time, the presence of these components, in both cases,
increased in frequency. They increased to the point that all but revenge reached the level
of individual necessity and revenge fell just short. This speaks to Azar and his
collaborators’ (2000) assertions that PSC can change and/or take on additional
components or issues of contention over time. What is particularly salient, though, is that
this project has potentially revealed one of the ways in which a PSC changes and takes on
additional components, through psychological impetus. What this could mean in real-life
or in applied terms is that while attention is given to mitigating contentions over land,
physical security, or political power, attention must also be given to the emotive,
perceptual, identification impact that both groups have on each other. As such, my
findings could have real-world utility.
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Factor analysis of the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases found that violent
incidents, non-state actors, competition-based conflict, psychological motivation, and (to
a lesser extent) deaths all load on one factor. This one factor is responsible for 77% of all
of the variation across the two PSC cases. Because conflict duration is a hallmark
component of protracted social conflict, and it loads on its own factor, it can be asserted
that the aforementioned components are predictive of how long a conflict endures and by
extension the duration of a PSC. At least, in the critical cases evaluated. As such, they are
rightly associated with PSC.
The primary proposition of this dissertation is that 20 or more years of violent
conflict, the participation of non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or
more directly attributable deaths, competition-based conflict, and psychological
motivation are each necessary components of PSC. Findings using appropriate qualitative
and quantitative methodologies (Boolean analysis and factor analysis) support my
proposition in two critical PSC cases- the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland conflicts.
Each of the primary categorical components assessed (descriptive and sustaining) is
supported as a necessary component of PSC. However, analysis of radial components
within each of the sustaining components (competition-based conflict and psychological
motivation) finds that while the presence of some the radial components are supported as
jointly necessary components (emotion, perception, and group-identification), other
radial components (territory, security, political power, and revenge) cannot be determined
with confidence without examining other PSC cases. Finally, the necessity of resources,
social power, and self-identification are not supported at all. Therefore, analysis of the
two critical PSC cases reveals the following theoretical structure of PSC:
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Political Power
Tangible Assets
Territory
CompetitionBased Conflict
Political Power
≥ 20 Years
Violent Conflict

Non-Tangible
Assets
Revenge

≥3
Violence/Peace
Cycles
PSC
≥ 500 Deaths

Key:
Non-State Actors

Emotion

Psychological
Motivation

Perception

___ - Theoretical Necessity Supported
___ - Theoretical Necessity Undetermined
- Descriptive Component
- - - - Supporting Component
- Boolean “and”
- Boolean “or”

Group-Identity

Figure 8.1: Model of Theoretically Necessary Components PSC- Across Cases
WEAKNESSES AND CHALLENGES
No research structure is without its challenges. This section of the conclusion
discusses the weaknesses, limitations, problems, and challenges of my research project.
First and foremost, is that this dissertation includes only two case studies. While the
findings of this project are encouraging, making generalized statements about the nature
of PSC or its theoretical components using only two, albeit critical, cases is reckless. To
address this weakness, it is advisable to analyze other PSC cases. This includes a negative
case so to discern not only necessity, but sufficiency as well.
Also, prima facie, it can appear that selection bias has occurred. In this project,
though, the object of analysis is the conceptual structure that I present rather than the
cases themselves. The cases are not the objects of scrutiny, the theoretically based
reconceptualization that I have presented is. Therefore, the purposeful selection of critical

303

PSC cases was made so that the proposed structure would have to be held up to the
“standard bearers” of PSC. If the structure does not match the patterns of the two critical
PSCs, it is the reconceptualization that must be rejected, not the cases. Thus, the selection
of critical PSC cases is a necessary point of departure in methodologically and
scientifically determining the necessary components of PSC. As the conceptualization is
supported by the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs, the natural progression is to
apply the conceptual model to other known PSC cases and other enduring social
conflicts.
A fundamental challenge to any qualitative case study is that while it can support
or disprove theory, it cannot indicate causation. Though quantitative methods have been
incorporated into this study to account for this structural weakness, the appropriate
methodology, confirmatory factor analysis, can only discuss the relatedness of the other
components. Hence, the qualitative limitations of this study are mitigated but not fullyaverted. As this study has only begun to examine the necessary components in PSC, no
generalizable inference can be made at this point, except to say that the proposals put
forth by this study, have been generally supported by the two critical PSC cases.
Another weakness of this study is found in my data collection parameters. While
limiting certain aspects of the data collection so that only direct actors are quoted is a
strength in that it allows for the actors that are directly involved in PSCs to speak for
themselves, it also introduces limitations. This limitation was most evident in the
categorical component of competition-based conflict. There were more than 14,000
articles that met the project’s search parameters. However, with 882 violent incidents
recorded across both cases, there were only 285 articles that contained statements that
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clearly communicated any reason why the acts of violence were committed. Also, the
overwhelming majority of these conflict statements were from the Arab/Israeli case (see
figures 8.1 and 8.2). As noted, this could be for several reasons. The first possible
reason is that news media is reactive in nature. Writers of articles need to report on a
violent event within limited time-frames and they must relay the critical information in a
concise manner. Because of this, emphasis can be placed on who, what, where, and when
a violent event happened rather than why. Sufficiently answering questions as to why
violent behavior has occurred may be too time-intensive to explore fully when writing to
a deadline. The realities of newsprint may also have informed the reporting patterns that I
noticed. Also, at the beginning of each case, I noted that reporting styles tended to be
more narrative in nature and that when quotes were given, they were more apt to be given
by state-level or elite actors. As the non-state actor is a key component of PSC (Azar et.
al., 1978, 50; Kelman, 2000, 273), a primary driving force in the continuation of violence
may not have been given a public voice to communicate why they were committing acts
of violence. I also noted that article authors would often paraphrase non-state actors’
reasons why they committed acts of violence rather than let the actor speak for
themselves. Therefore, while my pre-established data collection parameters were
intended to add strength to my findings by allowing only the statements of the actual
actors in each conflict to be considered, this decision coupled with the reporting styles
and practices may have impacted the findings by limiting useable information.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
When I first began my doctoral studies, I worried that I would not find an area of
study in international relations that interested me and that needed further study and
development. Now, as look towards the completion of my dissertation and the beginning
of my professional career, I am no longer concerned whether I will have anything to
study. Rather, my thoughts now turn to whether or not I will have enough time to fully
explore all of my research questions and puzzles before the time allotted to me has
passed. The subjects of PSC and terrorism have ignited my intellectual curiosity. Why do
PSCs refuse to end? Why do individual-level actors choose to commit acts of (political)
violence? These questions form the foundation of my research interests and form the
basis of the follow-on study ideas that this dissertation has spawned.
As mentioned earlier, the first follow-on project to this dissertation is to expand
the number of cases that are analyzed to better determine what the necessary and
sufficient components of PSC are. By examining other established PSC cases (Azar,
1978, 46), I may be able to make more generalizable statements about its components. I
would like to increase the number of PSC cases that are studied to include cases such as
the Kashmir, Cyprus, and Sri Lankan conflicts. I would also like to include a negative
case, the post-World War II Belgian case, to determine sufficiency94.
There are also other incidents of enduring social conflict that I would examine
through the PSC theoretical lens. Of particular interest to me would be to examine cases
in Latin America and Africa where societal violence has occurred. If conflicts are found
to have all of the necessary components of PSC, and have not been previously

94

Post World War II Belgium experienced tension between the ethnic Walloon and Flemish populations.
Though many of the conditions that are present in PSCs were present in Belgium, no violence erupted.
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unidentified as such, the realization that these cases are, or were, PSCs could provide
valuable insight. If a conflict that is currently ongoing is identified as a PSC, the
approach and management of the conflict could be adjusted. If a PSC is identified that is
no longer active, analysis could provide insight into how it started, what sustained it, and
what changed to bring it to an end.
This dissertation focuses primarily on what PSCs are and how they are sustained.
How PSCs are managed or how they end has not been fully explored in this exercise.
Thus, another research project that I would like to engage upon is how the conceptual
structure that I have proposed can aid in PSC management and/or resolution. For
example, in the two critical cases that I have analyzed, the Arab/Israeli case consistently
shows higher frequency and intensity in its violence patterns. Also, it is currently
considered to be one of the least “solvable” PSCs. The Northern Ireland conflict appears
to be on its way to resolution and throughout time the frequency and intensity of violence
is comparatively much less than that of the Arab/Israeli conflict. Could the differences in
the patterns of the six components measured in my dissertation be informative as to why
one PSC is nearing resolution and the other appears to be dead-locked in conflict?
Dedicating a separate study to analyzing the differences between these two critical PSC
cases could provide valuable insight as to why PSCs end and why they continue on
despite best efforts.
This dissertation also revealed patterns that both the Arab/Israeli and Northern
Ireland cases shared. For example, in both cases, revenge statements and emotion,
perception, and group-identity sentiments increased over the life of the conflict. As the
cases progressed across time, psychological engagement also increased. As I mentioned
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previously, revenge, emotion, perception, and group-identity sentiments grew in both
cases as the conflicts endured over time. It is also true that there was a measurable
decrease in references to territory as a reason for violent behavior and a measurable
increase in violence to protect physical security in the Arab/Israeli case as time
progressed. These findings could provide empirical support for Azar and his
collaborators’ assertions about the changing nature of PSC. Similarly, Pruitt and Kim
(2004, 101-120) discuss psychological changes in conflict spirals as part of their
structural change model of conflict. I would like to study this and how it applies to PSC
more fully. I would like to examine my data to determine how psychological motive
changes or increases throughout the course of a PSC. Are there patterns, specific triggers,
or antecedents that can be predictive of meaningful changes in actor sentiments and
behaviors?
In the literature review and in chapter 5 (the Arab/Israeli case), I spent some time
examining the socialization aspects of PSC. Because PSC endures across generations and
children are socialized into PSC, I am curious as to which specific actors within a group
have the greatest impact on young peoples’ decisions to participate in violence. Is it
parents, the social cohort, siblings, or the (social) in-group? I would like to conduct a
survey-style qualitative research project and ask actors in PSCs who had an influence on
their decisions to participate in violence.
In 2000, Diehl and Goertz published “War and Peace in International Rivalry”. In
their book, they categorize enduring rivalries into three categories: Isolated conflicts,
proto rivalries, and enduring rivalries. Their categorical distinctions are based on the
number of years that enduring rivalries have been going on. Though PSCs are distinct
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forms of long-lasting conflict and should not be referred to as inter-changeable with
enduring rivalries, I find the idea of categorizing and/or stratifying PSC based on time,
intensity, or some other criteria a potentially useful prospect. Right now, PSCs are
conceptualized in a binary manner. Either they are a PSC or they are not. When it endures
over time, though, a PSC can ingrain itself into the social fabric of the actors. Thus, when
resolution-oriented intervention is introduced into the conflict, the actors could resist any
effort to ending the conflict because the conflict has become part of their individual and
social identity (conflict identity). As I discovered in my research, any potential role that
psychology plays in the continuation of PSC is not immediate. Rather, it develops over
time. Stratifying PSC in terms of levels of intensity or in increments of duration could
allow for earlier recognition and intervention in a violent social conflict before it become
fully incorporated into the social consciousness. This could be an exciting project!
When I made my decision concerning the selection of my data source, I purposely
chose the New York Time. My assumption was that the reporting of the New York Times
would be unbiased and provide a “fair” representation of the issues at play in each case.
Now, I would like to conduct a follow-on study using local news sources. By using
sources that are closer to the conflict and that represent the positions of the actors (in each
side of the dyads), a clearer picture of actual components that are descriptive of and are
sustaining PSC could be realized. There may also be utility in examining the findings of
the data gained form the New York Times comparatively against the findings from the
local news media.
There are also other nuances of PSC that caught my attention that I would be
interested in researching in the future. Another area of potential interest is how external
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actors and entities influenced PSC actors and PSC outcomes. In the Arab/Israeli case,
there were numerous references to foreign diplomatic support and pressure, financial
assistance, and military assistance. In the Northern Ireland case, references to these types
of support were much more limited. Why was this? The Northern Ireland case had
approximately 20 more years of analysis, yet there were fewer references to external
actor participation. Could external actors actually be a factor in why certain PSCs are so
intractable? It would be interesting to examine the Cold War proxy wars in Latin
America and Africa from this perspective.
In developing and analyzing the dataset for my dissertation, I now find that I have
more questions than answers regarding PSC. Clearly, there is more work that needs to be
done. However, a clear and accurate conceptualization of the theoretically necessary
components must be identified before any further, meaningful research and discovery is
made. Otherwise, I am building on an untested and untried foundation that could crumble
like a house of cards. Though I am excited about my future research agenda, these initial
findings must be supported by other PSC cases so that they are more generalizable.
Otherwise, I am guilty of the same offense that I am raise about current PSC scholarship;
I would be building my research off an unvetted conceptualization.
CONCLUSION
This dissertation project set out to fill gaps in the theoretical knowledge of PSC.
In 1978, noted scholar Dr. Edward Azar published a seminal work on PSC where he
presented his theoretical conceptualization of PSC. His theoretical model contained four
necessary components: effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and social
recognition of identity. Since that time, some PSC cases have received rigorous scholarly
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attention, and studies have been built from Azar’s theoretical conceptualization. The
exploration and vetting of any of PSC’s theoretical underpinnings have been minimal.
Because Azar’s necessary components made logical sense, they were accepted.
Thus, this dissertation has set forth to the test theoretical components of PSC.
Additionally, I proposed that and while Azar’s original theoretical concept of PSC filled a
necessary theoretical gap in its time, some of the components tend to be more abstract
and are difficult to measure while others are too narrow in scope. For example, what is
“effective participation”? What is “security”? Is it physical security, or is a sense of wellbeing? Similarly, do distinctive identity and social recognition of identity sufficiently
incorporate all of the possible psychological motivations that may be significant in PSC?
To address these challenges in Azar’s model, I presented and tested a theoretical
model of PSC that was based squarely in Azar’s foundational work while offering a more
concrete and measurable conceptualization of the necessary components of PSC. My
conceptual model contains six independently necessary categorical components, with
jointly necessary radial components, that when tested can clarify what components are
necessary for PSC to occur (See figure 8.1). Using two critical PSC cases, I have found
that the six proposed categorical components can be supported as necessary components
of PSC. While my initial findings are encouraging, basing a theoretical structure off form
only two cases is not sufficient to make generalizable assertions. As such, more cases
must be assessed before any meaningful and supportable theoretical assertions can be
made.
In an ever-changing world, understanding what PSC is, what is necessary for it to
occur, and what separates it from other forms of conflict is critical to any hope of
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resolution. By taking Azar’s theoretical structure and addressing its obscurities, making
components more concrete and measurable, filling in gaps were needed, and testing the
modified structure, a more comprehensive and supportable conceptualization of the
theoretically necessary components are realized. As such, our knowledge of PSC is
enhanced.
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APPENDIX
DATA COLLECTION PARAMETERS
The following is a list of parameters that were used to gather data for analysis:
1. Data Sources:
a. New York Times via ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851-2012)
2. Search Criteria:
a. Arab/Israeli PSC- Israel, or Israeli, and Palestinian, or Arab, and dead, or
killed or casualties
b. Northern Ireland PSC- Northern Ireland, or IRA, or Irish Republican
Army, and dead, or killed, or casualties
3. Assumptions:
a. All articles reported are accurate and unbiased
b. If the perpetrators of a violent act or identified, unless clearly indicated
otherwise, it is assumed that the deaths are members of the out-group
c. If a violent act is perpetrated within a geographical area known to be part
of a certain group, if unclaimed, it is assumed that members of the outgroup perpetrated the act of violence
4. Coding rules:
a. Quotes from one actor in different parts of the article are coded as the
same entry
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b. Quotes from different actors within the same article are coded as separate
entries
c. Political actors (members of political parties) that are not acting or
speaking on behalf of the state are coded as non-state actors
d. In the event different reportings of the same incident, self-reporting will be
used.
i. In the event that that deaths are reported without specific numbers
of casualties, the event is coded for deaths being present, but no
deaths are attributed to either actor
5. Data/information that is rejected:
a. Within-group disagreements and violence not relevant to the PSC
i. Internal disagreement over policy
b. Quotes with too few words to understand the intent of the speaker
independent from journalist commentary
c. Assignment of motive from the journalist’s point of view
d. Statements from journalist that give the journalist’s opinion of behavioral
intent or motivation
e. Editorial articles
f. Statements of actors that are not directly related to the PSC
i. Statements of foreign diplomats and political leaders
ii. Statements of lobby groups
g. Quotes and information that is used in previously recoded articles
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6. Data validity/verification:
a. Ten percent of all of the data will be rechecked and verified for accuracy
and coding. Approximately every ten articles, an article will be selected
and verified.
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DATA CODING DEFINITIONS


Perpetrator: Actor attributed to having initiated violence



Injuries: Incidence of people being injured as a result of violence, not including
deaths



Casualties: The number of deaths reported that are the result of PSC-related
violence



Quote in incident: There was a statement in the article that was germane to the
PSC



Conflict quote: There was a statement in the article that revealed a reason why an
act of violence was perpetrated



Competition-based conflict: There was a statement in the article that revealed
that violence was perpetrated to gain access or control of a finite resource or
commodity



Actor coding:
o Arab/Israeli Case

P = Actors associated with the Arab or Palestinian side of the dyad



I = Actors associated with the Israeli side of the dyad

o Northern Ireland Case

B = Actors associated with the British, Protestant, or Separatist
side of the dyad
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I = Actors associated with the IRA, Catholic, or Unionist side of
the dyad

o Masses- individuals, groups, or organizations not officially affiliated with
any governmental entity
o Elite- Individuals, groups, or organizations affiliated with or speaking on
behalf of a governmental entity


Territory: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was
committed to gain or gain control of territory



Resources: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was
committed to gain or gain control of a natural resource



Security: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was
committed to protect or gain physical security or survival



Political Power: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence
was committed to increase their political legitimacy, to gain control of
governmental policy, or to gain control of government



Social Power: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was
committed to increase influence or control over their social environment



Revenge: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was
committed in a reactionary manner to respond to the behavior and actions of the
out-group



Psychological quote: There was a statement in the article that revealed
psychological impetus towards the PSC
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Emotion: Statements that reveal an affective state of consciousness where
internal understandings and reactions to stimuli are expressed



Perception: Statements that reveal actors’ belief, understanding, comprehension,
or attributions of the out-group’s motives, attributes, or legitimacy



Self-identification: Statements that reveal personal sentiment, connection or
conceptualization of self with, or as opposed to, another person, group, or thing



Group-identification: Statements that reveal collective sentiment, connection,
belonging, or conceptualization of the group with, or as opposed to, another
person, group, or thing
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APPENDIX C –DATA CODING
The following is the coding format used in the Arab/Israeli PSC. The same format is used
for the Northern Ireland conflict, except that IRA and British actors are used in place of
Palestinian and Israeli actors:

Category
Date of
Event

Explanation of Category
Date recorded within article that the event took place

How it is
Coded
Actual date
of incident
Yes =1

P Perp.

Palestinians were the perpetrators of the event

No = 0
Yes =1

I Perp.

Israelis were the perpetrators of the event

No = 0
Yes =1

Injuries
D in
Incident

Were there injuries in the event

No = 0
Yes =1

Were there deaths in the event

No = 0

Number of Palestinian deaths

Actual
numbers of
deaths
reported

I Death

Number of Israeli deaths

Actual
numbers of
deaths
reported

Quo. in
incid.

Was there a quote in the article sufficient to glean the
intent of the speaker independently:

P Death
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Yes = 1
No =0

Was there a statement made that revealed that asset
competition is the reason why the actor engaged in
violent behavior

Yes = 1

Was there a statement by a Palestinian actor that
revealed the asset competition reason why the actor
P C Statem. engaged in violent conflict

Yes = 1

Confl. Stat.

I C Statem.

Was there a statement by an Israeli actor that revealed
the asset competition reason why the actor engaged in
violent conflict

No =0

No =0
Yes = 1
No =0
P=
Palestinian

P/I

Actor who made the conflict statement

I = Israeli
Yes = 1

E C Stat.

Was it an elite actor that made the statement

No =0
Yes = 1

M C Stat.

Was it a masses actor that made the statement

No =0
E= elite

Mass/Elite

Who made the conflict statement E= elite M= Masses

M= Masses
Yes = 1

Territ.

Did the statement reveal territorially-based conflict

No =0
Yes = 1

Resources

Did the statement reveal Resource-based conflict

No =0
Yes = 1

Security

Did the statement reveal security-based conflict

Pol Pow.

Did the statement reveal Political power competitionbased conflict

Soc Pow.

Did the statement reveal competition for social powerbased conflict

Revenge

Did the statement reveal revenge as a specific motive
for conflict
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No =0
Yes = 1
No =0
Yes = 1
No =0
Yes = 1

No =0

Psy. Stat.

Did the statement reveal the presence of a
psychological emotion or condition

Emot.

Did the statement reveal the presence of the
psychological emotion/condition of emotion

Percep.

Did the statement reveal the presence of the
psychological emotion/condition of perception

Self Id.

Did the statement reveal the presence of the
psychological emotion/condition of Self-identity

Group Id.

Did the statement reveal the presence of the
psychological emotion/condition of Group identity
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Yes = 1
No =0
Yes = 1
No =0
Yes = 1
No =0
Yes = 1
No =0
Yes = 1
No =0

DATA SAMPLE
Because there are over 2000 individual lines of coding, the following is a sample of the data collected from each PSC
case:
Arab/Israeli PSC95:
Window
s
1963
(32)

1963
Totals

Date of
event
4/23/1963
6/2/1963
6/24/1963
8/18/1963
8/18/1963
8/20/1963
8/19/1963
8/20/1963
8/20/1963

EC
Stat.
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1

MC
Stat.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Mass/
Elite
0
0
0
0
E
0
0
E
E

Territ.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Resources
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

11/16/1963
11/16/1963

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

-

3

0

-

1

95

Security
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0

Pol.
Pow.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Soc.
Pow.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Revenge
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

2

0

0

0

1963 in the Arab/Israeli case is selected because it has the least number of entries of all the years examined with several of the components
that are measured being present. However, it is still too long to fit all of the data on a single page. Thus, the gap between August 20 and
November 16 signifies that data has been omitted from the table. This page and the ensuing four pages are data from the same articles.
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Windows
1963

1963
Totals

Date of
event
4/23/1963
6/2/1963
6/24/1963
8/18/1963
8/18/1963
8/20/1963
8/19/1963
8/20/1963
8/20/1963

Psy
Stat.
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1

P
Stat.
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

I Stat.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

P/I
P
0
0
0
P
0
0
I
I

El. Psy.
Stat.
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1

Mass Psy.
Stat.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Mass/
Elite
E
0
0
0
E
0
0
E
E

11/16/1963
11/16/1963

1
1

0
1

1
0

I
I

1
1

0
0

E
E

-

8

5

3

-

8

0

-
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Wind.
1963

Date of
Event

Emot.

Percep.

Self
-id

Group
-id

4/23/1963
6/2/1963
6/24/1963
8/18/1963

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

8/18/1963
8/20/1963
8/19/1963

8/20/1963

8/20/1963
11/16/196
3

1963
Total
s

0
0
0

1

1
1

1
0
0

1

1
0

0
0
0

0

0
0

1
0
0

1

1
1

11/16/196
3

0

1

1

1

-

5

6

1

5

Statements
"Israel might choose this particular time for action against
all Arabs"

“Our armed forces are standing by to crush any new Israeli
aggression"

". . .a grave threat to peace. We feel there is a real danger to
peace if the Syrian actions do not stop”
". . . were butchered for the express purpose of fomenting
tension. . . We are not prepared to be the whipping boy for
the Arab world, and to have its tensions and turmoil seek
facile outlets across our borders"
"We are not afraid, except perhaps for Iraq, the other Arab
states won't back them up."
". . .because Nasser won't give up. Nor will he risk war again
until he's sure he can win. That means atomic weapons- and
he has a large desert in which to test. We can't test here"

-
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Windows

Date of
Event

1963

1963 Totals

Source

Nonstate

Name of
Non-state

Article Title

4/23/1963

NYT

-

0

Ousted Ministers Jailed in Jordan

6/2/1963

NYT

-

0

6/24/1963
8/18/1963
8/18/1963

NYT
NYT
NYT

-

0
0
0

Israel Reports Arab Attack
3 Arabs Slain by Israelis As Infiltrators
From Gaza
3 Border Intruders Killed By Israelis
3 Border Intruders Killed By Israelis
Middle East War and Peace

8/20/1963

NYT

-

0

8/19/1963
8/20/1963
8/20/1963

NYT
NYT
NYT

-

0
0
0

4th Border Intruder in 3 Days Is Slain by
Israelis in Negev
Israel Asks UN To Meet on Syria
Israel Asks UN To Meet on Syria

11/16/1963
11/16/1963
-

NYT
NYT
-

-

0
0
0

Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs
-
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Windows
1963

1963 Totals

Date of
event
4/23/1963
6/2/1963
6/24/1963
8/18/1963
8/18/1963
8/20/1963
8/19/1963
8/20/1963
8/20/1963

Article Date
April 24, 1963
June 3, 1963
June 25, 1963
August 19, 1963
August 19, 1963
August 20, 1963
August 20, 1963
August 21, 1963
August 21, 1963

Page #
1
3
4
6
6
31
2
1
1

Verified
Verified
Verified
Verified
Verified
Verified

11/16/1963
11/16/1963
-

November 16, 1963
November 16, 1963
-

21
21
-

-
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PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION LANGUAGE DICTIONARY
The following are samples of the Psychological motivation dictionary used to classify statement made by actors as emotional,
perceptual, self-identification, and group-identification –based motivations.

Emotion: an affective state of consciousness that communicates the feelings of an actor toward a stimulus or another actor
Word
Antipathy
Abhor
Abomination
Admire
Affection
Affection
Agony
Anguish

96

Gram.
N
V
N
V
N
N
Adj
N

Definition96
settled aversion or dislike
to regard with extreme repugnance
extreme disgust and hatred
To regard with wonder, pleasure, or approval
tender attachment
a moderate feeling or emotion
Intense pain of mind or body
Extreme pain, distress, or anxiety

Article97

Date

For All the Bombs, the
IRA Is No closer to Goals

13Dec-92

Definitions are retrieved from: http://www.merriam-webster.com/

97

Emotive words that are not taken from articles were retrieved from: http://www.psychpage.com/learning/library/assess/feelings.html or
http://www.psychpage.com/learning/library/assess/feelings.html
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Animosity

N

Animus

N

Antagonism

N

ill will or resentment tending toward active
hostility : an antagonistic attitude
a usually prejudiced and often spiteful or
malevolent ill will
actively expressed opposition or hostility
<antagonism between factions>
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Perception: is an awareness that is derived from sensory processes while a stimulus is present
Perceptual statements are unlike emotive sentiments in that they may not be determined by the use of a single word. Rather
they can be determined by the context of several words put together. They are statements that express one’s belief of the outgroups’ motives, belief of the out-group’s opinion of the in-group, communicates self-perception of the out-group, or
communicate an assessment of the PSC. The following are samples of perceptual statements that were identified in the
Arab/Israeli case:
Statement
“. . . a Holy War Against Israel”
“….forcing the enemy out of
resistance pocket…”

Actor
Israelis
Palestinians

Source

Article
War in Fog
Israeli Men Win
2 Villages as
Latrun Battle
Develops
Arab Legion is
Held Off

Date/pg. #
May 23, 1948/E1
May 29, 1948/1

NYT
NYT

"This is an eleventh hour attempt,. .
."

Palestinian

NYT

". . .the workers fired first and
"forced Arab forces to shell that
part to silence Jewish fire stations.”
"The enemy turns his eyes toward
Jerusalem, the eternal seat of our
eternal people. It will be a savage
and merciless battle without retreat.
Our fate will be victory or
annihilation. We shall fight to the
last man among us.”
“…here is no international law
which can justify the presence of
invading armies in a country that
does not belong to them…”

Palestinians

NYT

Jewish Workers
Fired On

June 9. 1953/9

Israelis

NYT

Bitter Fight
Predicted

July 7, 1948/7

Israelis

NYT

Former Irgun
Leader Sees
Palestine Unity

November 30,
1948/5
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May 31, 1948/1

With
Brotherhood
Among Jews and
Arab11/30
“…Destroy the political and
territorial integrity of state state…"

Israelis

NYT

"The Jordan armed forces have
been instructed to use force as from
today in repulsing any further acts
of aggression of the Jews along the
700-kilometer-long armistice line
between the two countries"
“…repulsing any further acts of
aggression of the Jews…”

Palestinians

NYT

Palestinians

"Israeli provocations and
Palestinians
propaganda: territorial ambition,
the psychological release of the
urge to bully others after having
suffered bullying for centuries,
endeavor to maintain the flow of
financial support from the United
States by keeping the appearance of
the Arab menace. . . criminal
immigrants from European ghettos"
"It is to be expected that the foreign Israelis
ministers will address their
attention to the only cause of the

Negeb Fight
Rages in Air and
on Land
Arab's Incursions
Worrying
Israelis,

December 27,
1948/1

NYT

Arab's Incursions
Worrying
Israelis,

February 2, 1953/
12

NYT

Glubb Accusation June 20, 1953/4
Incenses

February 2, 1953/
12

Israelis

NYT
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Israelis Take
Measures

October 18,
1953/1

intolerable state of affairs along the
Israel-Jordan border. . .
perpetrating brutal murders,
attacking life and attacking traffic
and completely undermining the
security of life and property in the
area and which is further
exemplified by the unwillingness or
inability of the Jordan authorities to
stem this tide of lawlessness in
fulfillment of their clear obligations
under the Armistice Agreement."
". . .centers of the murderous gangs. Israelis
. . All the responsibility rests on the
Jordan Government, which for
years has tolerated and thereby
encouraged acts of murder and
pillage against the inhabitants of
Israel. . .which have been trying for
five years to wreck the Jewish state
by . . . They denied them homes in
their countries and compelled the
Arab refugees to subsist on the. .
.and kept them deliberately in the
vicinity of Israel's frontiers for
these pernicious purposes

NYT
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Ben-Gurion
Charges Jordan
Proved Raid by
Villagers

October 20,
1953/1
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